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SECTION C.ll
NOSE WHEEL STEERING SUBSYSTEM
C. Ii-i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-204
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: NWS
MDAC ID: 204
ITEM: BOX, STEERING CONTROL - PILOT VALVE CONTROL
CIRCUIT (FAILS TO PROVIDE A GROUND)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN. B. THE NWS CONTROL BOX MANIPULATES 3 MAJOR
NWS SIGNALS: i) THE PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL (NWS ACTUATOR
HYDRAULIC ACTIVATION), 2) NWS COMMAND SIGNAL, AND 3) THE NWS
FAILURE DETECTION SIGNAL. NASA FMEAs ADDRESS THE NWS CONTROL
BOX COMMAND SIGNAL FAILURES AND THE FAILURE DETECTION CIRCUIT
FAILURES BUT NOT THE PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION SIGNAL FAILURES. IOA
ANALYSIS INCLUDED TWO FAILURE MODES ON THE PILOT VALVE ACTIVATION
SIGNALS. NEITHER OF THESE FAILURES WOULD RAISE THE
EXISTING CRITICALITY OF THE SCB [2/IR]. C. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDED.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. SSM COVERED THIS FAILURE IN THE PRCB PRESENTATION OF 4/15/88
CIL ITEM 02-ID-095-I. CRITICALITY 2/IR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENTID: NWS-308
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
NWS
308
PISTON, ACTUATORARM (JAMMED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN. B. A JAMMED ACTUATOR ARM CAN OCCUR AS THE
RESULT OF DEBRIS EXTERNAL TO THE ORBITER BECOMING LODGED BETWEEN
THE PISTON AND THE NOSE WHEEL STEERING COLUMN.
C. A JAMMED ACTUATOR ARM WILL RESULT IN THE ORBITER POSSIBLY
LEAVING THE RUNWAY AND THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS A FMEA BE WRITTEN FOR THIS ITEM REGARDLESS OF
THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURENCE DUE TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE
FAILURE MODE.
CIL RESOLUTION:
ACTION CLOSED BY PRCB PRESENTATION ON 4/15/88 CIL ITEM 02-ID-084-
2. CRITICALITY OF I/i.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-310
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
310
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFF VALVE) (FAILS TO FILTER)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN. B. FAILURE TO FILTER WILL RESULT IN THE
CONTAMINATION OF THE NWS ACTUATOR VALVE AND THE LOSS OF NWS. C.
A FAILURE REPORT (FPR A4640-01) HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN FOR THIS
FAILURE MODE. D. IOA RECOMMENDS NASA WRITE A FMEA FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. SSM AND R. I. PRESENTED THIS AS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE. B.
HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM AGREES THAT THIS IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
C. IOA CONCURS, WITHDRAW THIS ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-311
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
311
FILTER, INLET (SHUTOFF VALVE) (BLOCKED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN. B. CONTAMINATION OF THE FILTER WILL
RESTRICT THE HYDRAULIC FLOW TO THE ACTUATOR RESULTING IN THE LOSS
OF NWS.
C. A FAILURE REPORT (FPR A4640-01) FOR THE FILTER DISCUSSES THE
FAILURE OF THE ACTUATOR TO MEET THE STEERING RATE REQUIREMENT AS
A RESULT OF CONTAMINATION TO THE FILTER.
D. IOA RECOMMENDS NASA WRITE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. ISSUE CLOSED BY PRCB PRESENTATION OF 4/15/88 CIL ITEM 02-ID-
103-1. CRITICALITY 2/IR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-312
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(RUPTURE/LEAKAGE )
NWS
312
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM - CONNECTORS, HOSE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. NO FMEA WRITTEN. B. THERE IS A NON-FLEXIBLE HYDRAULIC LINE
LEADING FROM THE RETRACTION SIDE OF THE ACTUATOR PISTON TO THE
ACTUATOR MAIN HOUSING. LEAKAGE FROM THIS LINE OR ITS CONNECTORS
COULD CAUSE THE TOTAL LOSS OF NWS AND THE SHIMMY DAMPING
CAPABILITY OF THE ACTUATOR. THE SUBSEQUENT SHIMMY OF THE NOSE
WHEEL WOULD RESULT IN THE POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE NOSE GEAR AND
LOSS OF THE VEHICLE. NO TEST DATA ON THE EFFECTS OF SHIMMY WITH
NO HYDRAULIC DAMPING IS AVAILABLE. THE FACT THAT THE
COROTATING NOSE WHEELS HAVE SOME STABILIZING EFFECT IS NOT ENOUGH
TO DISMISS THE SHIMMY ISSUE. C. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE NASA
WRITE A FMEA FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.
CILRESOLUTION:
A. CCB CHAIRMAN DIRECTED NASA AND R. I. TO WORK THIS ISSUE WITH
MDAC ON 12/21/87. NO CONTACT BY EITHER ORGANIZATION. B. THIS
ISSUE IS RESOLVED BY PRCB PRESENTATION ON 4/15/88 CIL ITEM 02-ID-
090-1. CRITICALITY OF I/i.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
NWS-323 BASELINE [ ]
02-1-091-1 NEW [ X ]
NWS
323
VALVE, ANTI-CAVITATION CHECK (FAILS CLOSED)
A.S. MEDIAVILLA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. CIL EFFECTS: "(B) LOSS OF NWS (LOSS OF TORQUE) .... ". B.
FAILING THE CHECK VALVES CLOSED DOES NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
NWS TORQUE.
C. IOA RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR. FAILURE OF BOTH ANTI-
CAVITATION CHECK VALVES IS NOT LIFE/VEHICLE THREATENING. BUT THE
FAILURE OF BOTH VALVES AND THEN A NWS FAILURE THAT FORCES THE
FREE CASTOR MODE COULD RESULT IN CAVITATION. THE IOA ANALYSIS
ORIGINALLY DID NOT CONSIDER CAVITATION LIFE/VEHICLE THREATENING
BUT A CONSERVATIVE APPROACH WOULD BE TO ASSIGN THE FAILURE MODE A
3/IR.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. ISSUE CLOSED PER PRCB PRESENTATION OF 4/15/88 CIL ITEM 02-1-
091-1. NASA ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY OF 2/IR.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-326
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-101-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ISOLATION)
NWS
326
VALVE, E-H PROTECTION CHECK (RETURN LINE
(FAILS OPEN)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
A. IF THE VALVE FAILS OPEN JUST PRIOR TO LANDING GEAR (LG)
RETRACTION, HIGH PRESSURE BUILDUP DURING RETRACTION COULD DAMAGE
THE SERVO VALVE FIRST STAGE. MUCH LATER, DURING THE ACTUAL
FLIGHT WHEN NWS IS ACTIVATED, THE DAMAGED E-H SERVO VALVE COULD
RESULT IN A DOWNMODE TO FREE CASTOR. THE OPEN CHECK VALVE ALSO
RESULTS IN THE DEGRADATION OF SHIMMY DAMPING PROTECTION.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS AN UPGRADE IN CRITICALITY TO 2/IR.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. ISSUE CLOSED BY PRCB PRESENTATION OF 4/15/88 CIL ITEM 02-ID-
101-2. CRITICALITY OF 2/1R.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/03/86
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-329
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-106-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NWS
329
VALVE, OVERLOAD CHECK (2 OF) (FAILS CLOSED)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A. THE IOA EFFECTS ASSUME THE WORST CASE: A FAILED-CLOSED VALVE
AND THEN THE NOSE WHEEL HITTING A RUT OR FOREIGN OBJECT CAUSING
AN UNRELIEVED HIGH PRESSURE SPIKE THAT DAMAGES THE FIRST STAGE OF
THE EH VALVE RESULTING IN THE LOSS OF NWS.
B. IOA RECOMMENDS AN UPGRADE IN CRITICALITY TO 2/IR.
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. CCB CHAIRMAN DIRECTED NASA AND R. I. TO WORK THIS ISSUE WITH
MDAC ON 12/21/87. NO CONTACT BY EITHER ORGANIZATION.
B. CLOSED VALVE HAS A CRIT OF 3/3. THE SECOND IMPACT, HITTING A
RUT OR FOREIGN OBJECT ON THE RUNWAY IS REMOTE. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: NWS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-I-FC7248-0001
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(JAMMED IN AUTO)
NWS
503
INDICATOR, PUSH BUTTON: ROLL/YAW (CSS/AUTO)
LEAD ANALYST: A.S. MEDIAVILLA
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S REVISED "WORK AROUND" IS STILL CONSIDERED BY IOA AS OFF
NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES WHICH CANNOT BE USED TO DOWNGRADE
CRITICALITY (PER 22206).
CIL RESOLUTION:
A. ISSUE CLOSED BY PRCB PRESENTATION OF 4/18/88 CIL ITEMS 05-1-
FC7245-I AND 05-I-FC7248-I. CRITICALITY OF 2/IR.
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SECTION C.12
REMOTEMANIPULATORSUBSYSTEM
C. 12-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-401
NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
RMS
401
ENCODERPHOTODETECTORS
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
R. GRASMEDER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-402
NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
402
ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-403
NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
403
ENCODER ROTATING DISK
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ F ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE : 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-420
NASA FMEA #: 4130-189(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 420
ITEM: TACHOMETER ROTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-420A
NASA FMEA #: 4130-189(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDACID: 420
ITEM: TACHOMETER OTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-421
NASA FMEA #: 4130-189 (a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 421
ITEM: TACHOMETER ROTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-421A
NASA FMEA #: 4130-189(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 421
ITEM: TACHOMETER ROTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] [p] [ ] [x]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-424
NASA FMEA #: 2600-116A(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
424
POWER-ONRESET CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
NDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-435
NASA FMEA #: 3180-143(c)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
435
PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-435A
NASA FMEA #: 3170
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
435
PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-439
NASA FMEA #: 3220-146 (a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 439
ITEM: SCU
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-439A
NASA FMEA #: 3220-146(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 439
ITEM: SCU
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-440
NASA FMEA #: 3220-146(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 440
ITEM: SCU
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-440A
NASA FMEA #: 3220-146(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 440
ITEM: SCU
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-442
NASA FMEA #: 4020-183(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
442
POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-443
NASA FMEA #: 4030-184(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
443
POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-444
NASA FMEA #: 3180
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 444
ITEM: + 10V
LEAD ANALYST : R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /ZR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-448
NASA FMEA #: 2540-114 (a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 448
ITEM: D/A CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-450
NASA FMEA #: 2650-121(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: ENCODER FEEDBACK
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-452
NASA FMEA #: 2690/2700
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS
452
I/P CLOCKOR SYNCHSIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-454
NASA FMEA #: 2690/2700
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
454
O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ]
[ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ X ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-458A
NASA FMEA #: 2570-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 458
ITEM: SHIFT REGISTERS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-458B
NASA FMEA #: 2680-122(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 458
ITEM: SHIFT REGISTERS
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-460
NASA FMEA #: 2620-I17(a)
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
460
DIGITAL F/B (ENCODER)
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ i /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-462
NASA FMEA #: 2620-i17(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
462
ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-482
NASA FMEA #: 2600-116A(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 482
ITEM: POWER "ON" RESET
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ I /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-484
NASA FMEA #: 2950-130(e)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 484
ITEM: CURRENT LIMITER
LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS-485C
3010-132A(e)
RMS
485
CURRENT LIMITER
R. GRASMEDER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-601A
NASA FMEA # : 1970-93 (b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
601
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] IF] IF]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-601B
NASA FMEA #: 2040-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
601
16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3 )
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] IF]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 12-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-605
NASA FMEA #: 2050-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
605
SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-609
NASA FMEA #: 2000-
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
609
ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-611
NASA FMEA #: 1990/2000
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
611
QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY sCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-613
NASA FMEA #: 2450-110(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
613
MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-615
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 615
ITEM: 2-PHASE PWM
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-617
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
617
POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-619
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
619
30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-621
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
621
DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM ADJUSTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-623
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS
623
OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-625
NASA FMEA #: 2450
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 625
ITEM: RECTIFIER MODULES
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-627
NASA FMEA #: 1650
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 627
ITEM: MIA
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-629
NASA FMEA #: 1740/1760/1770/1780
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
629
CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-631
NASA FMEA #: 1770
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
631
16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-633
NASA FMEA #: 1710-78(a)
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS
633
O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)
B. GRASMEDER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-635
NASA FMEA #: 1660-76(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
635
I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]
[X]*
IX]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-635A
NASA FMEA #: 1670-76(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
635
I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-47
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-637
NASA FMEA #: 1640
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
637
TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-639
NASA FMEA #: 1650
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
639
RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-659
NASA FMEA #: 1830-83(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
RMS
659
LOWERSERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-659A
NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
659
LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-661
NASA FMEA #: 1830-83(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
661
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-661A
NASA FMEA #: 1840-83(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
661
UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-663
NASA FMEA #: 1880-87 (f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 663
ITEM: ABE OUTPUTDRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-673
NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
673
ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-55
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-675
NASA FMEA #: 1890
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
675
SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-681
NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: CPU
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[p] [P] [ ] [X]*
[P] [F] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-57
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-683
NASA FMEA #: 2340-i04(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDACID: 683
ITEM: 200 KHZ CLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[P] [P] [ ] IX]*
[P] IF] [F] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-685
NASA FMEA #: 2400-109 (h)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
685
PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-685B
NASA FMEA #: 2410-109 (h)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
685
PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ]
[P] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-687
NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
687
DIRECT MEMORYACCESSCONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ ] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-689
NASA FMEA #: 2440
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
689
POWERON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[P] [P] [ ]
[P] [F] [F]
[X]*
IX]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-62
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-691
NASA FMEA #: 2350-i05(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 691
ITEM: RAM
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-63
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-693
NASA FMEA #: 2350-i05(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 693
ITEM: ROM
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-64
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-695
NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 695
ITEM: O/P LATCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST : B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[p] IF] IF]
[ ] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-697
NASA FMEA #: 2360
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 697
ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-66
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2507-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4536
ITEM: PIC i, 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-67
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2515-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4537
ITEM: PIC i, 12
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-68
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2505-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: PIC 6, 17
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-69
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2513-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4543
ITEM: PIC 6, 17
LEAD ANALYST : ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-70
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4548
ITEM: PIC 8, 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-71
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4549
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2511-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4549
ITEM: PIC 8, 19
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-72
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4554
ITEM: PIC i0, 21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-73
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2509-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDACID: 4555
ITEM: PIC i0, 21
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-74
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4560
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2506-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4560
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-75
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4561
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2514-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4561
ITEM: PIC 2, 13
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-76
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4566
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2504-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4566
ITEM: PIC 7, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-77
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-4567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2512-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4567
ITEM: PIC 7, 18
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-78
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2502-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4572
ITEM: PIC 9, 20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2510-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4573
ITEM: PIC 9, 20
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2500-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4578
ITEM: PIC Ii, 22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 7/17/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-4579
NASA FMEA #: 05-6ID-2508-2
SUBSYSTEM: RMS/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: PIC ii, 22
LEAD ANALYST: ROBINSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-20506
NASA FMEA #: 2670-122(a)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20506
ITEM: ENCODER LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [p] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-20511
NASA FMEA #: 2630-I18(a)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDACID: 20511
ITEM: OUTPUTLATCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR J
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
RMS-20518
2910
RMS
20518
TRANSISTOR
B. GRASMEDER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
_ P _ [ P J
[ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ J
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-20699
NASA FMEA #: 1730-79(b)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20699
ITEM: SYNL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C. 12-86
?
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-20700
NASA FMEA #: 1730-79(b)
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20700
ITEM: SYNC CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-20707
NASA FMEA #: 2430-i09(j)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDAC ID: 20707
ITEM: READ STROBE
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: RMS-20708
NASA FMEA #: 2020-96(f)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
RMS
20708
REFERENCE VOLTAGE GENERATOR
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/16/87
ASSESSMENTID: RMS-20710
NASA FMEA #: 2420-I09A(i)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: RMS
MDACID: 20710
ITEM: PDC INT-2 OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: DURING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENT PERIOD, THIS
ISSUE WAS RE-EXAMINED. NASAs ASSERTION THAT THE SOFTWARE
CONSTITUTED A RELIABLE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY WAS DISCUSSED.
AFTER FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ALL AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH
NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.12-90
SECTION C.13
ATMOSPHEREREVITALIZATION SUBSYSTEM
C. 13-i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-108
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0543-3
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: ACCUMULATOR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (SSM),
JOHN WHELAN, ON MAY 23, 1988. HIS DATA INDICATES THAT EVEN IF
THE ACCUMULATOR FAILED, THE PUMP HEAD PRESSURE WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW OPERATION OF THE WATER LOOP. IOA AGREES WITH
THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARS-148
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
148
FILTER, 40 MICRON (3)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA HAS LEARNED THAT THIS
FILTER WAS EXAMINED AS PART OF THE PUMP FMEA 06-1-0547-4 WHOSE
CRITICALITIES MATCH THOSE OF IOA. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-151
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 151
ITEM: ORIFICE (3)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA HAS LEARNED THAT THIS
FILTER WAS COVERED AS PART OF THE PUMP FMEA 06-1-0547-4 WITH
CRITICALITIES THAT MATCH THOSE OF IOA. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-153
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 153
ITEM: ORIFICE (3)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA HAS LEARNED THAT THIS
FILTER WAS COVERED AS PART OF THE PUMP FMEA 06-1-0547-3 WITH
CRITICALITIES THAT MATCH THOSE OF IOA. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-170
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARS
170
MANUAL OVERRIDE FOR BYPASS VALVE (2)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN, THE NASA SSM, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THAT THIS FAILURE IS INCLUDED IN THE WORST CASE ANALYSIS
OF THE BYPASS VALVE FAILURE. (NASA FMEA 06-1-0538, CRIT 2/IR).
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-189
06-1-0563-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARS
189
ORIFICES, AVIONICS BAY 2, (2)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /? ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY WHICH
RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES. IOA AGREES WITH THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-191
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARS
191
HATCH, THERMAL CONDITIONING SYSTEM (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS STUDIED AS A PART OF NASA FMEA PACKAGE 01-4-CS
WHICH COVERS ALL ORBITER SEALS. A FAILURE IN THE THERMAL
CONDITIONING FOR THE SEALS WILL RESULT IN A FAILURE OF THE SEALS.
AS OF LATE 1987 THIS SEAL PACKAGE DATA WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR MDAC
REVIEW. THIS RE-EVALUATION PROCESS HAS MADE THE DATA AVAILABLE
FOR INCORPORATION INTO THE IOA RESULTS. (ACTUAL FMEA NO. 01-4-
CS24-I WITH CRITICALITIES IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF IOA).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-192
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARS
192
HATCH, THERMAL CONDITIONING SYSTEM (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS STUDIED AS A PART OF NASA FMEA PACKAGE 01-4-CS
WHICH COVERS ALL ORBITER SEALS. A FAILURE ON THE THERMAL
CONDITIONING FOR THE SEALS WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE SEAL.
OF LATE 1987, THIS SEAL PACKAGE DATA WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR MDAC
REVIEW. THIS REEVALUATION PROCESS HAS MADE THE DATA AVAILABLE
FOR INCORPORATION INTO THE IOA RESULTS (ACTUAL FMEA NO. 01-4-
CS24-I WITH CRITICALITIES IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF IOA).
AS
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARS-194
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
194
WINDOW THERMAL CONDITIONING SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS STUDIED AS A PART OF NASA FMEA PACKAGE 01-4-CS
WHICH COVERS ALL ORBITER SEALS. A FAILURE IN THE THERMAL
CONDITIONING FOR THE SEALS WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE SEAL. AS
OF LATE 1987, THIS SEAL PACKAGE DATA WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR MDAC
REVIEW. THIS RE-EVALUATION PROCESS HAS MADE THE DATA AVAILABLE
FOR INCORPORATION INTO THE IOA RESULTS. (ACTUAL FMEA NO. 01-4-
CS24-I WITH CRITICALITIES IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF IOA).
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-195
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0561-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
195
PAYLOAD BAY FLOOD LIGHT COLD PLATE
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0-561-2 INCLUDES THE FAILURE OF THE COLD PLATE FOR
THIS FLOODLIGHT WITH THE FAILURE OF A COLD PLATE FOR THE FLIGHT
DECK MDM. ALTHOUGH, IOA WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION
OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA CORRECTLY CARRIES THE
CRITICALITY OF THE WORST CASE FAILURE. THEREFORE MDAC WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-199
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0526-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARS
199
LCVG HEAT EXCHANGER (HX) (I)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ N ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] C N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY WHICH
RESULTED IN HIGHER CRITICALITIES. IOA AGREES WITH THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-212
NASA FMEA #: 05-6U-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS/EPD&C
212
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB35 (i)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE HAS MOVED IT FROM A CIL TO A
NON-CIL RANKING. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER EXISTS (NEW FMEA
NO. 05-6UB-6001-01).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-221
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0615-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
221
HEAT EXCHANGER, IMU (I)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988. THE NASA FMEA ADDRESSES THE DUCT LEADING TO THE IMU HEAT
EXCHANGER, AND NOT THE HEAT EXCHANGER ITSELF. A NEW FMEA (06-1-
0557-6) WILL BE CREATED TO ADDRESS RESTRICTED FLOW THRU THE
HX. BOTH WILL BE ASSIGNED A 2/2 CRITICALITY BY DIRECTION FROM
DAN GERMANY. THE CRITICALITY IS ASSIGNED SINCE AIR FLOW TO THE
HX CAN BE RESTORED BY CUTTING THE DUCT AND ESTABLISHING CABIN AIR
DIRECT CIRCULATION. THIS WILL CAUSE A LOSS OF MISSION, BUT
NOT A THREAT TO LIFE OR VEHICLE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARS-234
ARS
234
FILTER, 300 MICRON (3)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0611-1 IS WRITTEN FOR RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE
DUCT SECTIONS FOR AVIONICS BAY COOLING. ONE POSSIBLE CAUSE OF
THIS RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE DUCT SECTIONS IS RESTRICTED FLOW
THROUGH THE FILTER. THEREFORE, THIS IOA FMEA WORKSHEET CAN
BE MATCHED TO 06-1-0611-1 WHICH CLEARS THE ISSUE(S) ASSOCIATED
WITH MDAC ID'S 234 AND 2561X. MDAC ALSO ACCEPTS NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-255
ARS
255
CHECK VALVE (6)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CLOSER EXAMINATION REVEALS THE CHECK VALVE IS INCLUDED IN NASA
FMEA 06-1-0401-1. IOA AGREES WITH THE GROUPING AND WITH THE NASA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARS-273
05-6U-2005-I
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARS/EPD&C
273
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB35 (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE HAS MOVED IT FROM A CIL TO A
NON CIL RANKING. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER EXISTS. (NEW
FMEA NO. 05-6UB-6001-01).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-277
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0427-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 277
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (3 )
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF THE TWO CHECK VALVES ON THE NON-OPERATING FANS CAN
CREATE AN AIR CIRCULATION LOOP WHICH COMPLETELY BYPASSES THE IMU
HEAT EXCHANGER. THIS WILL LEAD TO THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER
ONLY TWO FAILURES. THEREFORE, IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-286
06-1-0368-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARS
286
TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVE (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND THE
HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-301A
06-1-0340-2
ARS
301
LiOH CANISTER (2)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ ER] [ P ]
IN] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA HAS UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY IN EVALUATING THIS FAILURE. IOA AGREES WITH THIS
APPROACH AND THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-303
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 303
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0301-4 (CRIT 2/2) IS WRITTEN AGAINST EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF AIR FROM CABIN FAN ASSEMBLY. IT MAY BE CONSIDERED
THAT A CAUSE OF THIS AIR LEAKAGE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE
LINES AND FITTINGS. FURTHER, THE IOA WORST CASE EFFECT WAS
CONSIDERED TO BE INCREASED PPCO2 LEVELS IN THE CABIN. FURTHER
EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT THE FIRST PROBLEM MANIFESTED WILL BE
DECREASED COOLING OF THE AVIONICS BAY WHICH CAN BE DETECTED AND
THE MISSION TERMINATED. MDAC WITHDRAWS THIS ISSUE AND THE ONE
ASSOCIATED WITH ARS-3061X.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARS-305
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0330-2
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
305
FILTER, 75 MICRON (I)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THERE IS ONLY ONE FILTER FOR BOTH CABIN FANS. DAMAGE TO THIS
FILTER WILL ALLOW DEBRIS TO REACH BOTH FANS. THEREFORE, IOA WILL
AGREE WITH NASA'S HIGHER CRITICALITIES AND MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARS-315
05-6U-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARS/EPD&C
315
CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB95 THROUGH CBI00 (6)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN CHANGING THE CRITICALITY TO
MATCH IOA'S. THEREFORE, THIS CHANGE WAS ACCEPTED BY NASA. (NEW
FMEA NO. 05-6UB-2000-01).
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-319
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
319
CHECK VALVE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CLOSER EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT THE CHECK VALVE IS INCLUDED IN
NASA'S FAN/MOTOR FMEA NUMBER 06-1-0301-1. ISSUE IS CLOSED.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-320
06-1-0338-1
ARS/EPD&C
320
SENSOR, PPC02 (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]*
[ 3 [ ] [ 3 [33
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION WHEN
DETERMINING THE CRITICALITY OF THIS SENSOR. NASA DID NOT
CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF CREW ACTIONS OR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITIES ON CONTROLLING THE PPC02 LEVEL IN THE CABIN. UNDER
THESE CONDITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-321
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
321
LINES & FITTINGS
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0301-4 (CRIT 2/2) IS WRITTEN AGAINST EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF AIR FROM CABIN FAN ASSEMBLY. IT MAY BE CONSIDERED
THAT A CAUSE OF THIS AIR LEAKAGE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE
LINES AND FITTINGS. FURTHER, THE IOA WORST CASE EFFECT WAS
CONSIDERED TO BE INCREASED PPCO2 LEVELS IN THE CABIN. FURTHER
EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT THE FIRST PROBLEM MANIFESTED WILL BE
DECREASED COOLING OF THE AVIONICS BAY WHICH CAN BE DETECTED AND
THE MISSION TERMINATED. MDAC WITHDRAWS THIS ISSUE AND THE ONE
ASSOCIATED WITH ARS-3061X.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-340
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0316-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
340
CHECK VALVE, SEPARATOR OUTLET (4)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988. THE VACUUM VENT NOZZLE IS OF A DIAMETER WHICH IS MUCH
SMALLER THAN THE CRITICAL SIZE JUDGED FOR A HOLE IN THE CABIN.
THEREFORE, IT WILL NOT CAUSE A LOSS OF LIFE. HOWEVER, THE
BACKFLOW OF WATER IS A VALID EFFECT AND WILL CAUSE MISSION
TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-344
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0310-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
344
LINES AND FITTINGS-SLURPER
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ? ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ALLOWS IOA TO RE-ASSESS ITS POSITION AND
AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARS-1221X
05-6U-2028-I
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS
1221
SWITCH, S6, WCL2 (I)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /? ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF THE FMEA BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN THE ASSIGNMENT
OF A NON-CIL CRITICALITY RANKING. THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER
EXISTS. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6UB-4002-03).
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-2211X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0557-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 2211
ITEM: IMU HEAT EXCHANGER
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /? ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE IMU HEAT
EXCHANGER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE
COMPONENTS LEADING TO AND FROM THE HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH CAN
RESULT IN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AIR. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE
EFFECTS OF THESE FAILURES ARE THE SAME, IOA WILL WITHDRAW THE
ISSUE WITH THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-2331X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0571-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
2331
LINES & FITTINGS (ENTIRE LOOP)
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ N ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS THE RESTRICTED FLOW IN THE ENTIRE LOOP TO
BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN
COMPONENTS WITHIN THE LOOP WHICH CAN CAUSE RESTRICTED FLOW (SUCH
AS FILTERS, PUMPS, ETC.). TO THE EXTENT OF A PRIMARY FAILURE,
IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-2332X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0579-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 2332
ITEM: FLEX LINES
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ N ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS THE RESTRICTED FLOW IN THE ENTIRE LOOP TO
BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN
COMPONENTS WITHIN THE LOOP WHICH CAN CAUSE RESTRICTED FLOW (SUCH
AS FILTERS, PUMPS, ETC.). TO THE EXTENT OF A PRIMARY FAILURE,
IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARS-2561X
06-1-0611-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARS
2561
DUCT SECTIONS, AVIONICS BAY
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0611-1 IS WRITTEN FOR RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE
DUCT SECTIONS FOR AVIONICS BAY COOLING. ONE POSSIBLE CAUSE OF
THIS RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE DUCT SECTIONS IS RESTRICTED FLOW
THROUGH THE 300 MICRON FILTER (COVERED IN ARS-234).
THEREFORE, THIS NASA FMEA CAN BE CONSIDERED A VALID FAILURE
ALTHOUGH IT MORE APPROPRIATELY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE EFFECT OF
A PRIMARY FAILURE. MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-2562X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0611-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
2562
RETURN AIR DUCT SECTIONS-AVIONICS BAY
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AIR FROM THE DUCT
SECTIONS THEMSELVES TO BE A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE, THERE ARE
COMPONENTS IN THE AIR STREAM LEADING TO OR FROM THE DUCTS WHICH
WHEN FAILED WILL MANIFEST THE SAME EFFECTS. TO THE EXTENT THAT
THIS ITEM CAN BE CONSIDERED ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF A PRIMARY
FAILURE, IOA WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-3061X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0301-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 3061
ITEM: CABIN FAN ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-1-0301-4 IS WRITTEN AGAINST EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AIR
FROM THE CABIN FAN ASSEMBLY. IT MAY BE CONSIDERED THAT A CAUSE
OF THIS AIR LEAKAGE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE ASSOCIATED LINES
AND FITTINGS (COVERED IN ARS-321). FURTHER, THE IOA WORST
CASE EFFECT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE INCREASED PPO2 LEVELS IN THE
CABIN. ADDITIONAL EXAMINATION REVEALS THAT THE FIRST PROBLEM
MANIFESTED WILL BE DECREASED COOLING OF THE AVIONICS BAY WHICH
CAN BE DETECTED AND THE MISSION TERMINATED. MDAC WITHDRAWS THIS
ISSUE AND THE ONE ASSOCIATED WITH ARS-321.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-3601X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0630-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARS
3601
RETURN AND SUPPLY AIR DUCT SECTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AIR FROM THE DUCT
SECTIONS THEMSELVES TO BE A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE, THERE ARE
COMPONENTS IN THE AIR STREAM LEADING TO OR FROM THE DUCTS WHICH
WHEN FAILED WILL MANIFEST THE SAME EFFECTS. TO THE EXTENT THAT
THIS ITEM CAN BE CONSIDERED ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF A PRIMARY
FAILURE, IOA WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARS-3604X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0635-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARS
MDAC ID: 3604
ITEM: RETURN AIR DUCTS
LEAD ANALYST: S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE RETURN AIR
DUCT SECTIONS TO BE A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE, THERE ARE COMPONENTS
IN THE AIR STREAM LEAKING TO OR FROM THE DUCTS WHICH WHEN CLOGGED
WILL MANIFEST THE SAME EFFECTS. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE
RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE DUCTS CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF
THE EFFECTS OF A PRIMARY FAILURE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-4017X
06-1-0303-1
ARS
4017
SIGNAL CONDITIONER (i)
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] [N]
B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY FOR SENSORS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ /NA ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARS-4027X
06-1-0615-2
ARS
4027
IMU AIR DUCTS
S. SINCLAIR/M. SAIIDI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALTHOUGH IOA CONSIDERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FROM THE IMU HEAT
EXCHANGER TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE
COMPONENTS LEADING TO AND FROM THE HEAT EXCHANGER WHICH CAN
RESULT IN EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF AIR. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE
EFFECTS OF THESE FAILURES ARE THE SAME, IOA WILL WITHDRAW THE
ISSUE WITH THE CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.13-39

SECTION C.14
EXTRAVEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT
SUBSYSTEM
C. 14-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-192A
NASA FMEA #: 480-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
192
CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY IN REVISED FMEA 480-FM6.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/I0/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-202
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
202
CHECK VALVE AND VENT FLOW SENSOR (ITEM 121)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA WITHDREW ITS FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-225
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
225
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL MODIFY CAUSES IN II3A FAILURE MODES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-226
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EMU
226
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER (ITEM II3A)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL MODIFY CAUSES IN II3A FAILURE MODES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-238
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
EMU
238
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-239
NASA FMEA #: II3D-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
239
PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA RESOLUTION.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-243
NASA FMEA #: II3E-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
243
H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL _
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA RESOLUTION.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-298A
NASA FMEA #: 215-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
298
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-301
NASA FMEA #: 215-FMI, FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
301
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (ITEM 215)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-320
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EMU
320
SOP FILL PORT QD AND FILTER (ITEM 213F)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA FAILURE MODES OF DOWNSTREAM COMPONENTS AS
ENCOMPASSING THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-321
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
321
SOP ASSEMBLY (ITEM 200)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA WILL MODIFY FAILURE MODE CAUSES IN NASA FMEA 213B-FM2A FOR
THIS COMPONENT.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-322
NASA FMEA #: 200-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EMU
322
SOP ASSEMBLY(ITEM 200)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-384
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
384
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA WILL MODIFY ITS FMEA TO INCORPORATE THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-387
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
387
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA ACCEPTS THIS FAILURE MODE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-393A
NASA FMEA #: 360-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
393
VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[2/2 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
IX].
[ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-413
NASA FMEA #: 362-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
413
EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] IF] [NA]
[P] [P] [NA]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-439
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
439
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST : G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL ADD AS A CAUSE IN NASA FMEA 366-FM6.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
EMU-440
EMU
440
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
G. RAFFAELLI
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL ADD AS A CAUSE IN NASA FMEA 366-FM5.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-441
NASA FMEA #: 366-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
441
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL ADD 3/IR MISSION PHASE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
EMU-447
367-FM5
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
447
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
NASA WILL ADD A NEW FAILURE MODE 367-FM6, CONTACT TO CONTACT.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-453
NASA FMEA #: 368-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
453
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL ADD 368-FM9, 2/IR FOR INLET.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-458
NASA FMEA #: 351-FMI
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
458
BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-463
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
463
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA 150-FM9 AS ENCOMPASSING THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-464
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
464
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA 150-FM9 AS ENCOMPASSING THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-466
NASA FMEA #: 150-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
466
CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-476
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM.-
EMU
476
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA WILL INCORPORATE THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-27
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-478
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
478
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA WILL INCORPORATE THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-28
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-479
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
479
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] IF]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA WILL INCORPORATE THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-29
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-480
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
480
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NASA WILL INCORPORATE THIS FAILURE MODE INTO THE FMEA.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-30
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-485
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
485
DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA 350-FM25 AS ENCOMPASSING THIS FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-609
NASA FMEA #: I02-FM26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
609
MULTIPLE WATER CONNECTOR (HUT HALF)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-32
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-612
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
612
HARD UPPER TORSO SHELL
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS INCORPORATION IN NASA FMEA 440-FM4.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-33
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-615
NASA FMEA #: 102-FMI8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
615
BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ F ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-34
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-624
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
624
EXTRAVEHICULAR VISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/i0/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-626
NASA FMEA #: 108-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
626
EXTRAVEHICULARVISOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/10/86
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-657
NASA FMEA #: 104-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EMU
657
BODYSEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: J. WHITMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-37
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 759
ITEM: DCM
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
EMU-759X
300-FM7
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[ F ]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IF THE ENTIRE NUMBER OF SCREWS FAILED BRACKET SEPARATION CAN
RESULT IN SUIT DEPRESSURIZATION AND LOSS OF LIFE. SCREEN A
SHOULD BE PASSED DUE TO CAPABILITY FOR CHECKOUT DURING GROUND
TURNAROUND. SCREEN C SHOULD BE FAILED TO REFLECT A COMMON CAUSE
FAILURE FOR THE SCREWS (E.G. IMPACT) .
CLAY MCCULLOUGH/VP AGREED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1988 THAT NASA WOULD
PERFORM ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A RESULT OF EVA IMPACT LOADS. RESULTS OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL
DETERMINE THE FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-38
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EMU-784X
100-FMI
EMU
784
PLSS
G. RAFFAELLI
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ F ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR BC CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THAT THIS
BRACKET IS ONE OF TWO WHICH IF BOTH WERE LOST CAN RESULT IN
SEPARATION OF HUT FROM PLSS AND UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION.
CLAY MCCULLOUGH/VP AGREED ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1988 THAT NASA WOULD
PERFORM ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE CREDIBILITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A RESULT OF EVA IMPACT LOADS. RESULTS OF THIS ANALYSIS WILL
DETERMINE THE FAILURE MODE CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-819X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 819
ITEM: RESTRAINT MODIFIED
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA ACCEPTS IOA RECOMMENDATION.
[ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-823X
NASA FMEA #: 106-FMI2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EMU
823
WRIST DISCONNECT(GLOVE SIDE)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENTID: EMU-825X
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EMU
825
WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA TO ADD TO FMEA.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 8/06/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EMU-888X
NASA FMEA #: 107-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 888
ITEM: RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NASA WILL REVISE TO IOA CRITICALITY.
[ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 14 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.14-43

SECTION C.15
POWER REACTANT SUPPLY AND
DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEM
C. 15-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/12/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-216
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
216
H2 TANK SUBASSEMBLY(4) , (3), OR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK030-1 AND M4-1BI-TK030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
NASA FMEA 04-1B-A01FSH-I COVERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF ALL H2 LINES,
COMPONENTS, AND FITTINGS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88).
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/13/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-231
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
231
H2 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV031
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV031-1 AND M4-1BI-RV031-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE
EXTERNAL LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7
SECONDS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER,
4/12/88), BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS NOT
NA, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PRESSURE
RELIEF FUNCTION OF THE RELIEF VALVE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/13/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-234
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
234
H2 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV041
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV031-1 AND M4-1BI-RV031-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
THE CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE
EXTERNAL LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7
SECONDS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER,
4/12/88), BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS NOT
NA, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PRESSURE
RELIEF FUNCTION OF THE RELIEF VALVE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/13/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-237
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
237
H2 CHECK VALVE (2) CV031,CV041
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CV030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS FAILED
BECAUSE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE IS NOT DETECTIBLE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/13/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-240
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV030-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
240
H2 CHECK VALVE (I) CV030
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-CV030-1 AND M4-1BI-CV030-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88) ,
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS FAILED
BECAUSE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE IS NOT DETECTIBLE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-252
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPG
252
H2 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOIDCROSSOVERVALVE (i) LV031
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-1 AND M4-1BI-LV031-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. CRITICALITY
IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS AN EXTERNAL LEAK CAN KILL TWO
FUEL CELLS, AND DURING ASCENT THE VEHICLE REQUIRES TWO OF THREE
FUEL CELLS. SCREEN B IS FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL
VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/14/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-255
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV033
EPG
255
H2 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4-1BI-LV033-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FUEL CELL FAILURE
REQUIRING FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT
SUPPLY VALVES TO CAUSE THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE
ORBITER. SCREEN B IS FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL VALVE INTERNAL LEAKS
ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-258
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV043
EPG
258
H2 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4-1BI-LV033-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FAILURE REQUIRING
FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
TO CAUSE THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBITER. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL VALVE INTERNAL LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A
VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-261
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV033-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV044
EPG
261
H2 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV033-1 AND M4-1BI-LV033-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE HARDWARE
CRITICALITY IS A 2 BECAUSE IT WILL ONLY TAKE A FAILURE REQUIRING
FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN, PLUS A FAILURE OF THE REACTANT SUPPLY VALVES
TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ORBITER. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL VALVE INTERNAL LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A
VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-264
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
264
H2 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (I) LV041
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV031-1 AND M4-1BI-LV031-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. CRITICALITY
IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS AN EXTERNAL LEAK CAN KILL TWO
FUEL CELLS, AND DURING ASCENT THE VEHICLE REQUIRES TWO OF THREE
FUEL CELLS. SCREEN B IS FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL
VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-II _2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-267
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV045-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPG
267
H2 SOLENOIDGSE SUPPLYVALVE (I) LV045
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV045-1 AND M4-1BI-LV-45-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A GSE QUICK
DISCONNECT LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7
SECONDS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER,
4/12/88), BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE VPI IS AVAILABLE TO GSE ONLY.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-275
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV015-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
275
02 SOLENOIDGSE SUPPLYVALVE (I) LV015
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV015-1 AND M4-1BI-LV015-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A GSE QUICK
DISCONNECT LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7
SECONDS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER,
4/12/88), BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE VPI IS AVAILABLE TO GSE ONLY.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/16/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-278
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LV012
EPG
278
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM1 SUPPLY VALVE (I)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV012-1 AND M4-1BI-LV012-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS FAILED
BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI
DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-281
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV012-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LV022
EPG
281
02 SOLENOID ECLSS SYSTEM 2 SUPPLY VALVE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-I-LV012-1 AND M4-1BI-LV012.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS FAILED
BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI
DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/17/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-289
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM".
(I) LV013
EPG
289
02 FUEL CELL 1 SOLENOIDREACTANTSUPPLYVALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1BI-LV013-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL VALVE INTERNAL LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A
VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-292
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
292
02 MANIFOLD 1 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV011
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-1 AND M4-1BI-LV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. CRITICALITY
IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS AN EXTERNAL LEAK CAN KILL TWO
FUEL CELLS, AND DURING ASCENT THE VEHICLE REQUIRES TWO OF THREE
FUEL CELLS. SCREEN B IS FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL
VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/17/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-295
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
295
02 MANIFOLD 2 SOLENOID CROSSOVER VALVE (i) LV021
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV011-1 AND M4-1BI-LV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. CRITICALITY
IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS AN EXTERNAL LEAK CAN KILL TWO
FUEL CELLS, AND DURING ASCENT THE VEHICLE REQUIRES TWO OF THREE
FUEL CELLS. SCREEN B IS FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL
VALVE LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENTID: PRSD-301
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(i) LV024
EPG
301
02 FUEL CELL 3 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1BI-LV013-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI
DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-304
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-LV013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(I) LV023
EPG
304
02 FUEL CELL 2 SOLENOID REACTANT SUPPLY VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-LV013-1 AND M4-1BI-LV013-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. SCREEN B IS
FAILED BECAUSE NOT ALL INTERNAL LEAKS ARE DETECTIBLE BY A VPI
DRIVEN BY SOLENOID POSITION.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/19/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-307
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
307
02 MANIFOLD 1 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV011
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV011-1 AND M4-1BI-RV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS NOT NA,
BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PRESSURE RELIEF
FUNCTION OF THE RELIEF VALVE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/19/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-310
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-RV011-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
310
02 MANIFOLD 2 RELIEF VALVE (i) RV021
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-RV011-1 AND M4-1BI-RV011-1.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILED OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE
CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS NOT NA, BECAUSE THIS
FAILURE MODE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PRESSURE RELIEF FUNCTION OF THE
RELIEF VALVE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/19/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-313
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-CV010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
313
02 CHECK VALVE (2) CV021
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA # M4-1BI-CV010-1. SCREENS ARE P F P, BY NSTS
LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION, 1/19/88.
THE FAILURE MODE IS FAILS OPEN OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE. THE
CRITICALITY IS 2/IR BECAUSE THIS FAILURE PLUS A LARGE EXTERNAL
LEAK CAN DEPLETE CRYO PRESSURE BELOW SAFE LEVEL IN 7 SECONDS
(MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88),
BEFORE CREW CAN CLOSE MANIFOLD VALVES. SCREEN B IS FAILED
BECAUSE FAILURE OF THIS VALVE IS NOT DETECTIBLE.
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/19/86
ASSESSMENT ID: PRSD-330
NASA FMEA #: M4-1B2-TK010-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPG
330
02 TANK SUBASSEMBLY (4), (3), OR (2)
LEAD ANALYST: S. GOTCH
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ALSO NASA FMEA'S 04-1B-TK010-1 AND M4-1BI-TK010-1.
NASA FMEA 04-1B-A01FS0-1 COVERS EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF ALL H2 LINES,
COMPONENTS, AND FITTINGS (MEETING WITH DEPUTY SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
DAVID SAUCIER, 4/12/88).
REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988 C.15-24
SECTION C.16
MAIN PROPULSIONSYSTEM
C. 16-i
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-010X
NASA FMEA #: 2381-3
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: i0
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 RTLS INBOARD/OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT
DIODE (2). FAIL SHORTED TO GROUND.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-013X
NASA FMEA #: 2263-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
13
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST : B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-018X
NASA FMEA #: 2275-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
18
FILL AND DRAIN LAI MDMBLOCKING DIODE (i)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-028X
NASA FMEA #: 2355A-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
28
OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CIRCUIT.
SHORTING OF THE OPEN CONTACT TO GROUND IN THIS SWITCH IS
INFEASIBLE. THERE IS NO GROUND CONNECTION AND THE SWITCH CASE IS
NOT GROUNDED.
SWITCH CASE IS GROUNDED. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-033X
NASA FMEA #: 2359A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
33
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 DISONNECT. FAIL SHORTED.
2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE DIODE, PLUS A
SHORT IN THE ON INTERNAL HDC DIODE, WILL GROUND A SOLENOID.
CLOSE SIGNAL WILL BE GROUNDED PREVENTING DISCONNECT CLOSURE,
WHICH IS A i/I FAILURE (SEE 0408-6). GROUNDED OPEN SIGNAL
FOLLOWED BY
INADVERTENT CLOSE SIGNAL AND LATCH FIALURE WILL CAUSE DISCONNECT
TO CLOSE (I/i, SEE 0408-2).
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-037X
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 37
ITEM: MDM LAI
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH20/B F&D.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-044X
NASA FMEA #: 2397-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
44
RPC A OUTPUT DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE RPC A OUTPUT BLOCKING DIODE. FAIL
SHORTED. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH
MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-064X
NASA FMEA #: 2100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 64
ITEM: OPEN HDC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP, WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-065X
2100-3
EPD&C/MPS
65
OPEN HDC
B. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUIT.
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 2100-3 WITH 2100-2 AND INDICATES 2/IR PPP
FOR NOMINAL AND 1/1 FOR ALL ABORTS. IOA RECOMMENDATION ON MPS-
065X WAS FOR ABORT ONLY. MPS-064X ADDRESSED NOMINAL FLIGHT.
RI/NASA RESULTS NOW MATCH IOA RECOMMENDATIONS.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-067X
NASA FMEA #: 2101-3
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 67
ITEM: CLOSEHDC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 2101-3 WITH 2101-1 AND ASSIGNED A 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-072X
NASA FMEA #: 2031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
72
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
L02 DISCONNECT. FAIL SHORTED.
2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE DIODE, PLUS A
SHORT IN THE ON INTERNAL HDC DIODE, WILL GROUND A SOLENOID.
CLOSE SIGNAL WILL BE GROUNDED PREVENTING DISCONNECT CLOSURE,
WHICH IS A i/i FAILURE (SEE 0408-6). GROUNDED OPEN SIGNAL
FOLLOWED BY
INADVERTENT CLOSE SIGNAL AND LATCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE DISCONNECT
TO CLOSE (i/i, SEE 0408-2).
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-074X
2032-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
74
HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P _ [ X _ *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-O75X
NASA FMEA #: 2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
75
HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT FOR GH2 FLOW CONTROL VALVES. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-076X
NASA FMEA #: 2033-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 76
ITEM: RELAY (3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT FOR GH2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS
REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA
RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-077X
NASA FMEA #: 2033-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 77
ITEM: RELAY (3)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR GH2 FCV CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-078X
NASA FMEA #: 2034-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 78
ITEM: BLOCKINGDIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ m ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR GH2 FCV CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-079X BASELINE [ ]
2034-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 79
ITEM: BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR GH2 FCV CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-081X
2035-2
EPD&C/MPS
81
TOGGLE SWITCH
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ NA]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X_ *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA NOW SHOWS SCREEN B PASS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS REVISION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-088X
NASA FMEA #: 2235-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
88
SWITCH SCANDIODES (3)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
GH2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-II5X
NASA FMEA #: 2350-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
115
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 DISCONNECT. FAIL SHORTED.
2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE DIODE, PLUS A
SHORT IN THE ON INTERNAL HDC DIODE, WILL GROUND A SOLENOID.
CLOSE SIGNAL WILL BE GROUNDED PREVENTING DISCONNECT CLOSURE,
WHICH IS A i/I FAILURE (SEE 0408-6). GROUNDED OPEN SIGNAL
FOLLOWED BY
INADVERTENT CLOSE SIGNAL AND LATCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE DISCONNECT
TO CLOSE (i/I, SEE 0408-2).
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-143X
NASA FMEA #: 2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
143
LH2 PREVALVESBLOCKINGDIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN SWITCH COMMAND A BLOCKING DIODE.
IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
FAIL SHORTED. THE FAILURE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-144X
NASA FMEA #: 2215-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
DIODES (3)
EPD&C/MPS
144
LH2 PREVALVECLOSE SWITCH COMMANDA BLOCKING
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-145X
NASA FMEA #: 2216-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
DIODES (3)
EPD&C/MPS
145
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND C BLOCKING
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-146X
NASA FMEA #: 2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DIODES (3)
EPD&C/MPS
146
LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND B BLOCKING
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-147X
NASA FMEA #: 2218-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(6)
EPD&C/MPS
147
LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE SWITCH B&C BLOCKING DIODES
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-148X
NASA FMEA #: 2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
148
LH2 PREVALVESOPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (6)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-201X
NASA FMEA #: 0518-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
201
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESSCHECKVALVE (CVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 0518-3 WITH 0502-2.
IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-207X
NASA FMEA #: 0408-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
207
LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA EFFECTS IMPLY A FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE, WHICH IS
ADDRESSED ON 0408-6. WORST CASE EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS INDICATION
OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE IS TO CAUSE SIX MINUTE DELAY OF ET
SEP.
SEE ALSO 0408-13.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-209X
NASA FMEA #: 0803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
209
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT(PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0803-I HAS BEEN REPLACED BY 0408-13.
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. OPEN INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-214X
NASA FMEA #: 0454-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ONLY)
MPS
214
LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CRITICALITY REVISED TO 2/IR PFP IN POST-PRCB CIL.
RI/NASA EFFECTS STATE FAILURES OF THE LATCH TO LOCK OR UNLOCK,
WHICH ARE ADDRESSED ON A NON-CIL FMEA AND 0454-3, RESPECTIVELY.
ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING LATCH WILL HAVE
NO EFFECT.
SEE ALSO 0454-9.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-217X
NASA FMEA #: 0805-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ONLY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
217
LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0805-1 HAS BEEN REPLACED BY 0454-9.
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. LOCKED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA INDICATES A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-224X
NASA FMEA #: 0801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
224
LO2 PREVALVE(PVl, 2, 3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0801-1 HAS BEEN REPLACED BY 0401-11.
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. OPEN INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-225X
NASA FMEA #: 0414-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
225
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0414-3.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATION SYSTEM ONLY WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
THE RI/NASA SCENARIO IMPLIES FAILURE OF THE VALVE AS WELL AS ITS
INDICATOR. SEE O414-6.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENIFIT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-227X
NASA FMEA #: 0414-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM-.
MPS
227
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-35
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-228X
NASA FMEA #: 0311-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
228
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CIL STATES FAILURES OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE OR REMAIN
CLOSED, WHICH ARE ADDRESSED ON 0311-2 AND 0311-4. ERRONEOUS
INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
SEE ALSO 0311-8.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-36
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-230X
NASA FMEA #: 0311-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
230
LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-232X
NASA FMEA #: 0310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM'.
MPS
232
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CIL STATES FAILURES OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE OR REMAIN
CLOSED, WHICH ARE ADDRESSED ON A NON-CIL FMEA AND 0310-4,
RESPECTIVELY. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE-
WILL HAVE NO HARMFUL EFFECT. SEE ALSO 0310-9.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-235X
NASA FMEA #: 0310-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
235
LO2 INBOARDFILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-237X
NASA FMEA #: 0806-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
237
LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0806-1 HAS BEEN COMBINED WITH 0310-9.
THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0310-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0310-9).
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-240X
NASA FMEA #: 0453-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
240
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE CLOSED, OPEN INDICATION.
FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN IS ADDRESSED ON 0453-1. FAILURE OF THE
INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
THE RI/NASA SCENARIO IMPLIES FAILURE OF THE VALVE AS WELL AS ITS
INDICATOR. SEE 0453-5.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-241X
NASA FMEA #: 0453-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
241
LO2 POGOACCUMULATORECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. OPEN INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-243X
NASA FMEA #: 0427-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
243
LH2/LO2 PROPELLANTLEVEL SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FALSE DRY SIGNAL.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PPP AND REMOVED
0427-2 FROM THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY IS NOT DETECTABLE.
LOSS OF A SINGLE SENSOR IS DETECTABLE.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-251X
NASA FMEA #: 0422-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
251
LO2 BLEED LINE, 1.5" DIA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS CIL WITH 0428-1. CRITICALITY STILL
AGREES WITH IOA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-255X
NASA FMEA #: 0456-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
255
LO2 RELIEF SENSE LINE, .38" DIA
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA AINDICATES A i/I CRITICALITY FOR THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE.
HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER TURBOPUMP SEALS ARE NOT CAPABLE OF
PROVIDING ADEQUATE RELIEF. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-257X
NASA FMEA #: 0428-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
1.5, 2" DIA
MPS
257
LO2 BLEED RECIRC & POGO SUPPRESSION LINE, i,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ADDRESSED ON 0428-1.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA/CIL.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-264X
NASA FMEA #: 0510-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
264
GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (CVI6 TO PD9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-265X
NASA FMEA #: 0515-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
265
LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO PASS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-266X BASELINE [ ]
0515-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
266
LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
W.J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-267X
NASA FMEA #: 0515-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
267
LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
W.J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-271X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
271
LO2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0723-1. IOA ACCEPTS
HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICLAITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-272X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
272
GO2 DISCONNECTPRESSURETRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0747-1. NO ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-274X
NASA FMEA #: 0627-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
274
GO2 ENGINE OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0748-1 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-275X
NASA FMEA #: 0627-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
275
LO2 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECTTEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED 0627-5 AND ANALYZED THE TWO TRANSDUCERS ON
0727-1 AND 0728-1. BOTH HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY OF 3/IR
PFP. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-280X
NASA FMEA #: 0301-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
280
LH2 INBOARDFILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATOR FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-283X
NASA FMEA #: 0808-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
283
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0808-1 HAS BEEN COMBINED WITH 0301-8.
THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0301-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0301-8).
SEE RI/NASA 0301-8.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-284X
NASA FMEA #: 0302-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
284
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALTIY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-287X
NASA FMEA #: 0807-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
287
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0807-1 HAS BEEN COMBINED WITH 0302-7.
THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER ERRONEOUS
INDICATION (0302-3) AND LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION (0302-7).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-295X
NASA FMEA #: 0304-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
295
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-296X
NASA FMEA #: 0304-11
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
296
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVl3)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF VALVE ACTUATOR.
RI/NASA HAS MOVED THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE TO 0304-8 AND ASSIGNED A
3/IR PFP. FAILURE WILL PREVENT VALVE FROM OPENING WHEN REQUIRED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RELIEF SYSTEM MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
ACTUATOR LEAKAGE IS CITED ON 0304-1 AS A CAUSE OF
FAILURE TO OPEN, A 2/IR FAILURE.
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED BY 0304-1 WHICH ADDRESSES POST-MECO
OPERATIONS. FMEA # 0304-8 IS MEANT TO ADDRESS ASCENT ONLY. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-297X
NASA FMEA #: 0431-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
297
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0431-9 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO I/i. RI/NASA CIL INDICATES FAILURE TO CLOSE,
WHICH IS ADDRESSED ON A NON-CIL FMEA. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF A
PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. SEE 0431-12.
IOA BELIEVES THIS IL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-298X
NASA FMEA #: 0431-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
298
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS CIL. IOA RECOMMENDED DELETION SINCE
0431-6 WAS A DUPLICATE OF 0431-5.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-305X
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
305
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (PV22 TO PDI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA REVISED 0430-1 TO COVER THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE AND
ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY OF I/i WHICH MATCHES THE IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-307X
NASA FMEA #: 0405-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
307
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN OPEN IS ADDRESSED ON 0405-2.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-308X
NASA FMEA #: 0405-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
308
LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP AND i/i FOR A
PAD ABORT. FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE IS COVERED ON 0405-6.
NSTS 22206 2.3.2d EXCLUDES FAILURE OF THE ENGINE TO SHUT DOWN
SAFELY. THE RI/NASA SCENARIO IMPLIES FAILURE OF THE VALVE AS
WELL AS ITS POSITION INDICATOR AND WOULD REQUIRE A 3/IR
CRITICALITY. THE RI/NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY APPLIES TO AN FRF
ONLY.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-313X
NASA FMEA #: 0403-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
313
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ D ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS ELIMINATED 0403-6 AND PLACED THE RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
FAILURE MODE ON 0403-4. AS SUCH, 0403-4 NOW CORRESPONDS TO MPS-
2103 AND THE i/I CRITICALITIES MATCH. MPS-313X CAN BE DELETED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-316X
NASA FMEA #: 0505-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
22, 23)
MPS
316
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV21,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ F ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL TO CHECK.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PNAF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-67
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-318X
NASA FMEA #: 0504-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
58)
MPS
318
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, 57,
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR FPF, WHICH AGREES
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-321X
NASA FMEA #: 0407-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
321
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA EFFECTS IMPLY A FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE, WHICH IS
ADDRESSED ON 0407-6. WORST CASE EFFECT OF ERRONEOUS INDICATION
OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE IS TO CAUSE SIX MINUTE DELAY OF ET
SEP.
SEE ALSO 0407-13.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-323X
NASA FMEA #: 0804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
323
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0804-1 HAS BEEN REPLACED BY 0407-13.
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. OPEN INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-324X
NASA FMEA #: 0402-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
324
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CIL DESCRIBES A FAILURE OF THE PREVALVE TO OPEN DUE TO A
STRUCTURAL FAILURE SUCH THAT THE INDICATOR SHOWS THE VALVE TO BE
OPEN. FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE REVISED TO ACCURATELY DESCRIBE THE
POSTULATED SCENARIO.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-326X
NASA FMEA #: 0802-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
326
LH2 PREVALVE(PV4, 5, 6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ /IR ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
] [x]*
] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0802-1 HAS BEEN COMBINED WITH 0402-6.
THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED UNDER LOSS OF
POSITION INDICATION (0402-6) AND ERRONEOUS INDICATION (0402-7).
THIS ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DELETED.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-329X
NASA FMEA #: 0437-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
329
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F _ [ V I [ X J *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERROUNEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0437-3.
ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE HAS NO EFFECT.
THE RI/NASA SCENARIO IMPLIES FAILURE OF THE VALVE AS WELL AS ITS
INDICATOR. SEE 0437-6.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-330X
NASA FMEA #: 0437-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
MPS
330
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-334X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
334
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i, WHICH AGREES WITH
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-335X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
335
1/42 FEED RTLS INBOARDVALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REMOVED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-336X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
336
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0651-2.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT OTHER THAN A
POSSIBLE LAUNCH SCRUB. SEE 0651-8.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-337X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
337
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARDVALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-338X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
338
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVIS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION. VALVE OPEN, CLOSED INDICATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED IS ADDRESSED ON 0651-2.
FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT OTHER THAN A
POSSIBLE LAUNCH SCRUB. SEE 0651-8.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-339X
NASA FMEA #: 0651-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
339
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PVI8)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDIATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-350X
NASA FMEA #: XXXXXX
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
350
LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PD2 TO PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
IOA HAS NOT LOCATED A NEW RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET TO REPLACE XXX,
WHICH HAS BEEN DELETED.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION AT A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-353X
NASA FMEA #: 0515-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
353
LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURESIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO PASS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-355X
NASA FMEA #: 0515-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
355
LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-361X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
361
LH2 ENGINE MANIFOLD PRESSURETRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0721-1. IOA ACCEPTS
HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-362X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
362
GH2 OUTLET PRESSURETRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TRANSDUCER FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. NO REDUNDANCY.
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0740-1 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PPP.
REMOVAL FROM THE CIL ELIMINATES THE CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-363X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
363
GH2 DISCONNECT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0746-1. NO ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-364X
NASA FMEA #: 0627-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
MPS
364
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0724-1 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-366X
NASA FMEA #: 0202-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
366
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVl, 2, 3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/i WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-370X
NASA FMEA #: 0205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
370
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,2,3,7,8,9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE REGULATOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO REMAIN CLOSED.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-372X
NASA FMEA #: 0262-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
MPS
372
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUT VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. RI/NASA CITES A LEAK AS A SECOND
FAILURE, BUT A LEAK IS A I/i FAILURE IN ISOLATION AND THUS SKEWS
THE ANALYSIS. ENGINES ARE NOT REDUNDANT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULTS BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-375X
NASA FMEA #: 0202-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
375
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/I WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-378X
NASA FMEA #: 0605-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 378
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0605-2 IS NOW MATCHED TO MPS-4060.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-379X
NASA FMEA #: 0605-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 379
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/I. THE RI/NASA FMEA
STATES THAT THE SINGLE FAILURE OF A RUPTURE OF CVI3 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT. ANALYSIS OF CVI3 AND CV24 SHOULD BE SEPARATED. IOA
ACCEPTS CRITICALITY i/I FOR CV24 (MPS-383X).
THE MPS SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J.
BORCHES, ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION AT A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-382X
NASA FMEA #: 0605-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDACID: 382
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION
CHECK VALVE (CV24)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA 0605-2 IS NOW MATCHED TO MPS-4110.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-400X
NASA FMEA #: 0602-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
400
LO2 MANIFOLDREPRESSURIZATIONREGULATOR(PR5)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF REGULATOR FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF BOTH SOLENOID VALVES
(LV40, 41) WILL RESULT IN HELIUM INJECTION INTO THE LO2 MANIFOLD.
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FMEA WITH 0602-2.
IOA HAS NO ISSUE. SEE ALSO MPS-4541.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-409X
NASA FMEA #: 2077-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
409
OPEN RPC OUTPUTDIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE FRIOM THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-414X
NASA FMEA #: 2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
414
OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
12 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL SHORTED. DIODE FAILS B
SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE, AND LACK OF
INSTRUMENTATION. RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER OPEN SWITCH
BLOCKING DIODES (2187-2 AND 2189-2).
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-415X
NASA FMEA #: 2186-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
415
CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
12 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL SHORTED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY (GPC AND MANUAL) IN CLOSING THE L02 PREVALVE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY
MASKS THE FAILURE.
RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES
(2188-2) .
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-421X
NASA FMEA #: 2238B-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
421
BLOCKINGDIODE, SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE DIODE. THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR A DIODE IN
THE LO2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT. THE FMEA NUMBER IS 2238A-
2. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP, WHICH
MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-425X
NASA FMEA #: 2397-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
425
RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 12A
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE RPC A OUTPUT BLOCKING DIODE. FAIL
SHORTED. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH
MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I00
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-427X
2056B-2
EPD&C/MPS
427
DIODE, OP SW BLOCK (LCA)
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SWITCH SCAN CAN NOT ELIMINATE OTHER FAILURES. DIODE FAILURE IS
NOT DETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I01
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-430X
NASA FMEA #: 2355B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
430
DIODE, OP SW BLOCK (MODULE)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ X ]
REMARKS:
LH2 OUTBOARD FIL & DRAIN VALVE CIRCUIT.
THERE IS NO ELECTRICAL GROUND ON $6. NASA SCENARIO IS
INFEASIBLE. SWITCH CASE IS NOT GROUNDED.
SWITCH CASE IS GROUNDED. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-432X
NASA FMEA #: 2359B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
432
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
L02 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT.
FAIL OPEN. NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-433X
NASA FMEA #: 2037-5
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
433
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-439X
NASA FMEA #: 2286-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
439
DIODE (3A), CL SW BLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL SHORTED.
VALVE MAY OPEN DURING ASCENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY BE
DETECTABLE VIA VALVE POSITION INDICATION BUT CREW MAY NOT BE ABLE
TO RESPOND IN TIME TO PREVENT ENGINE EXPLOSION.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-458X
NASA FMEA #: 2031-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
458
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSIONDIODES
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
INADVERTENT REPETITION OF MPS-72X.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-461X
NASA FMEA #: 2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
461
HDC I-RELAY CONTROL PWR
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT FOR GO2 FLOW CONTROL VALVES. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-462X BASELINE [ ]
2033-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 462
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT FOR GO2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS
REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA
RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-463X
NASA FMEA #: 2033-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 463
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADO/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR GO2 FCV CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-465X BASELINE [ ]
2090-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 465
ITEM: CL HDC III
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-466X
NASA FMEA #: 2090-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 466
ITEM: CL HDC III
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCYSCREENS
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
IOA ACCEPTS
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-III
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-467X
NASA FMEA #: 2091-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 467
ITEM: CL HDC I
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CIRCUIT. PREMATURE OUTPUT. SECOND
FAILURE WILL CAUSE BLEED VALVE TO CLOSE. SEE RI/NASA 0452-1.
NOT A CIL ENTRY. NO CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-468X
NASA FMEA #: 2092-2
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 468
ITEM: CL RPC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CIRCUIT. PREMATURE OUTPUT. SECOND
FAILURE WILL CAUSE BLEED VALVE TO CLOSE. SEE RI/NASA 0452-1.
NOT A CIL ENTRY. NO CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-469X BASELINE [ ]
2092-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 469
ITEM: CL RPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CIRCUIT. PREMATURE OUTPUT. SECOND
FAILURE WILL CAUSE BLEED VALVE TO CLOSE. SEE RI/NASA 0452-1.
NOT A CIL ENTRY. NO CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-472X
NASA FMEA #: 2093-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
472
CL RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP, WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-498X
NASA FMEA #: 2350-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
498
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES (2)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH CIRCUIT.
FAIL SHORTED.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE HDC WILL SHORT THE LOCK OR UNLOCK
COMMAND TO GROUND. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW THE
DISCONNECT VALVE TO CLOSE DURING ENGINE BURN RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE.
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-601X
NASA FMEA #: 2167-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 601
ITEM: TOGGLESWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSME CONTROLLER POWER. FAIL TO TRANSFER TO OFF. THE TOGGLE
SWITCH IS NOT USED AT MECO.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-603X BASELINE [ ]
2167-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 603
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE TOGGLE SWITCH IS NOT USED AT MECO.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-605X
NASA FMEA #: 2168-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
605
CIRCUIT BREAKER
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSME CONTROLLER POWER. FAIL OFF. THE FAILURE OF SOME BUT NOT
ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS CAN BE DETECTED.
ALL 3 ARE REQUIRED TO OPERATE CONTROLLER.
DETECTABLE VIA CONTROLLER.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-619X
NASA F_ #: 2166-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 619
ITEM: FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MAIN ENGINE LIMIT SHUTDOWN CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-620X
NASA FMEA #: 2170-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 620
ITEM: FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN. THE MANUAL SHUTDOWN
CAPABILITY IS USED WHEN LIMIT CONTROL IS INHIBITED AND AN ENGINE
LIMIT VIOLATION OCCURS (I.E., ABORT CASE).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. PUSHBUTTON
COMMANDS APPEAR TO BE DUAL REDUNDANT.
BOTH SIGNALS ARE REQUIRED. PUSHBUTTON COMMANDS ARE NOT
REDUNDANT. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-621X
NASA FMEA #: 2171-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
621
PUSHBUTTONSWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN. THE MANUAL SHUTDOWN
CAPABILITY IS USED WHEN LIMIT CONTROL IS INHIBITED AND AN ENGINE
LIMIT VIOLATION OCCURS (I.E., ABORT CASE).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. PUSHBUTTON
COMMANDS APPEAR TO BE DUAL REDUNDANT.
BOTH SIGNALS ARE REQUIRED. PUSHBUTTON COMMANDS ARE NOT
REDUNDANT. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-622X
NASA FMEA #: 2171-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
622
PUSHBUTTON SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSME SHUTDOWN. FAIL CLOSED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP AND i/i FOR
ABORTS WHICH MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-640X
NASA FMEA #: 2027-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
640
BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM HDC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-642X
NASA FMEA #: 2028-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
642
BUS 2 AND 3 DOWNSTREAM AND BUS 1 HDC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AN UNDERLOAD WOULD NOT OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE FIRST FAILURE.
SENSORS ARE AVAILABLE AT 100.15%, 100%, AND 99.85% AND ARE ALL
POWERED BY A SEPARATE BUS.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-644X
NASA FMEA #: 2232-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 644
ITEM: BUS 4 RPC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-646X
NASA FMEA #: 2233-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
646
RPC OUTPUT DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PARALLEL POWER PATHS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE FIRST FAILURE.
SECOND FAILURE WILL NOT ELIMINATE TWO POWER SUPPLIES.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
A
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-648X
NASA FMEA #: 2233-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
648
RPC OUTPUT DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-667X
NASA FMEA #: 2161-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
667
BACKUPLH2 VLV SWITCH FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ p ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-669X
NASA FMEA #: 2162-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPD&C/MPS
669
DUMP SEQUENCE SWITCH S1
B. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-670X
NASA FMEA #: 2163-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
670
BACKUPLH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-672X
NASA FMEA #: 2163-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
672
BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PREMATURE TRANSFER TO OPEN, CONTACT-TO-CONTACT SHORT ACROSS
"OPEN" POLES.
PROPELLANT VENTING DURING BOOST COULD CAUSE FIRE/EXPLOSION.
SOFTWARE INHIBITS WERE NOT CONSIDERED.
PREMATURE TRANSFER TO START COULD VENT PROPELLANT OVERBOARD
DURING BOOST. THIS COULD RESULT IN FIRE/EXPLOSION.
DOCUMENTATION ON ANY SOFTWARE INHIBIT WAS UNAVAILABLE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-673X
2163-4
EPD&C/MPS
673
BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[F] IF]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-680X BASELINE [ ]
2416-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 680
ITEM: STATUS LIGHT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0663-1 AND DELETED IT
FROM THE CIL. THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-681X
NASA FMEA #: 2407-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 681
ITEM: METER M1 (PC)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-682X
NASA FMEA #: 2408-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
682
METER M2 (LO2/LH2 MANF. PRESSURE)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-683X
NASA FMEA #: 2409-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
683
METER M4 (HELIUM PRESSURE)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0662-1.
POSTULATED FAILURES OF FA MDM AND MAIN ENGINE VIOLATE NSTS 22206
2.3.2d. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-137
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-684X BASELINE [ ]
2410-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
684
TOGGLE SWITCH (TANK/REG SELECT FOR METER M4)
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-806X
NASA FMEA #: 2050-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROLLER
EPD&C/MPS
806
HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWNVALVES HYBRID DRIVER
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CRITICALITY FOR AN ABORT IS I/i.
RI/NASA ANALYSIS REPORTS 3/3 NOMINAL, i/i ABORT.
NO ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-807X
NASA FMEA #: 2111-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
8O7
HELIUM ISOLATION B VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. LOSS OF HELIUM
PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN (SEE NSTS
22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION BUT NSTS 22206 2.3.31
REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-808X
NASA FMEA #: 2114-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
808
HELIUM ISOLATION "B" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORT.
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY
TO 3/IR PFP.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR. THE
RI/NASA RESULT MATCHES THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-809X
NASA FMEA #: 2115-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
809
HELIUM ISOLATION "B" VALVE RPC OUTPUT DIODE (6)
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
[ N ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
SHORT TO GROUND.
THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-810X
NASA FMEA #: 2117-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
810
HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-811X BASELINE [ ]
2119-2 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
811
HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-812X
NASA FMEA #: 2119-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
812
HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-813X
NASA FMEA #: 2120-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DIODES
EPD&C/MPS
813
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA HAS REVISED ITS RECOMMENDATION AND MADE THIS A NON-CIL.
CIL ISSUE.
NO
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-814X
NASA FMEA #: 2300-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 814
ITEM: FUSES (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-817X
NASA FMEA #: 2302-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 817
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-818X
NASA FMEA #: 2302-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 818
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT.
OPEN.
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM
SUPPLY.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
FAIL
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-819X BASELINE [ ]
2302-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 819
ITEM: TOGGLESWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
B. SLAUGHTER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-825X
NASA FMEA #: 2312-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
825
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-830X BASELINE [ ]
2065-1 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
83O
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT HDC III (2)
B. SLAUGHTER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL OFF. RI/NASA INDICATES I/i FOR ABORT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-832X
NASA FMEA #: 2135-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
832
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSIONDIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE (LVI0) CIRCUIT.
FAIL SHORT.
SECOND FAILURE COULD GROUND SOLENOID OPEN POWER.
RI/NASA HAS ASSIGNED 2/IR PPP FOR SIMILAR EFFECT (0208-1).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-835X
NASA FMEA #: 2143-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
835
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA ASSUMES A HELIUM LEAK WHICH IS CRITICALITY i/i BY ITSELF TO
GET THEIR IR.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-836X
NASA FMEA #: 2144-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
836
ISOLATION DIODES (6)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-837X
2145-2
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
837
ISOLATION DIODES
B. SLAUGHTER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE COULD RESULT IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST.
THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L
REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE
SHUTDOWN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-901X
NASA FMEA #: 0602-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
901
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS REGULATOR (PR5)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SENSE PORT CLOGGED.
REGULATOR WILL REMAIN OPEN DURING ENTRY REPRESS, PRESSURIZING THE
MANIFOLD. FAILURE OF RELIEF SYSTEM DURING ENTRY MAY CAUSE
MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO HAZARD DURING DUMP PRESSURIZATION.
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 0602-5 WITH 0602-2 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
SWITCH FAILURE CAN CAUSE BOTH REPRESS VALVES TO OPEN. NOTE:
THIS FAILURE MODE FOR THE LH2 REGULATOR (PR6) IS ADDRESSED ON
0629-4 AND WAS ASSIGNED A 2/IR BY RI/NASA. SEE ALSO 2312-2.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, D. PREVETT,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION AT A MEETING ON 9-9-88.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-915X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
915
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS (3)
LEAD ANALYST : W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0741-1 AND REVISED THE
ANALYSIS TO ADDRESS AN ERRONEOUS LOW PRESSURE INDICATION. THE
RESULTING RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/1R PPP.
TERMINATION OF HELIUM FLOW SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE ENGINE
SHUTDOWN (SEE NSTS 22206 2.3.2d) AND LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY IR.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-917X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-10
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCERS (6)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST:
MPS
917
ENGINE HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
ASSESSMENT:
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0743-1 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PPP.
REMOVAL FROM THE CIL ELIMINATES THE CIL ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-918X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
MPS
918
PNEUMATIC HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-919X
NASA FMEA #: 0626-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
919
HELIUM ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-920X
NASA FMEA #: 0627-6
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
920
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS (6)
W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MULTIPLE FAILURE OF TRANSDUCERS MAY ALLOW STRUCTURAL TEMPERATURE
LIMITS TO BE VIOLATED DURING TANK FILL AND CAUSE RUPTURE AND LOSS
OF VEHICLE. FAILURE DURING ASCENT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0749-1 AND REVISED THE
CRITICALITY TO 3/3. NO CIL ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-921X
NASA FMEA #: 0627-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
921
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0750-1. NO CIL ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-924X
NASA FMEA #: 0901-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
924
STRUCTURAL ATTACH POINTS
W.J. MCNICOLL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ NA]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
NSTS 22206 2.3.1 DOES NOT REQUIRE A FMEA FOR STRUCTURE.
0901-1.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA.
DELETE
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1002
NASA FMEA #: 0514-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
20)
MPS
1002
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ /NA ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL TO CHEK.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1005
NASA FMEA #: 0514-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2O)
MPS
1005
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO OPEN.
FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE TO OPEN WILL ALLOW INCREASING GO2
PRESSURE TO RUPTURE THE HEAT EXCHANGER, POSSIBLY RESULTING IN
ENGINE EXPLOSION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/i WHICH MATCHES THE IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1006
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
20)
MPS
1006
GO2 PRESSURE ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CVI8, 19,
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART.
THE BURNING OF THIS VALVE COULD CAUSE A HOLE WHICH WOULD ALLOW
HOT GO2 TO ENTER THE AFT COMPARTMENT. THIS WOULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND A POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0514 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1012
NASA FMEA #: 0518-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1012
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED 0518-2 WITH 0502-2.
IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1014
NASA FMEA #: N/A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
1014
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0502 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS.
GO2 TEMPERATURE AT THE LOCATION OF THIS COMPONENT IS TOO LOW TO
SUPPORT COMBUSTION. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1021
NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1021
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
[F] [P] [X]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICLAITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT. THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH
MPS-1023.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1022
NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1022
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICLAITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT. THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED
MPS-1023.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1023
NASA FMEA #: 0451-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1023
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICLAITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1025
NASA FMEA #: 0451-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1025
LO2 BLEED CHECKVALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
RI/NASA HIGHER CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-1028 BASELINE [ ]
0451-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
1028
LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
THIS IOA WORKSHEET APPLIES ONLY TO THE PRELAUNCH PHASE. LOSS OF
TEMPERATURE CONDITIONING FOR ONE ENGINE MAY CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY.
THIS IOA WORKSHEET SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH #1023.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1031
NASA FMEA #: 0519-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1031
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF TWO FLOW CONTROL VALVES MAY CAUSE VIOLATION OF SAFETY
LIMITS ON 02 ULLAGE PRESSURE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE
ULLAGE PRESSURE TO FALL BELOW ITS MINIMUM ALLOWABLE VALVE. THIS
IS MONITORED AND WILL BE INDICATED TO THE CREW.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/I.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1032
NASA FMEA #: 0519-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1032
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
LEAD ANALYST : K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/20/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1033
NASA FMEA #: 0519-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
1033
GO2 PRESSUREFLOWCONTROLVALVE (LV53, 54, 55)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1055
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1055
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0513 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS.
GO2 TEMPERATURE AT THE LOCATION OF THIS COMPONENT IS TOO LOW TO
SUPPORT COMBUSTION. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-1056 BASELINE [ ]
0513-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
1056
GO2 PRESSURIZATION (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PD4)
K.A. HOLDEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO CLOSE/REMAIN CLOSED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/i.
IOA ACCEPTS THE I/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS. PROPULSIVE VENTING
THROUGH THE OPEN GO2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT MAY, DEPENDING ON
PLACEMENT AND ORIENTATION, AID THE TUMBLE SYSTEM RATHER THAN
REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. LEAKAGE OF GO2 INTO THE DISCONNECT
CAVITY AFTER MECO IS NOT HAZARDOUS. SEE ALSO 0755-3.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT AS THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME,
PENDING A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE STATED RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-1063
NASA FMEA #: 0517-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1063
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FMEA WITH 0501-1.
FAIL TO CLOSE, REMAIN CLOSED OR INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
IOA ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN C FOR FAILURE TO CLOSE. SCREEN C
SHOULD PASS FOR FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED AND INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
REMAINS A CIL ENTRY REGARDLESS OF SCREENS. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1064A
NASA FMEA #: 0517-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1064
LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS (ORB/GND) DISC (PD9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FMEA WITH 0501-4 AND CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY TO i/i.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-I091
NASA FMEA #: 0516-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(PDI5)
MPS
1091
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. RI/NASA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE AS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR FFF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1092
NASA FMEA #: 0516-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(PDI5)
MPS
1092
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] IF]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/I WHICH MATCHES THE IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/22/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-1093
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(PDI5)
MPS
1093
GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SPONTANEOUS IGNITION IN/OF PART.
COMBUSTION OF THE COMPONENT WILL ALLOW ESCAPE OF 02, CREATING A
FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD THAT CAN DESTROY THE VEHICLE.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0516 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS.
GO2 TEMPERATURE AT THE LOCATION OF THIS COMPONENT IS TOO LOW TO
SUPPORT COMBUSTION. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-II31
NASA FMEA #: 0311-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1131
LO2 OUTBOARDFILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-II73
NASA FMEA #: 0452-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
1173
LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS CIL WORKSHEET WITH 0452-2 AND ASSIGNED
A i/i CRITICALITY.
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT. BLEED DISCONNECT CAN NOT BE INCLUDED
AS A REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-IISI
NASA FMEA #: 0453-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
21)
MPS
1181
LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20,
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP AND REVISED THE
ANALYSIS TO APPLY ONLY TO FRF AND PAD ABORTS (PRELAUNCH). IOA
ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-II92
NASA FMEA #: 0427-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
I192
LO2 LOW LEVEL LIQUID SENSOR (MTI, 2)
LEAD ANALYST: K.A. HOLDEN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FALSE DRY ECO SIGNAL.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOW ADDRESSED ON 0427-4. RI/NASA HAS
ASSIGNED A 2/IR PPP. THIS ASSESSMENT ALSO COVERS THE LH2 ECO
SENSORS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2006
NASA FMEA #: 0301-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2006
LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i.
RI/NASA CIL IMPLIES FAILURES OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE OR REMAIN
CLOSED, WHICH ARE ADDRESSED ON A NON-CIL FMEA AND 0301-4,
RESPECTIVELY. ERRONEOUS INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE
WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. AT LEAST TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO
HAVE A HARMFUL EFFECT. THE SECOND, A FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO
REMAIN CLOSED, IS A I/i REGARDLESS OF POSITION INDICATION. SEE
ALSO 0301-8.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2015
NASA FMEA #: 0302-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2015
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRONEOUS INDICATION.
RI/NASA CIL IMPLIES FAILURES OF THE VALVE TO CLOSE OR REMAIN
CLOSED, WHICH ARE ADDRESSED ON 0302-2 AND 0302-4. ERRONEOUS
INDICATION OF A PROPERLY OPERATING VALVE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
SEE ALSO 0302-7.
IOA BELIEVES THIS CIL ENTRY IS REDUNDANT BUT WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE
ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PRESENCE IS NOT HARMFUL AND ITS REMOVAL
WOULD CONSUME SCARCE RESOURCES WITHOUT ANY CORRESPONDING BENEFIT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2053
NASA FMEA #: 0304-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2053
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES FAILURE TO REMAIN OPEN. MANIFOLD
PRESSURE INDICATOR AND ALARM SUPPORT PASSAGE OF SCREEN B.
NSTS 22206 2.3.4c EXCLUDES FAILURE OF THE RELIEF SYSTEM FOR
DETERMINATION OF SCREEN C. SINGLE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTABLE.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2061
NASA FMEA #: 0431-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2061
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL TO OPEN OR REMAIN OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2062
NASA FMEA #: 0431-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2062
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] IF]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA FMEA # SHOWN ABOVE IS INCORRECT. THIS ASSESSMENT
ADDRESSES FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED, FMEA # 0431-4. IOA ACCEPTS
RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2081A
NASA FMEA #: 0430-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2081
LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (FHI9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ANALYSIS IS FOR THE FOAM INSULATED LINE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CIL TO COVER THE VACUUM-JACKETED LINE.
THE LINE IS NOT FOAM INSULATED. MDAC 2081A SHOULD BE DELETED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2102
NASA FMEA #: 0403-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2102
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMPVALVE (PVI4, PVI5, PVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2103
NASA FMEA #: 0403-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2103
LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, PVI5, PVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS CHANGED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0403-4. CRITICALITY
STILL MATCHES IOA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-2162 BASELINE [ ]
0411-2 NEW [ X ]
MPS
2162
LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV7)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2191
NASA FMEA #: 0505-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(CV21,CV22,CV23)
MPS
2191
GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO OPEN.
THE RI/NASA CIL INDICATES THAT THIS CRITICALITY HAS BEEN REVISED
TO 2/IR FPP. THE CIL WORKSHEET FOR THIS WAS OMITTED FROM THE
RI/NASA DOCUMENTATION.
RI/NASA LISTING OF SCREENS AS FPP WAS A MISPRINT. THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES, ACCEPTED THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION AT A MEETING ON 9-2-88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2212
NASA FMEA #: 0503-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2212
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT (PD5)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i.
THE ET TUMBLE SYSTEM IS BASED ON RESIDUAL GO2.
PROPULSIVE VENTING THROUGH THE OPEN GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
MAY, DEPENDING ON PLACEMENT AND ORIENTATION, AID THE TUMBLE
SYSTEM RATHER THAN REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS.
LEAKAGE OF GH2 INTO THE DISCONNECT CAVITY AFTER MECO IS NOT
HAZARDOUS. IOA AEPTS THE i/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS. SEE ALSO
0756-3.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT AS THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME,
PENDING A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS TO ACURATELY DETERMINE THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE STATED RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2222A
NASA FMEA #: 0501-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
2222
LH2 TANK GROUNDPRE-PRESSDISCONNECT(PDI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
COMP_ [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (if different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2222B
NASA FMEA #: 0501-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2222
LH2 TANK GROUND PRE-PRESS DISCONNECT (PDI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/i.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2231
NASA FMEA #: 0516-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(PDI6)
MPS
2231
GH2 PRESSURIZATIONMANIFOLDTEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ F ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/I WHICH MATCHES THE IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2231A
NASA FMEA #: 0516-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(PDI6)
MPS
2231
GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD TEST POINT COUPLING
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ HA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. RI/NASA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE AS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR FFF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2272
NASA FMEA #: 0402-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
MPS
2272
LH2 PREVALVE(PV4,PV5,PV6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-204
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2275
NASA FMEA #: 0402-6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2275
LH2 PREVALVE (PV4,PV5,PV6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. OPEN INDICATION FAILS ON.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2343A
NASA FMEA #: 0436-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2343
LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD RELIEF VALVE (RV6)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
THIS RI/NASA ANALYSIS COULD BE COMBINED WITH 0436-5.
FIRST FAILURE WILL ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LH2 FROM SENSE LINE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2351
NASA FMEA #: 0608-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
2351
LH2 DUMPPRESSURIZATIONORIFICE (RPI0)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
E N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2381
NASA FMEA #: 0651-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2381
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION OF
REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-2382A
NASA FMEA #: 0651-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2382
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ F ]
[ F ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-209
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-2391
NASA FMEA #: 0651-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
2391
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARDVALVE (PVlS)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J.MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION OF
REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-2392A BASELINE [ ]
0651-4 NEW [ X ]
MPS
2392
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARDVALVE (PVI8)
W.J.MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HASA DELETED THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3010
NASA FMEA #: 0202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3010
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVI,CV2,CV3)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
A SINGLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN WILL CAUSE AN INTACT ABORT. NO LOSS OF
CREW OR VEHICLE. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT ON THE BASIS OF AFT COMPARTMENT
OVER PRESSURIZATION UPON SECOND FAILURE.
NSTS 22206 2.3.2d INDICATES THAT THE SSME SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF
HELIUM FLOW SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SAFE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3020
NASA FMEA #: 0201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(PD8)
MPS
3020
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT(ORB/GND,ORB HALF),
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO CLOSE OR REMAIN CLOSED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFF.
SECOND FAILURE (CVI, 2, 3) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF HELIUM AND AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF ANOTHER CHECK VALVE WILL CAUSE A
SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE. NSTS 22206 2.3.31
REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.
IOA ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN C. NSTS 22206 2.3.2D INDICATES
THAT THE SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF HELIUM FLOW SHOULD BE CONSIDEREq_
AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SAFE ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3021
NASA FMEA #: 0201-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(PD8)
MPS
3021
HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT (ORB/GND, ORB HALF),
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA FMEA 0201-3 REFERS ONLY TO DETECTABLE LEAKAGE PRIOR TO
LAUNCH. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3021A
NASA FMEA #: 0201-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(PD8)
MPS
3021
HELIUM SUPPLYDISCONNECT(ORB/GND, ORB HALF),
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SECOND FAILURE (CVl, 2, 3 FAIL TO CHECK) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF
HELIUM AND AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN. FAILURE OF ANOTHER CHECK VALVE
WILL CAUSE A SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
NSTS 22206 2.3.2d INDICATES THAT THE SSME SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF
HELIUM FLOW SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SAFE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT ON THE BASIS OF AFT COMPARTMENT
OVERPRESSURIZATION UPON SECOND FAILURE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3050A
NASA FMEA #: 0203-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3050
4.7 CU. FT. HELIUM SUPPLY TANK (TKI,2,3,7,9,11)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THE PREVIOUS VERSIONS OF 0203-1 AND 0203-2
TO MAKE THIS 0203-1 AND HAS ASSIGNED A i/i. THIS AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION. THE IOA WORKSHEETS 3050 AND 3050A CAN ALSO
BE COMBINED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3070
NASA FMEA #: 0258-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3070
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SINGLE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. LEAKAGE OF UPSTREAM LINE IS
A SINGLE FAILURE POINT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3070A
NASA FMEA #: 0258-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDACID: 3070
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS FMEA WITH 0258-2.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3071
NASA FMEA #: 0258-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3071
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26;36,37;41,42)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL TO OPEN. POSSIBLE LAUNCH SCRUB.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-3071A
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
3071
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] C N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN.
FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. ANY INTERRUPTION OF HELIUM
FLOW IN THE OTHER LEG WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF
MISSION.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0258 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS.
FAILURE NOT CREDIBLE. CHECK VALVE WILL NOT CLOSE DURING FLOW.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3080
NASA FMEA #: 0242-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
MPS
3080
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RESTRICTED FLOW.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN SHUTDOWN OF ONE ENGINE AND LOSS OF
MISSION. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
LOSS OF HELIUM FLOW SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
SEE NSTS 22206 2.3.2d.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3082
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(FL2,6;3,7;4,8)
MPS
3082
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER - PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO THE 0242 SERIES IN THE RI/NASA
RESULTS. DOWNSTREAM CONTAMINATION CAUSING LOW FLOW IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER FMEA WORKSHEETS (0205-1).
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3090A
NASA FMEA #: 0204-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
LEAD ANALYST:
MPS
3090
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
SECOND FAILURE WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
LOSS OF HELIUM FLOW SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
IOA ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN B.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3091
NASA FMEA #: 0204-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
MPS
3091
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3092
NASA FMEA #: 0204-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
MPS
3092
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/i. FAILURE WILL CAUSE
ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION. ESCAPING HELIUM MAY
OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3092A
NASA FMEA #: 0204-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(LVI,2;3,4;5,6)
MPS
3092
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS FAILURE MODE TO EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
THE PILOT VENT PORT AND REVISED THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3 NOMINAL
AND i/i FOR RTLS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-226
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3110
NASA FMEA #: 0205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3110
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL CLOSED; LOW OUTLET PRESSURE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP. IOA ACCEPTS
FAILURE OF SCREEN B.
SECOND FAILURE WILL CAUSE ENGINE SHUTDOWN AND LOSS OF MISSION.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
LOSS OF HELIUM FLOW SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
SEE NSTS 22206 2.3.2d.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3110A
NASA FMEA #: 0205-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3110
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL, WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3111
NASA FMEA #: 0205-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3111
ENGINE HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,7;2,8;3,9)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO I/I WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3120
NASA FMEA #: 0206-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
MPS
3120
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION (i/i). POSSIBLE ENGINE SHUTDOWN
CAUSED BY LOSS OF HELIUM (2/2).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
THIS FMEA IS LISTED BY RI/NASA AS A CIL ENTRY BUT IS NOT INCLUDED
IN THEIR DOCUMENTATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3120A
NASA FMEA #: 0206-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
MPS
3120
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO RESEAT.
SINCE RI/NASA DID NOT MAKE THIS FMEA A CIL ENTRY, NO
DOCUMENTATION/RATIONALE IS AVAILABLE ON WHICH TO BASE AN
ASSESSMENT.
FAILURE TO RESEAT FOLLOWING RELIEF CAN CAUSE AFT COMPARTMENT
OVERPRESSURIZATION.
THIS FAILURE WAS ADDRESSED ON RI/NASA FMEA # 0206-1 WHICH CARRIES
A I/i CRITICALITY BUT WAS OMITTED FROM THE RI/NASA RESULTS. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3121
NASA FMEA #: 0206-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
MPS
3121
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION (1/1).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
THIS FMEA IS LISTED BY RI/NASA AS A CIL ENTRY BUT IS NOT INCLUDED
IN THEIR DOCUMENTATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3122
NASA FMEA #: 0206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(RVI,8;2,9;3,10)
LEAD ANALYST:
MPS
3122
ENGINE HE RELIEF VALVE PANEL A;B
M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ NA]
[ N ]
B
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ NA]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
r ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION UPON SECOND FAILURE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR FNAF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-3130 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
MPS
3130
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE SENSE LINE
M.L.MCNEELY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION.
RI/NASA DID NOT ADDRESS RELIEF VALVE SENSE LINES AS SEPARATE
ITEMS. RI/NASA DOES SHOW EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE RELIEF VALVE AS
CRITICALITY i/I (0206-4)
THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE IS NOW INCLUDED ON RI/NASA 0111-i WHICH
CARRIES A i/i CRITICALITY.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3140
NASA FMEA #: 0207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
3140
ENGINE REG OUTLET CHECK VLV (CV5,29;6,40;7,45)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILS TO CHECK.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT. THE CHECK VALVE CANNOT PROTECT AGAINST AN
UPSTREAM LEAK.
RI/NASA LISTS THIS FMEA AS A CIL ENTRY BUT IT WAS OMITTED FROM
THEIR DOCUMENTATION.
A LEAK BETWEEN THE ISOLATION VALVE AND THE CHECK VALVE CAN BE
ISOLATED BY THE CREW. FAILURE OF THE CHECK VALVE WILL ALLOW
HELIUM FROM THE OTHER LEG TO LEAK AWAY. CREW ACTION DOES NOT
AFFECT CRITICALITY. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3150
NASA FMEA #: 0260-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
MPS
3150
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETAION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3151
NASA FMEA #: 0260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
MPS
3151
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT INLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETAION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3152
NASA FMEA #: 0260-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV59,61,63)
MPS
3152
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLYINTERCONNECTINLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3160
NASA FMEA #: 0262-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
LEAD ANALYST:
MPS
3160
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3162
NASA FMEA #: 0262-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
MPS
3162
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA INDICATES 3/3 FOR NOMINAL FLIGHT AND i/i FOR RTLS ABORT
ONLY.
THIS FAILURE MODE ASSUMES LEAKAGE THROUGH THE PILOT VENT PORT
ONLY.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-3162A
NASA FMEA #: 0262-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV60,62,64)
MPS
3162
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS RI/NASA FMEA HAS BEEN COMBINED WITH 0262-3.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3170
NASA FMEA #: 0261-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3170
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL
OUTLET (CV28,39,44)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO PASS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3180
NASA FMEA #: 0259-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INLET (CV27,38,43)
LEAD ANALYST:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
MPS
3180
ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
M.L.MCNEELY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] [N] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-3181
NASA FMEA #: 0259-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 3181
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT CHECK VALVE-PANEL
INLET (CV27,38,43)
LEAD ANALYST: M.L.MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4010
NASA FMEA #: 0202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4010
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
C
[ F ]
[ P ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT. SEE ALSO MPS-3010.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4020
NASA FMEA #: 0241-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4020
PNEUVALVE HE REG OUTLETCHECKVALVE (CV8)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN B AND WITHDRAWS THIS ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4021
NASA FMEA #: 0241-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4021
PNEUVALVE HE ISOLATION CHECKVALVE (CV8)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SECOND FAILURE (LVI0) WILL PREVENT VALVE OPERATIONS FOR DUMP.
VENTING HYDROGEN WILL CREATE A FIRE HAZARD DURING ENTRY/LANDING.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE FAILURE OF SCREEN B AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4030
NASA FMEA #: 0209-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4030
PNEUVALVE HE ISOLATION CHECKVALVE (CV9)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/I.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4031
NASA FMEA #: 0209-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4031
PNEUVALVE HE ISOLATION CHECKVALVE (CV9)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4040
NASA FMEA #: 0631-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4040
GO2 PRESS MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUDANDCY.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4050
NASA FMEA #: 0603-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4050
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUDANDCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4051
NASA FMEA #: 0603-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4051
LO2 FEED MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI2)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM PRESSURE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR DUMP. RELIEF SYSTEM AND
INERTING WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL, WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4060
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4060
GH2 PRESS MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI3)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR RI/NASA 0605-2. FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED.
THE RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/IR PFP.
GH2 WILL, UPON SECOND FAILURE, PASS THROUGH CVI3 AND CV24 AND
ENTER THE FEED MANIFOLD THROUGH CVI5.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4070
NASA FMEA #: 0632-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4070
LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESSCHECK VALVE (CVI4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4071
NASA FMEA #: 0632-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4071
LH2 RECIRC MANIF REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4080
NASA FMEA #: 0630-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4080
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVl5)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4081
NASA FMEA #: 0630-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4081
LH2 FEED MANIF NOM REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI5)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DEGRADED DUMP. MPS INERTING WILL CLEAR REMAINING LH2. RELIEF
SYSTEM WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. NO REDUNDANCY.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4110
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4110
GH2 PRESS MANIFOLD REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV24)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR RI/NASA 0605-2. FAIL TO REMAIN CLOSED.
THE RI/NASA CRITICALITY IS 2/IR PFP.
GH2 WILL, UPON SECOND FAILURE, PASS THROUGH CVI3 AND CV24 AND
ENTER THE FEED MANIFOLD THROUGH CVI5.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4120
NASA FMEA #: 0248-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4120
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV30)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LINE RUPTURE IS NOT VALID AS LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE HAS NO
EFFECT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4121
NASA FMEA #: 0248-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4121
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESS CHECK VALVE (CV30)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL. OPENING FILL AND
DRAIN VALVES SHOULD ALLOW FOR AN ADEQUATE LH2 DUMP WITHOUT HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4132
NASA FMEA #: 0238-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4132
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY-ISOLATION VALVE (LV7,LV8)
LEAD ANALYST: A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NAJ [ NA 3 [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4140
NASA FMEA #: 0208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4140
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/1R PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4141
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4141
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
LEAD ANALYST : A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS ADDED THIS FAILURE MODE TO 0208-1 WHICH CARRIES A
CRITICALITY OF 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4142
NASA FMEA #: 0208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4142
PNEU HE CROSSOVER SOLENOID (LVI0)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4152A
NASA FMEA #: 0225-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4152
LO2 PREVALVEOPENINGSOLENOID (LVI2,LVI4,LVI6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE MODE IS PREMATURE ACTUATION.
FAILURE OF BOTH OPENING SOLENOIDS CAN PREVENT PREVALVE CLOSURE
DESPITE PROPER OPERATION OF CLOSING SOLENOIDS, i.e., ACTUATION OF
OPENING SOLENOIDS BEFORE VALVE HAS CLOSED AT MECO.
SCENARIO IS NOT CREDIBLE. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4162A
NASA FMEA #: 0226-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4162
LO2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI3,LVlS,LVI7)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F _ [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CRITICALITY HAS BEEN REVISED TO 2/IR PFP.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-266
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4164
NASA FMEA #: 0227-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4164
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4166
NASA FMEA #: 0227-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4166
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
LEAD ANALYST : A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDATION WAS 3/3 BASED ON FAILURE OF PREVALVE TO CLOSE
HAVING NO EFFECT AND RULE 2.3.2d (NSTS 22206) EXCLUDING FAILURES
IN INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS.
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4166A
NASA FMEA #: 0227-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4166
LH2 PREVALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LVI8,LV20,LV22)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDATION WAS 3/3 BASED ON FAILURE OF PREVALVE TO CLOSE
HAVING NO EFFECT AND RULE 2.3.2d (NSTS 22206) EXCLUDING FAILURES
IN INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS.
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4167
NASA FMEA #: 0228-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4167
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI9,LV21,LV23)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO CLOSE PREVALVE HAS NO EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES IN
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS ARE NOT CONSIDERED (NSTS 22206, 2.3.2d).
REF: RI/NASA CIL OF 12-23-87 AND RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET OF 12-14-
87. INITIAL IOA RECOMMENDATION WAS 3/3, NNN.
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4168
NASA FMEA #: 0228-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4168
LH2 PREVALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LVI9,LV21,LV23)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE OF PREVALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED HAS NO EFFECT. FAILURES IN
INTERFACING SUBSYSTEM ARE NOT CONSIDERED (NSTS 22206, 2.3.2d).
INITIAL IOA RECOMMENDATION WAS 3/3. RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS
ITEM FROM THE CIL.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4172
NASA FMEA #: 0231-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV24)
MPS
4172
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/I. INADEQUACY OF HPOT
SEAL LEAKAGE TO PREVENT RUPTURE SUPPORTS THE i/I CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4172A
NASA FMEA #: 0231-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV24)
MPS
4172
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 0231-5 WITH 0231-2, WHICH CARRIES A I/I
CRITICALITY. THE i/I WAS ACCEPTED BY IOA ON ASSESSMENT SHEET
MPS-4172. THIS ASSESSMENT, MPS-4172A, CAN BE DELETED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4182A
NASA FMEA #: 0232-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV25)
MPS
4182
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CLOSING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED 0232-5 WITH 0232-2, WHICH CARRIES A i/i
CRITICALITY AND AGREES WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION. MPS-4182A
CAN BE DELETED.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4190
NASA FMEA #: 0233-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4190
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE (LV26,LV27)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS RI/NASA CRITICALITY SHOULD READ 3/3 FOR NOMINAL FLIGHT AND
I/I FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS.
THE PURGE IS CRITICAL DURING ABORTS ONLY.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4191
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4191
HE SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVE (LV26,LV27)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INADEQUATE PURGE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
RI/NASA HAS ADDED THIS FAILURE MODE TO 0233-3 WHICH CARRIES
CRITICALITIES OF 3/3 FOR NOMINAL AND i/i FOR ABORT. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4242
NASA FMEA #: 0229-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4242
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4242A
NASA FMEA #: 0229-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4242
LH2 RECIRC PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV36)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER INTERPRETATION
OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4250
NASA FMEA #: 0230-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4250
LH2 REPLENISH VALVE OPENING SOLENOID(LV39)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAN PREVENT LH2 DUMP. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RELIEF
SYSTEM CAN CAUSE MANIFOLD RUPTURE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA PREVIOUSLY
RECOMMENDED 2/IR PPF. SCREEN C SHOULD PASS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4260
NASA FMEA #: 0601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
MPS
4260
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4261
NASA FMEA #: 0601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4261
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV40,LV41)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4270
NASA FMEA #: 0606-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4270
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVE (LV42,LV43)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/3 WITH i/i FOR RTLS AND
TAL ABORTS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4282
NASA FMEA #: 0219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV46)
MPS
4282
LO2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CRITICALITY HAS BEEN REVISED TO 2/IR PFP.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4302
NASA FMEA #: 0217-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV48)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4302
LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA CRITICALITY HAS BEEN REVISED TO 2/IR PFP.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4321
NASA FMEA #: 0215-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LVS0)
MPS
4321
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4322
NASA FMEA #: 0215-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
(LVS0)
MPS
4322
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECTVALVE OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THEIR CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
PASS FOR SCREEN B BASED ON POSITION INDICATOR.
IOA RECOMMENDED 2/IR BASED ON REQUIREMENT FOR TWO FAILURES TO
ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LH2. RI/NASA STATES THAT LH2 LEAKAGE IS NOT
HAZARDOUS AT ET SEP. NSTS 22206 2.3.3h CLASSIFIES ALL SUCH
LEAKAGES AS CRIT I. RI/NASA ASSIGNS 2/IR BASED ON AN ENGINE
FAILURE AND A SOLENOID FAILURE. NSTS 22206 2.3.2d DOES NOT ALLOW
FAILURE OF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4330
NASA FMEA #: 0216-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LVSI)
MPS
4330
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THEIR CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS
PASS FOR SCREEN B BASED ON POSITION INDICATOR.
IOA RECOMMENDED 2/IR BASED ON REQUIREMENT FOR TWO FAILURES TO
ALLOW LEAKAGE OF LH2. RI/NASA STATES THAT LH2 LEAKAGE IS NOT
HAZARDOUS AT ET SEP. NSTS 22206 2.3.3h CLASSIFIES ALL SUCH
LEAKAGES AS CRIT i. RI/NASA ASSIGNS 2/IR BASED ON AN ENGINE
FAILURE AND A SOLENOID FAILURE. NSTS 22206 2.3.2d DOES NOT ALLOW
FAILURE OF INTERFACING SUBSYSTEMS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4332A
NASA FMEA #: 0216-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV51)
MPS
4332
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4340
NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV72)
MPS
4340
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMPVALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA
RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4341
NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4341
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV72)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD DUMPVALVE OPENING
COMPARE [ / ]
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS MOVED THIS FAILURE MODE TO 0245-4 AND ASSIGNED A 2/IR
PPP CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4350
NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV73)
MPS
4350
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARDDUMPVALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA
RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4351
NASA FMEA #: 0245-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOLENOID (LV73)
MPS
4351
LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD DUMP VALVE OPENING
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS MOVED THIS FAILURE MODE TO 0245-4 AND ASSIGNED A 2/IR
PPP CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4361
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4361
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESSVALVE (LV74,LV75)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN.
OPENING OF FILL & DRAIN VALVES SHOULD ALLOW FOR ADEQUATE DUMP
WITHOUT MANIFOLD PRESSURIZATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4362
NASA FMEA #: 0246-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4362
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVE (LV74,LV75)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCPETS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4392
NASA FMEA #: 0250-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4392
LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE OPENING SOLENOID (LV79)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR FAILURE TO CLOSE.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE FROM THE CIL. FAILURE
OF THE SOLENOID TO DEACTUATE WILL ALLOW LH2 TO ESCAPE THROUGH THE
BLEED DISCONNECT AFTER LIFTOFF. LCC REQUIRES THAT THE VALVE BE
CLOSED BEFORE ALLOWING ENGINE IGNITION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4412A
NASA FMEA #: 0225-5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(LV83,LV84,LV85)
MPS
4412
L02 PREVALVE REDUNDANT OPENING SOLENOID
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
FAILURE MODE IS PREMATURE ACTUATION.
FAILURE OF BOTH OPENING SOLENOIDS CAN PREVENT PREVALVE CLOSURE AT
MECO, REGARDLESS OF THE OPERATION OF THE CLOSING SOLENOIDS.
SCENARIO IS NOT CREDIBLE. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4530
NASA FMEA #: 0239-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4530
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY REGULATOR (PR4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SECOND FAILURE (LVI0) WILL PREVENT VALVE OPERATIONS FOR DUMP.
RELIEF SYSTEMS WILL PROTECT AGAINST MANIFOLD RUPTURE. VENTING
HYDROGEN WILL CREATE A FIRE HAZARD DURING ENTRY/LANDING.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE FAILURE OF SCREEN B AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-4540
0602-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
4540
LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PRS)
A.J.MARINO
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL WHICH IN ACCORD WITH
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4541
NASA FMEA #: 0602-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4541
LO2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR5)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OUTLET PRESSURE HIGH/FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP. FAILURE OF
COCKPIT SWITCH CAN CAUSE LV40 AND LV41 VALVES TO OPEN. SEE
RI/NASA 0629-4. SEE ALSO RI/NASA 2312-2.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION AT A MEETING ON 9-2-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-299
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4550
NASA FMEA #: 0629-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4550
LH2 MANIF REPRESS REGULATOR (PR6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/3 WITH I/i FOR RTLS AND
TAL ABORT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-300
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4551
NASA FMEA #: 0629-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4551
LH2 MANIF REPRESSREGULATOR(PR6)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-301
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4560
NASA FMEA #: 0251-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4560
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR FNF.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-302
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4561
NASA FMEA #: 0251-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4561
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THE FMEA NUMBER FOR THIS FAILURE MODE (FAIL
TO RESEAT). IT IS NOT A CIL ENTRY. IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-303
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4561A
NASA FMEA #: 0251-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4561
PNEU VALVE HE SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THE FMEA NUMBER FOR THIS FAILURE MODE
(RUPTURE/LEAKAGE)TO 0251-3. IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-304
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4600
NASA FMEA #: 0247-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4600
LH2 FEED MANIF RTLS REPRESSORIFICE (RP9)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. OPENING FILL AND
DRAIN VALVES SHOULD ALLOW FOR AN ADEQUATE LH2 DUMP WITHOUT HELIUM
PRESSURIZATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-305
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4620
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4620
PNEUMATIC HE FILL LINE (.50",.375",.625" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT ADDRESSES THE LINE FROM CHECK VALVE CV4 TO TANK
TK4. POSSIBLE OVERPRESSURIZATION.
RI/NASA APPARENTLY FAILED TO INCLUDE THIS LINE IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
SEE ALSO MPS-4650.
THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE IS NOW INCLUDED ON RI/NASA 0255-1 WHICH
CARRIES A i/I CRITICALITY.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-306
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4630E
NASA FMEA #: 0143-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4630
PNEUMATICHE PRESSURELINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE CONNECTING THE BLOWDOWN VALVES
(LV26, 27).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-307
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-4630F
NASA FMEA #: 0144-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
4630
PNEUMATICHE PRESSURELINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE FROM THE DOWNSTREAM BLOWDOWN
VALVE (LV27) TO THE PURGE ORIFICE.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/I.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-308
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4630G
NASA FMEA #: 0236-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
4630
PNEUMATIC HE PRESSURE LINE (.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NaSA [ 2 /1R
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [FJ [P] [XJ*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE 0.5" LINES FROM THE UPSTREAM PNEUMATIC
CHECK VALVE (CV8) TO ALL DOWNSTREAM SOLENOID INTERFACES ON THE
NON-ACCUMULATOR LEG. A SINGLE FAILURE CAN CAUSE COMPARTMENT
OVERPRESSURIZATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/I WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-309
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640A
NASA FMEA #: 0119-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-310
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640B
NASA FMEA #: 0122-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LINE CONNECTING THE LH2 MANIFOLD RTLS
REPRESSURIZATION VALVES (LV75, 75).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP, WHICH AGREES
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-311
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640C
NASA FMEA #: 0236-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE 0.25 AND 0.38" LINES FROM THE UPSTREAM
PNEUMATIC CHECK VALVE (CVS) TO ALL DOWNSTREAM SOLENOID INTERFACES
ON THE NON-ACCUMULATOR LEG. A SINGLE FAILURE CAN CAUSE
COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO i/i WHICH AGREES WITH THE
IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-312
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640E
NASA FMEA #: 0191-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST : A .J .MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR SEVERAL HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT A
SOLENOID VALVE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE
PROPELLANT VALVE. THESE ARE: LV72 TO PVI7, LV73 TO PVI8, LV79
TO PV22, LV51 TO PD3, LV47 TO PDI, LV49 TO PD2, LVI9 TO PV4,
LV21 TO PV5, LV23 TO PV6, LV66 TO PDI LATCH AND LV68 TO PD2
LATCH. ALL OF THESE LINES ARE UNPRESSURIZED (SOLENOID CLOSED)
PRIOR TO MECO. FAILURE MODE IS RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
RI/NASA INDICATES I/i CRITICALITY FOR ALL ABORT MODES.
LINE RUPTURE AFTER OPENING THE SOLENOID CAN CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION. ALL LINES WILL BE PRESSURIZED AFTER MECO.
IF POST-MECO OVERPRESSURIZATION IS A HAZARD, CRITICALITY SHOULD
BE I/I. RUPTURE PRE-MECO CAN DAMAGE OTHER VITAL COMPONENTS
VIA SHRAPNEL. THESE LINES ARE TOO SMALL (.25, .375 INCH) TO
ALLOW A FLOWRATE SUFFICIENT TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT
COMPARTMENT. LINE MATERIAL DOES NOT PRODUCE SHRAPNEL. IOA
ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-313
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640G
NASA FMEA #: 0193-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[P] [p] [P] [x]*
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR SEVERAL HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT THE FILL
& DRAIN VALVES TO THEIR CLOSING SOLENOIDS. THESE ARE: LV33 TO
PVlI, LV35 TO PVI2, LV29 TO PV9 AND LV31 TO PVI0. THESE LINES ARE
PRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT.
FAILURE MODE IS RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION UPON FIRST FAILURE.
PNEUMATIC ISOLATION VALVES ARE OPEN DURING ASCENT. RUPTURE MAY
DAMAGE OTHER VITAL COMPONENTS VIA SHRAPNEL.
THESE LINES ARE TOO SMALL (.25, .375 INCH) TO ALLOW A FLOWRATE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT. LINE MATERIAL
DOES NOT PRODUCE SHRAPNEL. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-314
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640H
NASA FMEA #: 0194-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA]
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THREE HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT A SOLENOID
VALVE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PROPELLANT
VALVE. THESE ARE: LV36 TO PVI4, 15, 16, LV77 TO PV20 AND LV78
TO PV21.
THESE LINES ARE UNPRESSURIZED DURING ASCENT AND REMAIN SO FOR THE
REMAINDER OF THE MISSION.
RUPTURE DURING PRELAUNCH OPERATIONS CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
FROM SHRAPNEL IMPACT ON OTHER COMPONENTS.
THESE LINES ARE TOO SMALL (.25, .375 INCH) TO ALLOW A FLOWRATE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT. LINE MATERIAL
DOES NOT PRODUCE SHRAPNEL. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-315
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640I
NASA FMEA #: 0194-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR FIVE HELIUM LINES THAT CONNECT A SOLENOID
VALVE TO A PROPELLANT VALVE IN ORDER TO OPERATE THE PROPELLANT
VALVE. THESE ARE: LV39 TO PVI3, LV32 TO PVII, LV34 TO PVI2,
LV28 TO PV9 AND LV30 TO PVI0. FAILURE MODE IS RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THESE LINES ARE UNPRESSURIZED DURING MAIN ENGINE ASCENT BUT
PRESSURIZED DURING MPS DUMP OR INERT.
IF POST-MECO OVERPRESSURIZATION IS A HAZARD CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
1/1.
RUPTURE MAY DAMAGE OTHER VITAL COMPONENTS VIA SHRAPNEL.
THESE LINES ARE TOO SMALL (.25, .375 INCH) TO ALLOW A FLOWRATE
SUFFICIENT TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE AFT COMPARTMENT. LINE MATERIAL
DOES NOT PRODUCE SHRAPNEL. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-316
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640J
NASA FMEA #: 0633-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LH2 HELIUM PRESSURIZATION FLEXIBLE
HOSE ASSEMBLY (CVI3, 14, 15 TO PR6).
THIS FAILURE IS 2/IR FOR LEAKAGE OF HYDROGEN (SECOND FAILURE -
CVI4 OR CVI5) OR HELIUM (SECOND FAILURE - REGULATOR PR6).
RI/NASA HAS ADDED i/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-317
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640K
NASA FMEA #: 0604-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST : A. J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE LO2 HELIUM PRESSURIZATION FLEXIBLE
HOSE ASSEMBLY (CVI0 TO CVI2 AND PR5).
THIS FAILURE IS 2/IR FOR LEAKAGE OF OXYGEN (SECOND FAILURE - CVlO
OR CVI2) OR HELIUM (SECOND FAILURE - REGULATOR PR5).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS FMEA TO INCLUDE i/i FOR RTLS AND TAL
ABORTS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-318
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4640L
NASA FMEA #: 0634-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(.25",.38" DIA)
MPS
4640
PNEUMATIC HE PRESS VALVE ACTUATION LINE
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE REPRESSURIZATION LINE FROM CV13 TO
CV24. RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
RI/NASA HAS ADDED CRITICALITY I/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS. IOA
ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-4650
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 4650
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM INTERCONNECT LINE
(.63",1.00",.50" DIA)
LEAD ANALYST: A.J.MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS ASSESSMENT IS FOR THE HELIUM LINES FROM THE PNEUMATICS TANK
(TK4) TO THE IN/OUT INTERCONNNECT VALVES.
RI/NASA APPARENTLY FAILED TO INCLUDE THIS LINE IN THEIR ANALYSIS.
SEE ALSO MPS-4620.
THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE IS NOW INCLUDED ON RI/NASA 0255-1 WHICH
CARRIES A i/I CRITICALITY.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5000A
NASA FMEA #: 2182-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5000
LO2 PREVALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-5001
2071-2
EPD&C/MPS
5001
LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
3 TOGGLE SWITCHES. INADVERTENT COMMAND TO REOPEN PREVALVE DURING
MECO SEQUENCE.
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5002
NASA FMEA #: 2071-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5002
LO2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
3 TOGGLE SWITCHES. INADVERTENT COMMAND TO CLOSE SOLENOID, MAY
CLOSE PREVALVE PREMATURELY DURING THE BURN.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5003
NASA FMEA #: 2070-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5003
ITEM: FUSE (IA)
LEAD ANALYST:
(4 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
12 FUSES. FAIL OPEN. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (GPC AND MANUAL) IN
CLOSING THE LO2 PREVALVE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCE NSTS 22206, PARA 2.3.3.C.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3f STATES THAT OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES SHALL
NOT BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
THE SWITCH IS USED ONLY FOR VACUUM INERTING. MANUAL CLOSURE OF
PREVALVES AT MECO WOULD NOT RELIABLY PREVENT ENGINE EXPLOSION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-5011 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5011
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5012
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5012
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-5013 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5013
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5014
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5014
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5071A
NASA FMEA #: 2180-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPD&C/MPS
5071
DIODE (I0 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
6 OPEN COMMAND D (FA4) MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL OPEN.
SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.
RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES (2182-
i).
SINCE RI/NASA DID NOT INCLUDE THIS ITEM IN THE CIL, IOA HAS NO
DOCUMENTATION THAT EXPLAINS HOW SCREEN B WAS PASSED.
A DEDICATED MONITOR DOWNSTREAM OF THE RPC SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF
SCREEN B. DIODES ANALYZED ON 2182 DO NOT HAVE A DEDICATED
MONITOR. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
FAILS B-
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5072
NASA FMEA #: 2180-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT".
EPD&C/MPS
5072
DIODE (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
6 OPEN COMMAND D (FA3) MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL OPEN.
SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.
RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES (2182-
i).
SINCE RI/NASA DID NOT INCLUDE THIS ITEM IN THE CIL, IOA HAS NO
DOCUMENTATION THAT EXPLAINS HOW SCREEN B WAS PASSED.
A DEDICATED MONITOR DOWNSTREAM OF THE RPC SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF
SCREEN B. DIODES ANALYZED ON 2182 DO NOT HAVE A DEDICATED
MONITOR. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
FAILS B-
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-330
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5074A
NASA FMEA #: 2181-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5074
DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
3 CLOSE (CLOSE CMD D, FA4) MDM BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL OPEN.
FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE FAILURE.
RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES (2183-
i).
A DEDICATED MONITOR DOWNSTREAM OF THE RPC SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF
SCREEN B. DIODES ANALYZED ON 2183 DO NOT HAVE A DEDICATED
MONITOR. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5074C
NASA FMEA #: 2186-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5074
DIODE (10 PER CIRCUIT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
3 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (ORIGINATING AT BCI). FAIL OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND FROM
REACHING SOLENOIDS. MANUAL (SWITCH) COMMAND IS ONLY USED FOR
VACUUM INERTING. NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA
RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5074E
NASA FMEA #: 2188-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5074
DIODE (i0 PER CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (ORIGINATING AT BCI & BCI). FAIL
OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND FROM
REACHING SOLENOIDS. MANUAL (SWITCH) COMMAND IS ONLY USED FOR
VACUUM INERTING. NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA
RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5075
NASA FMEA #: 2181-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5O75
DIODE (6 PER CIRCUIT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
9 CLOSE MDM (CLOSE CMD A & C, FA2 & 3) BLOCKING DIODES (AlCR28,
37, 44). FAIL OPEN. FAILS B-SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANCY MASKS THE
FAILURE.
RI/NASA SHOWS 3/IR PFP FOR OTHER CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES (2183-
i).
A DEDICATED MONITOR DOWNSTREAM OF THE RPC SUPPORTS PASSAGE OF
SCREEN B. DIODES ANALYZED ON 2183 DO NOT HAVE A DEDICATED
MONITOR. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5075A
NASA FMEA #: 2186-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPD&C/MPS
5075
DIODE (6 PER CIRCUIT)
NASA [ 3 /3
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
9 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (ORIGINATING AT ABI (AICR20,27)
AND AB3 (AICR45)). FAIL OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND FROM
REACHING SOLENOIDS. MANUAL (SWITCH) COMMAND IS ONLY USED FOR
VACUUM INERTING. NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5076B
NASA FMEA #: 2188-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5076
DIODE (7 PER CIRCUIT)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
6 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (ORIGINATING AT AB2 & 3). FAIL
OPEN.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT MANUAL CLOSE COMMAND FROM
REACHING SOLENOIDS. MANUAL (SWITCH) COMMAND IS ONLY USED FOR
VACUUM INERTING. NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5120A
NASA FMEA #: 2012B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
5120
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFFVALVE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ ] *
[ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE CORREDT FMEA NUMBER IS 2012A-2. 3 CLOSE SW SCAN DIODES. THE
RI/NASA CRITICALITY WAS REPORTED INCORRECTLY. IT SHOULD BE 2/IR
PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-337
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5120C
NASA FMEA #: 2237-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
5120
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFFVALVE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP, WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-338
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5121
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5121
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ORIGINAL IOA ANALYSIS WAS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE IT INDICATES THAT
A PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS WOULD ACTIVATE THE HELIUM CLOSING
SOLENOID LV24. THIS WOULD CLOSE THE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE.
HOWEVER, A PREMATURE OPEN-TO-BUS ON THE TOGGLE SWITCH WOULD
INHIBIT THE GPC'S CLOSE COMMAND, DEACTIVATE THE LV24 SOLENOID,
AND OPEN THE SHUTOFF VALVE.
THIS IOA ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO RI/NASA 2011-3 WHICH CARRIES A
CRITICALITY OF 2/IR PPP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5132
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5132
ITEM: MDM (FA3)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-5133
NA
EPD&C/MPS
5133
MDM (FA3)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-5134 BASELINE [ ]
NA NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5134
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5135
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5135
ITEM: MDM (FAI)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5136
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5136
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MPS-5137
NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5137
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
L02 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5138A
NASA FME #: 2238-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPD&C/MPS
5138
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN.
FAILURE ELIMINATES THE ABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE.
COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS READILY
DETECTABLE. NOT A CIL ISSUE (A5CR4 ONLY).
O2
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-5139
2238B-2
EPD&C/MPS
5139
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR TWO DIODES.
ATMOSPHERE IS CRITICALITY i.
STANDBY REDUNDANT.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
THE VENTING OF 02 INTO THE
THE BLOCKING PROTECTION IS NOT
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP, WHICH AGREES
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-5139A
2238-1
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
5139
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN.
FAILURE ELIMINATES THE ABILITY TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE VALVE.
COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS READILY
DETECTABLE. NOT A CIL ISSUE. (AICR32 AND AICR36).
O2
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-5139H
2013-1
EPD&C/MPS
5139
DIODE, ISOLATION (IA, 12A)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE IN THE LO2
FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT. A SHORT IN THIS DIODE
COULD GROUND THE OUTPUT TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID IF ALL REDUNDANCY
IS LOST. 02 COULD BE VENTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE FAILURE IS
NOT
REDILY DETECTABLE. RI/NASA INDICATES 2/IR FOR FAILURE OF THE LO2
FEEDLINE SHUTOFF VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED (0414-3).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5141
NASA FMEA #: 2162-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5141
L02 PROPELLENTDUMPSEQUENCETOGGLESWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PREMATURE TRANSFER TO START COULD VENT PROPELLANT OVERBOARD
DURING BOOST. THIS COULD RESULT IN FIRE/EXPLOSION.
DOCUMENTATION ON ANY SOFTWARE INHIBIT WAS UNAVAILABLE.
THE INADVERTENT SIGNAL WILL NOT BE READ BY SOFTWARE UNTIL MECO+
20 SEC. THE ET SEPARATES AT MECO+ 17. FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT.
IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5142
NASA FMEA #: 2162-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5142
LO2 PROPELLENT DUMP SEQUENCE TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/16/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-5143
2160-1
EPD&C/MPS
5143
FUSE (F31, F32)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2/LH2 DUMP CONTROL CIRCUIT. FAIL OPEN.
THE FAILURE WILL BE DETECTED DURING MPS DUMP (WHEN S1 IS NOT IN
GPC POSITION). DIRECT INSERTION MISSION IS THE MOST CRITICAL
CASE SINCE IT REQUIRES A MANUAL DUMP INITIATE COMMAND.
FAILURE OF ONE FUSE ONLY ELIMINATES ONE POWER PATH.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP. TWO START MDMs
RECEIVE SIGNALS. IT IS NOT CLEAR, BASED ON AVAILABLE DATA,
WHETHER BOTH ARE REQUIRED.
BOTH SIGNALS ARE REQUIRED. SOFTWARE USES BOTH. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/15/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5160D
NASA FMEA #: 2359B-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5160
LO2 OUTBOARDFILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROLCIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
1 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE. A SHORT IN THIS DIODE WITH AN
INTERNAL HDC FAILURE WOULD GROUND THE OPEN SOLENOID.
INADVERTENT CLOSE SOLENOID POWER WOULD CLOSE THE VALVE DURING
LOADING. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5500A
NASA FMEA #: 2280-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5500
LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER NASA 2/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA'S BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5554
NASA FMEA #: 2092-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5554
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (RPC24)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALTIY TO 2/IR PPP, WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5556
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5556
ITEM: MDM (FA2)
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-5557
NA
EPD&C/MPS
5557
MDM (FA3)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[p]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-5558
NA
EPD&C/MPS
5558
MDM (FA4)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-358
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5561
NASA FMEA #: 2096-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5561
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE. FAIL SHORTED.
A SHORT IN THE DIODE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY. A SECOND SHORTED
DIODE WITHIN THE SERIES HDC I WILL GROUND THE OUTPUT AND OPEN THE
VALVE.
SEE 0452-2, MPS-II73.
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5561A
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 5561
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
TRANSIENT SUPRESSION DIODE. FAIL OPEN.
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
NOT A CIL ISSUE.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5600A
NASA FMEA #: 2411-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5600
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
TOGGLE SWITCH. FAIL TO CLOSE.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5600B
NASA FMEA #: 2412-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5600
MPS INSTRUMENTPOWERCIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CIRCUIT BREAKER. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-5600C
2413-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5600
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[N] [N] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FUSE. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5600D
NASA FMEA #: 2416-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5600
MPS INSTRUMENT POWER CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SSME RED/AMBER STATUS ANNUNCIATOR.
LOSS OF ILLUMINATION. FAIL TO ILLUMINATE AMBER.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS FMEA NUMBER TO 0663-2.
ISSUE.
C ]
C ]
IOA HAS NO
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5650A BASELINE [ ]
2034-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5650
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] [N] [N]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
6 BLOCKING DIODES (XDUCER SEL).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP WHICH AGREES
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-5650B
NASA FMEA #: 2034-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5650
GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
6 BLOCKING DIODES (XDUCER SEL).
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-5701 BASELINE [ ]
2225-2 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EPD&C/MPS
5701
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (2 PER CIRCUIT)
HOLDEN/LOWERY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[P]
IN]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-5750 BASELINE [ ]
2252-1 NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECT VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
HOLDEN/LOWERY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LO2 DISCONNECT. FAIL SHORTED.
2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE DIODE, PLUS A
SHORT IN THE ON INTERNAL HDC DIODE, WILL GROUND A SOLENOID.
CLOSE SIGNAL WILL BE GROUNDED PREVENTING DISCONNECT CLOSURE,
WHICH IS A I/I FAILURE (SEE 0408-6). GROUNDED OPEN SIGNAL
FOLLOWED BY INADVERTENT CLOSE SIGNAL AND LATCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE
DISCONNECT TO CLOSE (I/i, SEE 0408-2).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-5750F
NASA FMEA #: 2250-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
5750
ET/ORBITER DISCONNECTVALVE CONTROLCIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: HOLDEN/LOWERY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
1 DIODE OP XOVER (12A). FAILURE CAN SHORT ALL OPEN COMMANDS TO
GROUND, VENTING OPEN PRESSURE AND ALLOWING VALVE TO CLOSE DURING
MAIN ENGINE BURN. LATCH IS NOT CERTIFIED TO PREVENT PNEUMATIC
CLOSURE. IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6011D
NASA FMEA #: 2252-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
DISCONNECT VALVE
EPD&C/MPS
6011
POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR LH2 FEEDLINE
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED. 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES.
A SHORT IN THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE COMBINED WITH A SHORT
IN AN INTERNAL HDC DIODE WILL GROUND A SOLENOID. CLOSE SIGNAL
WILL BE GROUNDED PREVENTING DISCONNECT CLOSURE, WHICH IS A I/I
FAILURE (SEE 0407-6). GROUNDED OPEN SIGNAL FOLLOWED BY
INADVERTENT CLOSE SIGNAL AND LATCH FAILURE WILL CAUSE DISCONNECT
TO CLOSE (i/I, SEE 0407-2).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6016
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPD&C/MPS
6016
INDICATOR SWITCH (PD2)
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MECHANICAL LINKAGE WILL PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF MECHANICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE.
THIS ANALYSIS CORRESPONDS TO RI/NASA 0407-10. WHICH CARRIES A
I/i CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6021C
NASA FMEA #: 2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
VALVES (2)
EPD&C/MPS
6021
POWER& CONTROLCIRCUITS FOR LH2 RTLS DUMP
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT IN A TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE WILL ERODE BLOCKING
REDUNDANCY. A SHORT IN AN INTERNAL HDC DIODE WILL GROUND OPEN
SOLENOID POWER AND CLOSE THE VALVE. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVE
COULD CAUSE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE DUE TO LH2 BOIL OFF.
RI/NASA INDICATES 2/IR FOR FAILURE OF AN RTLS DUMP VALVE TO
REMAIN OPEN (0651-3).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-6025
2202-1
EPD&C/MPS
6025
ISOLATION DIODE (2)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER
MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT. THIS
WORKSHEET SHOWED AN INCORRECT FMEA NUMBER. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
2002-1.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6026
NASA FMEA #: N/A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6026
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (FAI,FA3,FA4)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6027
NASA FMEA #: N/A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ / J
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
6027
FLIGHT CRITICAL AFT MDM (FAI,FA3,FA4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ J [ J [ J
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6051B
NASA FMEA #: 2224-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6051
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE OPENING SOLENOID
ENERGIZING CIRCUITRY
LEAD ANALYST : MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS HIGHER RI/NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MPS-6071
2264-1
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6071
ITEM: FUSE, IA (3)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6072
NASA FMEA #: 2038-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6072
TOGGLESWITCH
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS IOA ANALYSIS NOW CORRESPONDS TO RI/NASA 2038-1.
LH2 INBOARD FILL/DRAIN, HIGH POINT BLEED AND TOPPING VALVES
SWITCH. FAILS OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP WHICH MATCHES
THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/21/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6075B
NASA FMEA #: 2262-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6075
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TOPPING VALVE OPEN HDC. FAILURE IS DETECTED
BY V41XI458E.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6076A
NASA FMEA #: 2265-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6076
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
£ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6076C
NASA FMEA #: 2266-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6076
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6076H
NASA FMEA #: 2270-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6076
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 INBOARD FILL/DRAIN VALVE CIRCUIT.
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE. FAIL OPEN. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD VENT H2 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE DURING
BOOST. THE FAILURE IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
LOSS OF MANUAL (SWITCH) CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. VALVE IS
CLOSED MANUALLY ONLY AT THE END OF VACUUM INERTING. IOA ACCEPTS
THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6076T
NASA FMEA #: 2279-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
EPD&C/MPS
6076
ISOLATION DIODES (16)
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, HIGH POINT BLEED AND TOPPING VALVE
CIRCUIT.
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 TRANSIENT SIPPRESSION DIODES. FAIL SHORTED.
CRITICALITY 3/IR FOR SHORT AND IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
FAILURE CAN SHORT COMMANDS TO GROUND. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF FILL
& DRAIN VALVE CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE (I/i, SEE 0301-4).
LOSS OF OPEN COMMAND TO TOPPING VALVE CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE
(2/IR, SEE 0304_1).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6078
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6078
MDM (FAI, 2, LAI)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LH2 I/B F&D, TOPPING HIGH POINT BLEED.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6083A
NASA FMEA #: 2055A-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6083
TOGGLE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS COMBINED THIS ANALYSIS WITH 2055A-3.
A SECOND FAILURE, LOSS OF THE GROUND OPEN COMMAND, WOULD HAVE TO
OCCUR TO CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6086C
NASA FMEA #: 2358A-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6086
ISOLATION DIODE (4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR ONE CLOSE MDM ISOLATION DIODE. FAILURE IS
DETECTABLE DURING RELEVANT PHASES OF FLIGHT.
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6088
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 6088
ITEM: MDM
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LH20/B F&D. FA2
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-387
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6101
NASA FMEA #: 2013-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTROL CIRCUITS
EPD&C/MPS
6101
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE POWER AND
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 1 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE. A SHORT IN THIS
DIODE COULD GROUND THE OUTPUT TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID IF ALL
REDUNDANCY IS LOST. THE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE WILL OPEN. RI/NASA
INDICATES 2/IR FOR FAILURE TO REMAIN LOSED (0437-3).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6107A
NASA FMEA #: 2012-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6107
ISOLATION DIODE (ii)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES.
THE FMEA NUMBER SHOWN IS INCORRECT. IT SHOULD BE 2012B-2.
RI/NASA CRITICALITY SHOWN IS ALSO INCORRECT.
PFP. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
THE
IT SHOULD BE 2/IR
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/27/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6107E
NASA FMEA #: 2238A-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6107
ISOLATION DIODE (11)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES IN THE LO2 RELIEF
SHUTOFF VALVE CIRCUIT. RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO F. IOA
ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6109
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6109
MDM (FAI, FA3, FA4)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LH2 RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6141
NASA FMEA #: NA
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 6141
ITEM: MDM (FA4)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LH2 RECIRC DISCONNECT.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6144
NASA FMEA #: 2102-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6144
ISOLATION DIODES (4)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES IN THE RECIRC
DISCONNECT CIRCUIT. A SHORT IN THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES
COMBINED WITH A SHORT IN AN INTERNAL HDC DIODE WILL ELIMINATE
SOLENOID POWER.
DISCONNECT WILL FAIL TO CLOSE. RESULTS IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. SEE
RI/NASA 0405-6.
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-6157
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6157
ISOLATION DIODES, 12A (18)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LH2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES.
RI/NASA FMEA # IS 2205-1. IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
C ]
C ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-6158B
2214-1
EPD&C/MPS
6158
ISOLATION DIODES, 4.2A (3)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN SWITCH COMMAND A BLOCKING DIODE. FAIL OPEN.
THE DIODE PROVIDES REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD PREMATURELY CLOSE THE PREVALVE. LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY IS DETECTABLE. NOT A CIL ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-6159G
NASA FMEA #: 2222-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
6159
ISOLATION DIODE (36)
LEAD ANALYST: MCNICOLL/EMMONS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. A SHORT IN THE
DIODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF OPEN SOLENOID POWER. A LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE DURING ENGINE BURN RESULTING
IN AN EXPLOSION. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE DURING RELEVANT
PHASES OF FLIGHT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-6160
NA
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
6160
MODULATOR DEMODULATOR (4)
MCNICOLL/EMMONS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR MDM FAI, 2, 3, 4. LH2 PREVALVE CIRCUIT.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7100B
NASA FMEA #: 2113-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ISOLATION VALVES
EPD&C/MPS
7100
VALVE POWER & CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE RPC'S. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-7110
2110-1
EPD&C/MPS
7110
FUSE, 1AMP (9)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[p]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ENGINE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVES, B LEG.
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 "B" VALVE FUSES. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7110A
NASA FMEA #: 2116-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7110
FUSE, 1AMP (9)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE FUSES. IOA INDICATES 3/IR FOR
ABORTS ONLY.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7120B
NASA FMEA #: 2117-4
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7120
TOGGLE SWITCH, IP3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[P]
IF]
[ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7130A
NASA FMEA #: 2111-3
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPD&C/MPS
7130
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
SHORT TO GROUND.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
MPS-7130B
2111-4
COMPARE [ /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7130
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
B
[P]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7140
NASA FMEA #: 2118-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7140
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (3)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
ENGINE MANUFACTURER INDICATES THAT SEVEN SECONDS OF CONTINUOUS
HELIUM PURGE ARE REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. ABRUPT OR RAPID
LOSS OF HELIUM CAN CAUSE ENGINE EXPLOSION. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7140A
NASA FMEA #: 2118-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7140
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III (3)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-7150
2112-2
EPD&C/MPS
7150
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I (6)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PFP.
IOA ACCCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
MPS-7170A
2119-1
EPD&C/MPS
7170
ISOLATION DIODES (9)
EMMONS/MCNEELY
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ P ]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO "FAIL:.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR. IOA
ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN B. CRITICALITY MATCHES IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7180
NASA FMEA #: 2119-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7180
ISOLATION DIODES (3)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 3 "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES. FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED SCREEN B TO "FAIL:.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR. IOA
ACCEPTS FAILURE OF SCREEN B. CRITICALITY MATCHES IOA
RECOMMENDATION.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7190
NASA FMEA #: N/A
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPD&C/MPS
7190
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3,4
EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [F]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7220B
NASA FMEA #: 2141-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7220
TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP AND i/I FOR RTLS
AND TAL. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7260
NASA FMEA #: 2145-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/MPS
7260
ISOLATION DIODES (12)
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 6 DIODES IN THE INTERCONNECT IN VALVE CIRCUIT.
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE. THE FAILURE WILL
NOT BE DETECTED. RESULTS IN LOSS OF
MISSION (INTACT ABORT). NSTS 22206 REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7270
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
EPD&C/MPS
7270
MDM, FLIGHT AFT 1,2,3
EMMONS/MCNEELY
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7300C
NASA FMEA #: 2151-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300
ITEM: VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVES
LEAD ANALYST : EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR SIX BLOCKING DIODES IN THE CIRCUITS.
FAIL SHORTED. RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7300G
NASA FMEA #: 2404-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7300
ITEM: VALVE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS FOR HELIUM
INTERCONNECT OUTLET VALVES
LEAD ANALYST: EMMONS/MCNEELY
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE DOES NOT HAVE IDENTICAL EFFECT TO THAT REPORTED ON 2148-2
AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7400B
NASA FMEA #: 2304-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH (CLOSED) SCAN DIODES. FAIL SHORTED.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7400C
NASA FMEA #: 2305-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATICHELIUM SUPPLYISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROLCIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 MDM OPEN COMMAND BLOCKING DIODES.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
FAIL OPEN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7400E
NASA FMEA #: 2306-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH OPEN COMMAND BLOCKING DIODES.
OPEN.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
FAIL
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7400F
NASA FMEA #: 2306-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 SWITCH OPEN COMMAND BLOCKING DIODES.
SHORTED.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
FAIL
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7400G
NASA FMEA #: 2307-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7400
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE POWER
AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES. FAIL SHORTED.
SECOND FAILURE (A SHORT IN THE HDC) WILL SHORT THE OPEN COMMAND
TO GROUND. TWO MORE SIMILAR FAILURES WILL SHORT THE OPEN COMMAND
TO GROUND. TWO MORE SIMILAR FAILURES WILL SHORT THE OTHER
SOLENOID'S OPEN COMMAND TO GROUND, RESULTING IN CLOSURE OF BOTH
ISOLATION VALVES. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE CROSSOVER VALVE TO
OPEN CAN CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE (SEE 2306-1).
THE CONNECTION TO THE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE EMPLOYS A WIRE
OF SUCH SMALL DIAMETER THAT IT WILL OVERHEAT AND BREAK IF THE
INTERNAL DIODE ALSO SHORTS. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-419
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7430
NASA FMEA #: 2131-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
7430
PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-420
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7430A
NASA FMEA #: 2131-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7430
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ J [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-421
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7440
NASA FMEA #: 2130-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7440
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT FUSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-422
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7460
NASA FMEA #: 2132-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDACID: 7460
ITEM: PNEUMATICHELIUM CROSSOVERSOLENOIDVALVE
CONTROLCIRCUIT HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR PPP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-423
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/02/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7490
NASA FMEA #: NA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MDMCOMMANDS
EPD&C/MPS
7490
HELIUM SUPPLYBLOWDOWNVALVES CONTROLCIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR MDMs FA3 AND FA4.
MDMs ARE ANALYZED IN ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. ISSUE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-424
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7500B
NASA FMEA #: 2314-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
7500
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS REVISED THIS CRITICALITY TO 3/IR PFP.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-425
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENTID: MPS-7500D
NASA FMEA #: 2316-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
7500
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESSVALVES POWERAND CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES.
FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL.
FAILURE OF THE BLOCKING DIODE FOLLOWED BY AN INADVERTENT SIGNAL
FROM THE CORRESPONDING OPEN COMMAND, A SWITCH SCAN DIODE SHORT
AND A REGULATOR FAIL OPEN WILL CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
FAILURE DETECTABLE VIA SWITCH SCAN. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-426
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7540
NASA FMEA #: 2322-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
7540
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MDM OPEN COMMAND BLOCKING DIODES (2). FAIL OPEN.
RI/NASA INDICATES 3/3 FOR NOMINAL AND I/I FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-427
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7540B
NASA FMEA #: 2319-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
EPD&C/MPS
7540
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES POWER AND CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT IS FOR 2 OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES. FAIL SHORTED.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-428
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MPS-7600
NASA FMEA #: 2048-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS
MDAC ID: 7600
ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID
DRIVER CONTROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: A.J. MARINO
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL ON. RI/NASAHAS REVISED SCREEN B TO FAIL. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-429
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 5/31/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS-8001X
2205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EPD&C/MPS
8001
LH2 PREVALVE BLOCKING DIODE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM/FAILURE MODE WAS PREVIOUSLY OMITTED.
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-430
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-8002X BASELINE [ ]
2133-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPDC/MPS
8002
BLOCKING DIODE, CROSSOVER VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL OPEN. IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-431
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-8003X BASELINE [ ]
2142-2 NEW [ X ]
EPDC/MPS
8003
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, INTERCONNECT IN VALVE
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
INADVERTENT OUTPUT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROADER
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-432
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-8004X BASELINE [ ]
2414B-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EPDC/MPS
8004
HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE B CLOSE SWITCH SCAN
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL SHORTED.
RI/NASA HAS DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL WHICH IS IN ACCORD
WITH THE IOA RECOMMENDATION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9002X BASELINE [ ]
0405-11 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9002
LH2 RECIRCULATION RETURN 4" DIA DISCONNECT (PD3)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-434
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9003X BASELINE [ ]
0414-8 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9003
LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-435
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9004X BASELINE [ ]
0427-6 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9004
LO2/LH2 POINT LEVEL SENSORS AND ELECTRONICS
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE AT LO2 ECO SENSOR.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0418-2. BY NSTS-
22206, SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE COVERED BY
COMPONENT OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-436
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9005X BASELINE [ ]
0427-7 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9005
LO2/LH2 POINT LEVEL SENSORS AND ELECTRONICS
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NAJ
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-9007X
0431-10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
9007
GH2 HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-438
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-9008X
0431-11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
9008
GH2 HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] IF]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[PJ
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-439
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9009X BASELINE [ ]
0437-9 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9009
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-440
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
MPS-9010X
0452-9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
MPS
9010
LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-441
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9011X BASELINE [ ]
0453-8 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9011
LO2 POGP RECIRCULATION VALVE (PV20, PV21)
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9012X BASELINE [ ]
0651-10 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
PV18)
MPS
9012
RTLES DUMP, LH2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD VALVES (PVI7,
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9013X BASELINE [ ]
0661-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9013
LO2/LH2 ENGINE MANIFOLD PRESSURE METER
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
IADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-444
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9OISX BASELINE [ ]
0720-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9015
ITEM: LH2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER.
(V41PI200C, V41PII00C, V41PI300C).
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0417-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-445
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9017X BASELINE [ ]
0721-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9017
ITEM: LH2 17 INCH FEELINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT PRESSURE
TRANSDUCER (V41PI433C).
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0415-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-446
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9OISX BASELINE [ ]
0722-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9018
ITEM: LO2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
(V41PII30C), V41P1230C, V41PI330C)
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0420-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-447
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9020X BASELINE [ ]
0723-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9020
ITEM: LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (V41PI533C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0418-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-448
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9022X BASELINE [ ]
0724-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9022
ITEM: LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (V41TI428A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0415-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-449
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9023X BASELINE [ ]
0724-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9023
ITEM: LH2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (V41TI428A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9025X BASELINE [ ]
0725-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9025
ITEM: LH2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
(V41TII01C, V41TI201C, V41TI301C).
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0417-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9026X BASELINE [ ]
0725-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9026
ITEM: LH2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
(V41TII01C, V41TI201C, V41TI301C)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9028X BASELINE [ ]
0726-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9028
ITEM: L02 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
(V41TII31C, V41TI231C, V41TI331C).
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0420-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9029X BASELINE [ ]
0726-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9029
ITEM: LO2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
(V41TII31C, V41TI231C, V41TI331C)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] [ ]
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9031X BASELINE [ ]
0727-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9031
ITEM: LO2 17 INCH MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE "A"
TRANSDUCER (V41TI528A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0418-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9032X BASELINE [ ]
0727-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9032
ITEM: LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
TEMPERATURE "A" TRANSDUCER (V41TI528A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9034X BASELINE [ ]
0728-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9034
ITEM: LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
TEMPERATURE "B" TRANSDUCER (V41TI527A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [D] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0418-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9035X BASELINE [ ]
0728-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9035
ITEM: LO2 17 INCH FEEDLINE MANIFOLD DISCONNECT
TEMPERATURE "B" TRANSDUCER (V41TI527A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(V41P9OOOA)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9036X BASELINE [ ]
0729-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9036
LH2 RECIRC MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0309-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-459
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(V41P9407A)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9037X BASELINE [ ]
0730-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9037
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0308-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-460
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9038X BASELINE [ ]
0731-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9038
ITEM: LO2 BLEEDLINE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (V41P9108A,
V41P9208A, V41P9308A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0428-1. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-461
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(V4 iP9408A)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9039X BASELINE [ ]
0732-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9039
LO2 FILL AND DRAIN LINE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0307-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9040X BASELINE [ ]
0733-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9040
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION LINE TEMPERATURE (V41T9104A,
V41T9204A, V41T9304A) AND MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE (VIT9409A)
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0309-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9041X BASELINE [ ]
0733-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9041
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION LINE TEMPERATURE (V41T9104A,
V41T9204A, V41T9304A) AND MANIFOLD TEMPERATURE (V41T9409A)
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
Ix]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9042X BASELINE [ ]
0734-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9042
ITEM: LH2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (V41P9196A,
V41P9292A, V41P9396A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0417-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-465
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9043X BASELINE [ ]
0735-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9043
ITEM: LO2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER (V41P9195A,
V41P9295A, V41P9395A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0420-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-466
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9044X BASELINE [ ]
0736-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9044
ITEM: LO2 BLEED TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (V41P9109A,
V41P9209A, V41P9309A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0428-1. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-467
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9045X BASELINE [ ]
0736-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9045
ITEM: L02 BLEED TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (V41T9109A,
V41T9209A, V41T9309A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-468
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9046X BASELINE [ ]
0737-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9046
ITEM: LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD
TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER (V41T9001A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0428-1. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-469
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9047X BASELINE [ ]
0737-3 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9047
ITEM: LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD
TEMPERATURE (V41T9001A)
LEAD ANALYST: W. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
IX]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-470
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(V41T9435A)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9048X BASELINE [ ]
0738-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9048
LH2 HIGH POINT BLEED TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY FMEA 0429-2. BY NSTS-22206,
SECT. 2.3.3.i, THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BY COVERED BY COMPONENT
OR LINE LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FMEA.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-471
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
(V41T9435A)
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9049X BASELINE [ ]
0738-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9049
LH2 HIGH POINT BLEED TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALTY AND SCREENS.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-472
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9050X BASELINE [ ]
0238-6 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9050
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES (LV7,8)
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH VENT PORT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT BASED ON THEIR BROAD
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-473
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9051X BASELINE [ ]
0660-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9051
MAIN ENGINE THRUST CHAMBER PRESSURE METER (Pc)
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: INACCURATE READING.
RI/NASA DELETED THIS ITEM FROM THE CIL BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-474
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9052X BASELINE [ ]
0661-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA _ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9052
LO2/LH2 ENGINE MANIFOLD PRESSURE METER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
IN] IN] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: INACCURATE READING.
RI/NASA DELETED THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION.
IOA HAS NO ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9053X BASELINE [ ]
0720-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9053
LH2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION - SHIFTS HIGH.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-476
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9058X BASELINE [ ]
0740-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9058
GH2 PRESSURIZATION OUTLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0506-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-477
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9060X BASELINE [ ]
0741-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9060
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF THE TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0252-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-478
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9061X BASELINE [ ]
0742-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9061
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, READS HIGH.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-479
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9062X BASELINE [ ]
0742-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
9062
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER MPS-4620 BY IOA. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-480
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9064X BASELINE [ ]
0743-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9064
ENGINE HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0111-I. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-481
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9065X BASELINE [ ]
0744-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9065
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT. FALSE INDICATION WITHIN LIMITS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-482
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9066X BASELINE [ ]
0744-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9066
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRTICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0114-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-483
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9067X BASELINE [ ]
0745-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9067
PNEUMATIC ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, READS HIGH.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-484
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9068X BASELINE [ ]
0745-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9068
PNEUMATIC ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0110-I. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-485
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9070X BASELINE [ ]
0746-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9070
GH2 PRESSURIZATION LINE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0508-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-486
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9072X BASELINE [ ]
0747-2 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
9072
GO2 PRESSURIZATION LINE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0509-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-487
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9074X BASELINE [ ]
0748-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9074
GO2 PRESSURIZATION OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0507-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-488
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9075X BASELINE [ ]
0748-3 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9075
GO2 PRESSURIZATION OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ NA]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-489
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9077X BASELINE [ ]
0749-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9077
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC a B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEAs 0203-1 AND 0256-1.
UNDER NSTS 22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE
LEAKAGE. IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9078X BASELINE [ ]
0749-3 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9078
ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
RI/NASA CREATED THIS FMEA AFTER AFTER THE IOA INTERIM REPORT WAS
COMPLETED. NO CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-491
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9080X BASELINE [ ]
0750-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9080
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0237-2. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-492
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9081X BASELINE [ ]
0750-3 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9081
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[_] [N] [N]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
RI/NASA CREATED THIS FMEA AFTER THE IOA INTERIM REPORT WAS
COMPLETED. NO CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-493
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9082X BASELINE [ ]
0751-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9082
HELIUM INTERFACE PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAEAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0235-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-494
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9083X BASELINE [ ]
0752-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9083
LH2 REPRESSURIZATION REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0633-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-495
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9084X BASELINE [ ]
0753-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9084
LO2 REPRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD PRESSURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF TRANSDUCER BODY.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0604-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-496
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9085X BASELINE [ ]
0754-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9085
HELIUM INTERFACE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0235-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-497
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9086X BASELINE [ ]
0754-3 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9086
HELIUM INTERFACE TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
LOSS OF HELIUM PURGE SHOULD RESULT IN A SAFE MAIN ENGINE SHUTDOWN
(NSTS 22206 2.3.2d). RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. NSTS 22206
2.3.31 REQUIRES FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT OF IR.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT ON THE BASIS OF LOSS OF ENGINE
STARTUP/SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-498
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9087X BASELINE [ ]
0755-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9087
GO2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0509-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-499
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9088X BASELINE [ ]
0755-3 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9088
GO2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] E ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
IOA ACCEPTS THE i/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS.
PROPULSIVE VENTING THROUGH THE OPEN G02 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
MAY, DEPENDING ON PLACEMENT AND ORIENTATION, AID THE TUMBLE
SYSTEM RATHER THAN REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. LEAKAGE OF GO2 INTO
THE DISCONNECT CAVITY AFTER MECO IS NOT HAZARDOUS.
SEE 0513-2.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT AS THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME,
PENDING A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE STATED RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-500
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9089X BASELINE [ ]
0756-2 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9089
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE.
THIS FAILURE MODE IS ALREADY COVERED BY FMEA 0508-1. UNDER NSTS
22206 2.3.3i, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED UNDER LINE LEAKAGE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DELETION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, VIA HIS DESIGNATED ALTERNATE, J. BORCHES,
ACCEPTED THE IOA RECOMMENDATION DURING A MEETING ON 8-30-88.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9090X BASELINE [ ]
0756-3 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9090
GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: PROBE STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
IOA ACCEPTS THE I/i FOR RTLS AND TAL ABORTS.
PROPULSIVE VENTING THROUGH THE OPEN GH2 PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT
MAY, DEPENDING ON PLACEMENT AND ORIENTATION, AID THE TUMBLE
SYSTEM RATHER THAN REDUCE ITS EFFECTIVENESS. LEAKAGE OF GH2 INTO
THE DISCONNECT CAVITY AFTER MECO IS NOT HAZARDOUS.
SEE 0503-5.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT AS THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME,
PENDING A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE THE
FEASIBILITY OF THE STATED RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9091X BASELINE [ ]
0763-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
9091
PNEUMATIC SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL & TANK ISOLATOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ NA]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO DAMPEN STRUCTURAL VIBRATION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-503
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9092X BASELINE [ ]
0764-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9092
HPOT PURGE INSTALLATION VIBRATION MOUNT
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO ISOLATE SUPPLY LINES FROM HIGH ENERGY
VIBRATION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-504
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
MPS-9094X
0766-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
9094
INVAR SPACER
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO MAINTAIN INTERFACE PRELOAD DURING THERMAL
CHANGES.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-505
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
MPS-9095
0767-1
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9095
HEAT SHIELD MATCHED SET
W. J. MCNICOLL
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO PROTECT SSME POWERHEAD AND AFT FUSELAGE FROM
HOT GASES AND RADIANT HEAT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9096 BASELINE [ ]
0768-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
MPS
9096
LH2/LO2 17 INCH MANIFOLD FORWARDSTRUT ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO RESTRAIN MANIFOLD IN Z AND Y VEHICLE AXES.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9097 BASELINE [ ]
0769-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9097
ITEM: WASHER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT"
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO ROTATE DURING BOLT TORQUING.
RI/NASA CREATED THIS CIL AFTER THE IOA INTERIM REPORT WAS
COMPLETE. NO CIL ISSUE•
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9098 BASELINE [ ]
0770-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9098
ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION RETURN SYSTEM 4-INCH
DISCONNECT SPHERICAL BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO ALLOW AND MAINTAIN PROPER ALIGNMENT OF
RECIRCULATION RETURN DISCONNECT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-509
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9099 BASELINE [ ]
0771-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9099
ITEM: LO2/LH2 RECIRCULATION RETURN SYSTEM 2-INCH
DISCONNECT SPHERICAL BEARINGS
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAILURE TO ALLOW AND MAINTAIN PROPER ALIGNMENT OF
PRESSURIZATION DISCONNECT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9100 BASELINE [ ]
0772-1 NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
MPS
9100
LH2 PRESSURIZATION CONDITION RETURN SYSTEM MOUNT
W. J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAILURE TO RESTRAIN LINE ASSEMBLY IN NON-AXIAL
DIRECTION AND MINIMIZE MOVEMENT IN AXIAL DIRECTION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MOUNT
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9101 BASELINE [ ]
0773-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9101
GH2/GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD ASSEMBLY SLIDING
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ NA]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO ALLOW THERMAL EXPANSION/CONTRACTION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
MPS-9102 BASELINE [ ]
0774-1 NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: MPS
MDAC ID: 9102
ITEM: PNEUMATIC SYSTEM CONTROL PANEL 3/8, 1/2 AND 3/4
INCH LINE SUPPORT ADAPTER CLAMP ASSEMBLIES
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAIL MODE: FAIL TO PREVENT LINE FROM SLIDING IN THE AXIAL
DIRECTION OR RESTRAIN THE LINE FROM MOVING IN ANY OTHER
DIRECTION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ / ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
MPS-9103X BASELINE [ ]
0427-1 NEW [ X ]
MPS
9103
LO2/LH2 POINT LEVEL SENSORS AND ELECTRONICS
W. J. MCNICOLL
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ NA]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
MPS-9104X
0431-12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
MPS
9104
GH2 HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
LEAD ANALYST: W. J. MCNICOLL
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION. CLOSED INDICATION FAILS ON.
IOA ACCEPTS THE RI/NASA RESULT.
REPORT DATE 19 SEPTEMBER 1988 C.16-515

SECTION C.17
ORBITAL MANEUVERING SUBSYSTEM
C. 17-1
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-102
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1002-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
102
COUPLING, HELIUM FILL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY CONDITION
OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI
FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN
(DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS DURING
ENTRY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-2
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-III
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1003-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
111
VALVE, HELIUM ISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW). HOWEVER, NASA/RI ADDED "RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON 03-3-1003-2 (FAILS CLOSED). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"RESTRICTED FLOW" BE PLACED ON A NEW FMEA SEPARATE FROM "FAILS
CLOSED", AND THAT THE B AND C SCREENS BE FAILED. A FLOW
RESTRICTION DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE
(FAIL B SCREEN). ALSO, ANY CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT BOTH VALVES
SIMULTANEOUSLY (FAIL C SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH
ONE VALVE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH ISOLATION VALVES ARE
OPEN DURING OMS BURNS (OMS-I AND OMS-2), HOWEVER, THESE PARALLEL
VALVES ARE USED SINGLY FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND FOR OMS BURNS AFTER
OMS-2. THEREFORE, RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH ONE VALVE WOULD BE
DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT SOME POINT DURING A MISSION (AFTER
OMS-2). HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF THE B SCREEN FOR
PHASES IN WHICH BOTH VALVES ARE USED. IOA ACCEPTS C SCREEN
PASSAGE BASED ON THE QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF CONTAMINATION
SUFFICIENT TO BLOCK BOTH VALVES. HOWEVER, ANY UPSTREAM
CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT ALL REDUNDANCY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-3
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II3
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
113
COUPLING-TEST PORT, HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMP_E [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-4
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-II9
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
119
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE
PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
DURING OMS BURNS (OMS-I OMS-2), HOWEVER THE PARALLEL PATHS ARE
USED SINGLY FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND FOR BURNS AFTER OMS-2.
THEREFORE, LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE REGULATOR WOULD BE DETECTABLE
BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION (AFTER OMS-2).
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES IN
WHICH BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-120
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
120
REGULATORASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE
PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
DURING OMS BURNS (OMS-I OMS-2), HOWEVER THE PARALLEL PATHS ARE
USED SINGLY FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND FOR BURNS AFTER OMS-2.
THEREFORE, LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE REGULATOR WOULD BE DETECTABLE
BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION (AFTER OMS-2).
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES IN
WHICH BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-121
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1004-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
121
REGULATOR ASSEMBLY, HELIUM PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL-LEG OPERATION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE
PROPELLANT TANK LANDING CONSTRAINT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
DURING OMS BURNS (OMS-I OMS-2), HOWEVER THE PARALLEL PATHS ARE
USED SINGLY FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND FOR BURNS AFTER OMS-2.
THEREFORE, LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE REGULATOR WOULD BE DETECTABLE
BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION (AFTER OMS-2).
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES IN
WHICH BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-123
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
123
COUPLING-TEST PORT, VAPOR ISOLATION CHECKOUT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-8
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-127
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
127
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH FAILED OPEN VAPOR ISOL VALVE AND SERIES OXID CHECK VALVE
POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE
OMS PROP, OR OXID CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE COULD CAUSE A
HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN THE LINES. FAILURE OF ONE LEG OF
REDUNDANCY (CHECK VALVE POPPET) IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT
(FAIL B SCREEN). FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON
INPUTS FROM J. HOOPER (OMS SSM) ON 5/17/88. THE REGS ARE DESIGNED
TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROP AND HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE
TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME DOES NOT EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP
EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP
EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND WOULD BE DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS.
SSM DOES NOT CONSIDER MIXING OF PROPS A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE
LONG LINE PATHS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF PROP CONCENTRATIONS HIGH
ENOUGH TO CAUSE PROBLEM. SSM AGREED THAT IOA CONCERNS WERE NOT
IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDERS THE PROBABILITY TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY
SMALL". IOA STILL RECOMMENDS IR/3 BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST CASE
EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT. SINCE THESE FAILURES AND
"PROP EXPOSURE" CAN CAUSE IR EFFECTS (SEE 03-3-1003-2,1004-2,1006-
2) THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS IR'S.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-9
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-128
03-3-1006-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
128
VALVE, VAPOR ISOLATION-OXIDIZER
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH LEAKING VAPOR ISOL VALVE AND SERIES OXID CHECK VALVE POPPETS,
THE CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE OMS
PROP, OR OXID CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE COULD CAUSE A HYPERGOLIC
REACTION IN THE LINES. FAILURE OF ONE LEG OF REDUNDANCY (CHECK
VALVE POPPET) IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM J. HOOPER
(OMS SSM) ON 5/17/88. THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH
PROP AND HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME
DOES NOT EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG
FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND
WOULD BE DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. SSM DOES NOT CONSIDER
MIXING OF PROPS A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE LONG LINE PATHS AND THE
CREDIBILITY OF PROP CONCENTRATIONS HIGH ENOUGH TO CAUSE PROBLEM.
SSM AGREED THAT IOA CONCERNS WERE NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDERS
THE PROBABILITY TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS IR/3 BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST CASE EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS
SSM'S JUDGMENT. SINCE THESE FAILURES AND "PROP EXPOSURE" CAN
CAUSE IR EFFECTS (SEE 03-3-1003-2,1004-2,1006-2) THEY SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS IR'S.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-133
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
133
VALVE, QUADCHECKVALVES, FUEL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH FAILED OPEN FUEL CHECK VALVE POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION OF
REGULATORS BY PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS
CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE OMS PROP, OR FUEL
CROSSOVER TO THE OXID SIDE COULD CAUSE A HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN
THE LINES. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT
(FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM J. HOOPER
(OMS SSM) ON 5/17/88. THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH
PROP AND HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME
DOES NOT EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG
FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND
WOULD BE DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. SSM DOES NOT CONSIDER
MIXING OF PROPS TO BE A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE LONG LINE PATHS AND
THE QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF PROP CONCENTRATIONS HIGH ENOUGH TO
CAUSE PROBLEM. SSM AGREED THAT IOA CONCERNS WERE NOT IMPOSSIBLE,
BUT CONSIDERS THE PROBABILITY TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA
STILL RECOMMENDS IR/2 BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST CASE POSSIBLE
EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT. SINCE THESE FAILURES AND
"PROP EXPOSURE" CAN CAUSE IR EFFECTS (SEE 03-3-1003-2,1004-2,1006-
2) THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS IR'S.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-134
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
134
VALVE, QUAD CHECK VALVES, OXIDIZER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
WITH FAILED OPEN OXID CHECK VALVE POPPETS, THE CONTAMINATION OF
REGULATORS BY PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS
CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE OMS PROP, OR OXID
CROSSOVER TO THE FUEL SIDE COULD CAUSE A HYPERGOLIC REACTION IN
THE LINES. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT
(FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM J. HOOPER
(OMS SSM) ON 5/17/88. THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH
PROP AND HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME
DOES NOT EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG
FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND
WOULD BE DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. SSM DOES NOT CONSIDER
MIXING OF PROPS TO BE A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE LONG LINE PATHS AND
THE QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF PROP CONCENTRATIONS HIGH ENOUGH TO
CAUSE PROBLEM. SSM AGREED THAT IOA CONCERNS WERE NOT IMPOSSIBLE,
BUT CONSIDERS THE PROBABILITY TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA
STILL RECOMMENDS IR/3 BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST CASE POSSIBLE
EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT. SINCE THESE FAILURES AND
"PROP EXPOSURE" CAN CAUSE IR EFFECTS (SEE 03-3-1003-2,1004-2,1006-
2) THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS IR'S.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-137
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
137
COUPLING-TEST PORT, QUAD CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-146
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-1205-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
146
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-150
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
150
COUPLING-TEST PORT, PROPELLANT PRESSURE CHECK
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD405, 406, 505,
506) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-i, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO AGREES WITH
NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS
OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA.
THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP
LEAKAGE RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-156
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 156
ITEM: COUPLING-TANKVENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY CONDITION
OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI
FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN
(DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS
OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING IN
CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-165
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
165
COUPLING-PROP TANK, HORIZONTAL DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD479, 480, 579,
580) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-168
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
168
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM TRAP FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD426, 427, 526,
527) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO AGREES WITH
NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS
OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA.
THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP
LEAKAGE RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-171
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
171
COUPLING-TANK ACQ. SYSTEM FILL/VENT PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD421, 422, 521,
522) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO AGREES WITH
NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS
OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA.
THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP
LEAKAGE RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-174
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
174
COUPLING-PROPELLANT, TANK TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD416, 417, 516,
517) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO AGREES WITH
NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS
OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA.
THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS
AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP
LEAKAGE RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-20
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-207
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
207
COUPLING - PROPELLANT LOW-POINT DRAIN
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD469, 470, 569,
570) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-21
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-210
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
210
COUPLING-OMS/RCS PROPELLANT FILL PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY CONDITION
OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI
FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN
(DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT
POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-22
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-213
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2009-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
213
COUPLING - PROPELLANT GROUND-PURGE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD461, 462, 561,
562) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-23
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-231
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
231
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD667, 668) HAVE
BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2001-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI
FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP
SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLED. IOA ALSO AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF
B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)"
BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE
FAILURE MODE A_D IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS, AND POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE RESULTING IN CONTAMINATION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-24
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-234
03-3-2009-1
OMS
234
COUPLING-CROSSFEED DRAIN
C.D. PRUST
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ F ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ NA]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DID NOT APPEAR TO COVER THIS COUPLING ORIGINALLY.
HOWEVER, THE REF DES NUMBERS FOR THIS COUPLING (MD673, 674, 679,
686) HAVE BEEN ADDED TO 03-3-2009-1, PER IOA ISSUE. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY
CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO AGREES
WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET
FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS
FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD
COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT A STATEMENT BE ADDED TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-25
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-248
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4002-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
248
ENGINE INLET FILTER AND ORIFICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE MODE AS A i/I SINCE IT CAN CAUSE A
CATASTROPHIC ENGINE FAILURE. CONTAMINATION OF ENGINE INJECTOR
ORIFICES OR COOLING CHANNELS COULD RESULT IN COMBUSTION CHAMBER
BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/I AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS
ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE WAS DOWNGRADED TO A 3/3 BECAUSE IT IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-4004-2. IOA CONTACTED BOEING
RELIABILITY PERSONNEL FOR A RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF THIS
PRACTICE. BOEING PERSONNEL UPHELD THIS PRACTICE AS VALID, STATING
THAT THIS WAS DONE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CILS. IOA ACCEPTS THE
RULING BY BOEING RELIABILITY, BUT STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THIS
FMEA BE UPGRADED TO A i/I SINCE IT CAN RESULT IN AN OMS ENGINE
BURN-THROUGH AND SHOULD THEREFORE RECEIVE i/i ATTENTION. THE
PRACTICE OF DOWNGRADING A CIL TO A 3/3 BECAUSE ITS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON ANOTHER CIL IS NOT SUPPORTED IN NSTS 22206,
AND IS NOT CONSIDERED A VALID PRACTICE BY IOA. THIS ALLOWS A
FAILURE WITH 1 OR IR EFFECTS TO BE CLASSIFIED AS A 3/3 AND,
THEREFORE, NOT RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO A
FAILURE MODE WHICH EXISTS ON AN INDEPENDENT FMEA SHOULD REFLECT
THE ULTIMATE WORST-CASE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE MODE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-26
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-253
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
253
COUPLING - HIGH-POINT BLEED TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-262
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
262
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURERELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED) AS A I/i SINCE IT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THE BIPROP VALVE HOUSING AND LEAKAGE OF PROPELLANTS. THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE ARE CURRENTLY ONLY ADDRESSED AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-
4001-6. IOA RECOMMENDS A NEW i/i FMEA FOR THIS ITEM AND FAILURE
MODE TO ENSURE THAT THEY RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE BASED ON BIPROP
VALVE BURST TESTS WHICH SHOWED THAT THE BIPROP VALVE SEALS LEAKED
AND FAILED PRIOR TO HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE. THEREFORE,
OVERPRESSURIZATION WOULD BE RELIEVED BY SEAL FAILURE BEFORE
HOUSING FAILURE WOULD OCCUR. ALSO, IOA ACCEPTS THAT THIS FAILURE
MODE IS LISTED ONLY AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-4001-6 SINCE ITS WORST CASE
EFFECT IS BIPROP VALVE LEAKAGE, BUT RECOMMENDS IT BE COVERED
SEPARATELY ON AN INDIVIDUAL FMEA AND CIL TO ENSURE THAT IT
RECEIVES ADEQUATE INDIVIDUAL IR/2 ATTENTION. ALL INDIVIDUAL
COMPONENTS AND FAILURE MODES SHOULD HAVE INDIVIDUAL FMEAS AND
CILS.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-263
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
263
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF VALVE FAILS
OPEN) AS A 2/IR PFP. IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DOWNSTREAM BIPROP VALVE
TO BE REDUNDANT TO RELIEF VALVE IN ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE ARE CURRENTLY ADDRESSED ONLY AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-
4001-6. IOA RECOMMENDS A NEW 2/IR PFP FMEA FOR THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE TO ENSURE THAT THEY RECEIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE SINCE "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" OF
THE RELIEF VALVE IS LISTED AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-3-4001-6. THE
EFFECTS OF "FAILS OPEN" ARE THE SAME AS A WORST-CASE "INTERNAL
LEAKAGE". HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "FAILS OPEN" MODE BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL EITHER AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-4001-6, OR ON
A NEW FMEA AND CIL.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-265
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
OMS
265
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
C.D. PRUST
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THIS VALVE HOUSING ON THE FMEA/CIL. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THIS VALVE HOUSING BE ADDED TO THE OTHER VALVE HOUSINGS
COVERED ON 03-3-2101-1 WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: J. HOOPER (OMS SSM) ACCEPTED THE IOA
RECOMMENDATION ON 5/17/88, AND WILL INCORPORATE IT INTO THE
FMEA/CIL AT THE NEXT REWRITE ACTIVITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-267
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
267
COUPLING- BIPROP VALVE DRAIN/PURGETEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-31
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-273
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
273
COUPLING - BIPROP VALVE DRAIN PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-277
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4507-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
277
COUPLING-OMS ENGINE TRICKLE PURGE PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEAL AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO
THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA
AND GROUND CREWS DUE TO PROP LEAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-287
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4502-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
287
COUPLING-GN2TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY PASSED A SCREEN. HOWEVER, DURING MEETING
BETWEEN IOA AND SSM, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE A SCREEN SHOULD BE
FAILED FOR ALL QD COUPLINGS BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY CONDITION
OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI
FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN
(DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS
A CREDIBLE FAILURE AND IS ADDRESSED ON RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-294
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4511-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
294
VALVE-GN2 TANK FILL/VENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THE REDUNDANCY STRING LISTED UNDER THE "E" EFFECTS BE REVISED.
IOA CONSIDERS THE STRING TO INCLUDE ONLY THE FILL/VENT COUPLING
SEAL AND CAP, ACCUMULATOR, AND OTHER ENGINE. THERE ARE NO
ADDITIONAL REDUNDANT VALVES OR COUPLINGS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA NO LONGER CLASSIFIES THIS AS AN "ISSUE"
SINCE THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. HOWEVER, IOA DOES RECOMMEND
THAT THE REDUNDANCY STRING IN THE "E" EFFECTS BE CORRECTED AS
SHOWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-299
03-3-4503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
299
VALVE-GN2 PRESSURE ISOLATION
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE (FAILS CLOSED) AS A CRIT 1 DURING
A TAL ABORT, BASED ON INABILITY TO COMPLETE ALL ENGINE STARTS AND
PURGES WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED DURING A TAL ABORT. NASA/RI AGREED
TO MAKE THIS FMEA AN ABORT CRIT i, PER IOA ISSUE. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET 0MS-303. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "E" EFFECTS BE REVISED.
THE DOWNSTREAM REGULATOR IS NOT REDUNDANT FOR A FAILED CLOSED ISOL
VALVE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA NO LONGER CLASSIFIES THIS AS AN "ISSUE"
SINCE THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. HOWEVER, IOA DOES RECOMMEND
THAT THE REDUNDANCY STRING IN THE "E" EFFECTS BE CORRECTED AS
SHOWN.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-303
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4503-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
303
VALVE-GN2 PRESSUREISOLATION
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED
FLOW), BUT ADDED IT TO 03-3-4503-2, PER IOA ISSUE. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED FLOW" (ONLY) BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR
PFP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON A SEPARATE FMEA. THE INABILITY TO
DETECT A FLOW RESTRICTION THROUGH THE VALVE UNTIL THE ACCUMULATOR
HAS BEEN DEPLETED AND CANNOT BE REPLENISHED MAKE THE EFFECTS OF
THIS FAILURE THE SAME AS 03-3-4505-2 (2/IR PFP, i/i ABORT). SEE
ASSESSMENT SHEET 0MS-305. THIS SINGLE FAILURE RESULTS IN THE LOSS
OF ONE OMS ENGINE. THE "FAILED CLOSED" MODE IS DETECTABLE AND THE
REMAINING ENGINE START CAN BE SAVED (3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT). THE
DOWNSTREAM REGULATOR AND ACCUMULATOR ARE NOT REDUNDANT FOR THE
"RESTRICTED FLOW" MODE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS IR/2 ISSUE BASED ON THE
QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF A TOTAL FLOW RESTRICTION. EVEN THE
SMALLEST FLOW RATE THROUGH A FLOW RESTRICTED VALVE WOULD ALLOW
REPRESSURIZATION OF THE ACCUMULATOR AND SUBSEQUENT USE OF THE
AFFECTED ENGINE. HOWEVER, A TOTAL FLOW RESTRICTION IN THE
ISOLATION VALVE COULD HAVE THE SAME EFFECTS AS A FAILED CLOSED
REGULATOR OR CHECK VALVE (IR/2).
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-312
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4506-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
312
COUPLING, GN2 REGULATOR TEST PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A SCREEN BASED ON INABILITY TO
VERIFY CONDITION OF CAP SEALS AFTER CAP INSTALLATION. IOA ALSO
AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF B SCREEN. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
"POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
RCS QD COUPLING FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN (DURING FLIGHT)" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS
ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-322
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-4552-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 322
ITEM: GN2 ACCUMULATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RUPTURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i AND
PLACED ON A NEW FMEA, SEPARATE FROM THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE
MODE. NSTS 22206 REQUIRES THAT POTENTIAL SHRAPNEL EFFECTS BE
INCLUDED IN THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT FOR RUPTURE OF NON-
FILAMENT-WOUND PRESSURE VESSELS. SHRAPNEL COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE
TO VEHICLE, TPS, OMS ENGINE, AND PROP LINES.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON ANALYSIS BY
NASA/JSC PRESSURE VESSEL PERSONNEL WHICH INDICATED THAT THIS
ACCUMULATOR IS A "LEAKER" BY DESIGN. THEREFORE, A SHRAPNEL-
PRODUCING RUPTURE IS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
ACCUMULATOR. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT A MATERIAL OR
MANUFACTURING FLAW OR DEFECT, RESULTING IN AN ACCUMULATOR WHICH
DOES NOT MEET DESIGN SPECS, COULD RESULT IN A SHRAPNEL-PRODUCING
RUPTURE LEADING TO VEHICLE, TPS, OMS ENGINE, OR PROPELLANT LINE
DAMAGE. ALSO, NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES SEEM TO REQUIRE THAT THE
"RUPTURE" MODE INCLUDE THE EFFECTS OF POTENTIAL SHRAPNEL DAMAGE
(SECTION 2.3.3.h). THE ACCUMULATOR MEETS THE DEFINITION OF A
PRESSURE VESSEL IN NSTS 22206.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-39
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-330
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
330
VALVE-ENGINE CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE CONTROL VALVE AS A
FAILURE MODE ON A FMEA. 03-3-4001-2 DOES INCLUDE "CONTAMINATION"
AND "PLUGGED OPENING ORIFICE" AS CAUSES, HOWEVER IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT A NEW 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE. IOA CONSIDERS RESTRICTED FLOW TO BE A CREDIBLE
FAILURE MODE FOR COMPONENTS WITH INLET FILTERS OR ORIFICES. THIS
ITEM IS NOT MECHANICALLY LINKED TO THE BIPROP VALVES AND SHOULD
NOT BE INCLUDED ON THE "FAILS CLOSED" BIPROP VALVE FMEA (03-3-
4001-2) .
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE SINCE 03-3-4001-2 INCLUDES
"CONTAMINATION" AND "PLUGGED OPENING ORIFICE" AS CAUSES FOR A
FAILED CLOSED CONTROL VALVE AND BIPROPELLANT VALVE ASSEMBLY.
THEREFORE, THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE IS ADDRESSED ON THE CIL.
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT RESTRICTED FLOW BE ADDRESSED AS A
FAILURE MODE, RATHER THAN JUST A CAUSE, TO ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES
ADEQUATE ATTENTION.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-40
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-342
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
342
PNEUMATIC ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ NA] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (PROP LEAKAGE OR MIXING DUE
TO SEAL FAILURES). LEAKAGE OF PROP PAST BALL VALVE SEALS AND
ACTUATOR SEALS COULD RESULT IN MIXING OF HYPERGOLIC PROPS IN
ACTUATOR CAVITIES OR LEAKAGE INTO THE POD CAUSING POSSIBLE
CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, AND EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 3/IR PFP FMEA BE ADDED FOR PROP LEAKAGE PAST
SEALS INTO THE ACTUATOR CAVITIES. SEAL FAILURES NOT DETECTABLE
DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASE OF THIS
FAILURE MODE IS LEAKAGE OF PROPELLANT INTO THE POD, WHICH IS
ALREADY COVERED ON 03-3-2101-1 (STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE,
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE BIPROP VALVE HOUSING).
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-41
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-363
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6409-1
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 363
ITEM: BEARING-GIMBAL RING
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED
TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-LOOK ANALYSIS BY
IOA INDICATES THAT OVER 3000 LBS OF FORWARD AND AFT RCS PROPELLANT
(IN EXCESS OF THAT NEEDED TO COMPLETE A TAL ABORT) SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE FOR ORBITER ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING A TAL POST-MECO OMS
ET SEP BURN OR DUMP IF THIS FAILURE IS PRESENT. THIS AMOUNT
ASSUMES THAT THE 167 SEC TAL AFT RCS DUMP CAN BE INHIBITED. THIS
AMOUNT OF RCS PROP SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL
DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPERATIONS WITH ONE OMS ENGINE FAILED OUT
OF POSITION. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A MORE DETAILED
ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT RCS PROP
OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM THIS TAL FAILURE SCENARIO IS NOT A
PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-42
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-367
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 367
ITEM: ACME SCREW/NUT TUBE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PPP, i/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED
TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. 03-3-6402-2 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT
DRIVE ASSEMBLY". IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL
FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN
THE ASSEMBLY. FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-
LOOK ANALYSIS BY IOA INDICATES THAT OVER 3000 LBS OF FORWARD AND
AFT RCS PROPELLANT (IN EXCESS OF THAT NEEDED TO COMPLETE A TAL
ABORT) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ORBITER ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING A
TAL POST-MECO OMS ET SEP BURN OR DUMP IF THIS FAILURE IS PRESENT.
THIS AMOUNT ASSUMES THAT THE 167 SEC TAL AFT RCS PROP DUMP CAN BE
INHIBITED. THIS AMOUNT OF RCS PROP SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN
ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPERATIONS WITH ONE OMS
ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE
THAT RCS PROP OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE SCENARIO
IS NOT A PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-43
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-373
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
373
ANTIBACK DEVICE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL
WITH A 2/IR, i/i ABORT CRIT. A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE ANTI-
BACK DEVICE CAUSING THE INABILITY TO TRANSMIT TORQUE AND STOP
ROTATION OF THE UNUSED CHANNEL CAUSES THE LOSS OF THE ACTUATOR AND
LOSS OF TVC FOR ONE ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED
TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS
OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. THE SSM AGREED THAT "STRUCTURAL
FAILURE" SHOULD BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON 03-3-6403-1, HOWEVER
THIS IS A 3/IR PPP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS CIL ISSUE. J. VERNON (OMS TVC
SSM) QUESTIONS THE CREDIBILITY OF A SINGLE ANTI-BACK DEVICE
STRUCTURAL FAILURE WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO BOTH
TRANSMIT TORQUE AND STOP ROTATION. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT
THAT FAILURE MODE IS NON-CREDIBLE. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS THAT A
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE ANTI-BACK DEVICE RESULTING IN THE
INABILITY TO TRANSMIT TORQUE OR STOP ROTATION BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 3/IR PPP, HOWEVER THIS IS NO LONGER A CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-44
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-374
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
374
BEARING-GIMBAL THRUSTDRIVE
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE).
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL
WITH A 2/IR PPP, I/I ABORT CRITICALITY. A STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THIS BEARING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE ACTUATOR DUE TO MISALIGNMENT
AND BINDING OF THE GIMBAL DRIVE OR LOSS OF MESHING BETWEEN THE
GIMBAL DRIVE AND ONE CHANNEL. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED
TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS
OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR, i/i ABORT ISSUE. J. VERNON
(OMS TVC SSM) CONSIDERS THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE TO
BE PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF THE BEARING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
ONE CHANNEL (3/IR), WHICH IS COVERED ON 03-3-6404-1. LOSS OF THE
ENTIRE GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE (2/IR) IS NON-CREDIBLE. IOA ACCEPTS
JUDGMENT OF SSM, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE "STRUCTURAL FAILURE" MODE
BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL AS A 3/IR PPP FOR COMPLETENESS,
HOWEVER THIS IS NO LONGER A CIL ISSUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-45
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-376
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
376
BEARING-SPHERICALROD END
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO
MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS
WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED
TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. 03-3-6402-2 COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT
DRIVE ASSEMBLY". IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL
FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN
THE ASSEMBLY. FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-
LOOK ANALYSIS BY IOA INDICATES THAT OVER 3000 LBS OF FORWARD AND
AFT RCS PROPELLANT (IN EXCESS OF THAT NEEDED TO COMPLETE A TAL
ABORT) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ORBITER ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING
A TAL POST-MECO OMS ET SEP BURN OR DUMP IF THIS FAILURE IS
PRESENT. THIS AMOUNT ASSUMES THAT THE 167 SEC TAL AFT RCS PROP
DUMP CAN BE INHIBITED. THIS AMOUNT OF RCS PROP SHOULD BE ADEQUATE
TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPERATIONS
WITH ONE OMS ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE
PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT RCS PROP OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM
THIS FAILURE SCENARIO IS NOT A PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-46
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-378
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6406-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
378
MECHANICALSTOP-SNUBBER
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SSM STATES THAT CRIT WAS DOWNGRADED FROM 2/IR TO 3/3 AS A RESULT
OF A REVIEW WITH THE VENDOR. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PPP, I/I ABORT AND PLACED ON
THE CIL. IOA MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF A
SNUBBER FAILURE COULD BE BINDING OR JAMMING OF THE GIMBAL OUTPUT
DRIVE ASSEMBLY OR INCORRECT TVC RESULTING IN LOSS OF THE AFFECTED
ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE
CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE
FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE
ABORT. REDUNDANCY SCREEN SHOULD BE BLANK PER NSTS 22206.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE
CONCLUSION OF OMS TVC SSM AND VENDOR THAT A SNUBBER FAILURE COULD
HAVE NO EFFECT AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CLASSIFIED AS A 3/3.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-379
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
379
BEARING-NUT TUBE/OUTPUT SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR PPP, I/i ABORT FOR BINDING/JAMMING OF THESE
BEARINGS, WHICH ALLOW THE DRIVE SHAFT TO ROTATE WITHIN THE
SURROUNDING TUBULAR HOUSING. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED
TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS
OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE
(BINDING/JAMMING) ARE APPARENTLY INCLUDED ON 03-3-6402-2, WHICH
COVERS THE "GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE ASSEMBLY". IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THE COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL
FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE
ASSEMBLY. FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-LOOK
ANALYSIS BY IOA INDICATES THAT OVER 3000 LBS OF FWD AND AFT RCS
PROP (BEYOND THAT NEEDED FOR A TAL ABORT) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR
ORBITER ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPS IF THIS
FAILURE IS PRESENT (ASSUMING THE ARCS DUMP CAN BE INHIBITED).
THIS AMOUNT SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING
TAL POST-MECO OPS WITH ONE OME FAILED OUT OF POSITION. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE
PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT RCS PROP OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM
THIS FAILURE SCENARIO IS NOT A PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-48
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20002X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ATTACHMENT
OMS
20002
GIMBAL RING BEARING, GIMBAL RING/MOUNTING PAD
LEAD ANALYST : C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT ANALYZE THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF A
GIMBAL RING BEARING) IN THE ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. NASA/RI DO NOT
CURRENTLY ADDRESS THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE FMEA/CIL (BINDING OF
THIS BEARING IS COVERED ON 03-3-6409-1). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A
NEW I/I FMEA BE GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. A
STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THIS BEARING COULD RESULT IN DISATTACHMENT
BETWEEN THE ENGINE AND GIMBAL RING OR GIMBAL RING AND VEHICLE,
RESULTING IN LOSS OF ENGINE RESTRAINT AND POSSIBLE VEHICLE DAMAGE
OR PROP LINE BREAKAGE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. DISATTACHMENT OF THE
ENGINE AND VEHICLE DUE TO A GIMBAL RING MOUNTING PAD OR GIMBAL
RING BEARING STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED ON 03-3-
64011-1. THE MOUNTING PAD ASSEMBLY DESCRIPTION ON 03-3-64011-1
INCLUDES THE GIMBAL RING BEARINGS, AND THE CAUSES INCLUDE
"IMPROPER ASSEMBLY" RESULTING IN DISATTACHMENT OF THE ATTACH
POINTS. THIS ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE IOA CONCERNS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-49
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-20005X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20005
VALVE - BIPROP CAVITY PRESSURE RELIEF
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW) IN THE
ORIGINAL ANALYSIS. NASA/RI DO NOT CURRENTLY ADDRESS THIS FAILURE
MODE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A NEW
i/I FMEA. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
BIPROP VALVE HOUSING AND LEAKAGE OF PROP. THE BIPROP VALVE
HOUSING COULD FAIL BEFORE THE BALL VALVE SEALS FAIL AND RELIEVE
PRESSURE. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET OMS-267. IOA CONSIDERS RESTRICTED
FLOW TO BE A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE FOR ALL COMPONENTS WITH
INTEGRAL FILTERS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE BASED ON BIPROP VALVE
BURST TESTS WHICH SHOWED THAT THE BIPROP VALVE SEALS LEAKED AND
FAILED PRIOR TO HOUSING STRUCTURAL FAILURE. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "RESTRICTED FLOW" ALSO BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL EITHER AS A CAUSE ON 03-3-4001-6, OR ON A NEW IR/2 FMEA
AND CIL. SINCE THE WORST CASE EFFECTS OF "RESTRICTED FLOW" ARE
COVERED BY THE "FAILS CLOSED" CAUSE ON 03-3-4001-6, IOA DOES NOT
CONSIDER THIS RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN OPEN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-50
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-20OOSX
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20008
BEARING - SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL WITH A 2/IR PPP, i/I ABORT CRIT. STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF
THESE BEARINGS COULD CAUSE MISALIGNMENT AND BINDING OF THE GIMBAL
DRIVE AND LOSS OF TVC FOR THE AFFECTED ENGINE. THE INCREASED RCS
ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO
TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY
CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. THE SSM STATES
THAT THESE BEARINGS (ON EITHER SIDE OF THE SECONDARY DRIVE GEAR)
ARE THRUST BEARINGS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR, i/i ABORT ISSUE. J. VERNON
(OMS TVC SSM) CONSIDERS THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE TO
BE PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING OF THE BEARING AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
ONE CHANNEL (3/IR), WHICH IS COVERED ON 03-3-6404-1. LOSS OF THE
ENTIRE GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE (2/IR) IS NON-CREDIBLE. IOA ACCEPTS
JUDGMENT OF SSM, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE STRUCTURAL FAILURE MODE
BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL AS A 3/IR PPP FOR COMPLETENESS,
HOWEVER THIS IS NO LONGER A CIL ISSUE. IOA WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM
THAT THESE BEARINGS ARE THRUST BEARINGS.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-51
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-20009X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
20009
DRIVE GEARS, PRIMARYAND SECONDARY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE SSM STATES THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
DRIVE GEARS) IS COVERED BY 03-3-6402-2 (GIMBAL OUTPUT DRIVE
ASSEMBLY, BINDING/JAMMING). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL
FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURE MODES POSSIBLE IN
THE ASSEMBLY. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE
CLASSIFIED AS A 2/IR, i/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO
ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME
RCS PROP REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT. FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA
WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-LOOK IOA ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT OVER
3000 LBS OF FWD AND AFT RCS PROP (IN EXCESS OF THAT NEEDED TO
COMPLETE THE ABORT) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ORBITER ATTITUDE
CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPS IF THIS FAILURE IS PRESENT
(ASSUMES THAT AFT RCS DUMP CAN BE INHIBITED). THIS AMOUNT OF RCS
PROP SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING TAL
POST-MECO OPS WITH ONE OME FAILED OUT OF POSITION. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE PERFORMED
TO ENSURE THAT RCS PROP OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM THIS
FAILURE SCENARIO IS NOT A PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-52
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-20011X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-6402-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
20011
BEARING - ACTUATOR/VEHICLEATTACHMENT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PPP,
I/i ABORT. THE INCREASED RCS ACTIVITY REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN
VEHICLE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO TWO-ENGINE OMS OPS WITH ONE
ENGINE FAILED OUT OF POSITION MAY CONSUME RCS PROP NEEDED TO
COMPLETE THE ABORT. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY
COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL
FMEAS TO PROVIDE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE FAILURES POSSIBLE IN THE
ASSEMBLY.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. A QUICK-LOOK IOA ANALYSIS
INDICATES THAT OVER 3000 LBS OF FWD AND AFT RCS PROP (BEYOND THAT
NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ABORT) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR ORBITER
ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING TAL POST-MECO OMS OPS IF THIS FAILURE IS
PRESENT (ASSUMES THAT AFT RCS DUMP CAN BE INHIBITED). THIS AMOUNT
OF RCS PROP SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN ATTITUDE CONTROL DURING
TAL POST-MECO OPS WITH ONE OME FAILED OUT OF POSITION. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS AND/OR SIMULATION BE
PERFORMED TO ENSURE THAT RCS PROP OVERCONSUMPTION RESULTING FROM
THIS FAILURE SCENARIO IS NOT A PROBLEM.
REPORT DATE: 21 JULY 1988 C.17-53
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-399
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
399
CONTROLLER,REMOTEPOWER"
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN. THIS FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE UNTIL THE ASSOCIATED SWITCH IS PUT IN OPEN POSITION,
BUT THIS CAUSES VALVE TO BE STUCK OPEN. IF THE CREW HAD KNOWN
ABOUT THE FAILURE, THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE THROWN THE SWITCH INTO
OPEN, TO AVOID STICKING THE VALVE OPEN. THEREFORE, FAILURE IS
DETECTED BUT DETECTED TOO LATE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE A STUCK OPEN
HE PRESS VALVE IS PREFERABLE TO LEAVING THE VALVE CLOSED JUST TO
AVOID A STUCK OPEN VALVE. IT DOES NOT MATTER THAT THIS FAILURE
IS DETECTED TOO LATE TO PREVENT THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE,
SINCE THERE MUST BE OTHER FAILURES TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IR
EFFECT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C. 17-54
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/IR IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISO VALVE TO
FAIL OPEN. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY,
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT.
IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NONCIL, AND
TENTATIVELY CONCURS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-450C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253C-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF
RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW.
THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS
WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT
DETECTABLE AND THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-56
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2255-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450F
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-58
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-450G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-59
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-451A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NONCIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-
DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS
WELL PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-60
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-451C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 451
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-61
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/IR IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2007-1, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES TANK ISO VALVE TO
FAIL OPEN. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY,
THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT.
IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NONCIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF
RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW.
THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS
WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT
DETECTABLE AND THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-452E
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-64
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452F
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-65
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-452G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-453A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2253A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NONCIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-453C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2256B-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-454
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS INDIRECTLY DRIVEN BY OMS
HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES
CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL CLOSED. IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B
SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY
ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED
OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND SO THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT
DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE NASA'S
SCENARIO IS WORSE AND THIS ONE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN
COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES, AND SO DETECTING IT VIA
TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS, TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY
LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
IT IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-454A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA
CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS
NOT.
IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NONCIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-454C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF
RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW.
THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS
WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT
DETECTABLE AND THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
OMS-454F
05-6L-2259-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-454G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-454H
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-454I
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 454
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-455A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NONCIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES
THIS FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-
DEMULTIPLEXER (MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS
WELL PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-456
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS INDIRECTLY DRIVEN BY OMS
HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES
CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL CLOSED. IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B
SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY
ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW. THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT
OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED
OPEN DIODE ARE NOT DETECTABLE AND SO THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT
DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE NASA'S
SCENARIO IS WORSE AND THIS ONE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN
COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES, AND SO DETECTING IT VIA
TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS, TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY
LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
IT IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-456A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257A-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY OF 3/2R IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE
FMEA 03-3-2008-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE CROSSFEED VALVE
TO FAIL CLOSED. ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA
CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST BUT IS
NOT.
IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS TO A NONCIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456C
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2257C-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /:R J [ P ] [ P J [ P ] [ 7 *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE MCA STATUS OF
RELAY POSITIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE BY THE CREW.
THEREFORE, "CLOSE" RELAYS WHICH DO NOT OPEN AND "OPEN" RELAYS
WHICH DO NOT CLOSE BECAUSE OF A FAILED OPEN DIODE ARE NOT
DETECTABLE AND THE FAILED DIODE IS NOT DETECTABLE INFLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456F
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2259-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-80
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-456G
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-81
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
OMS-456H
05-6L-2260A-I
OMS
456
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]
IF] [P]
IN] IN]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA' S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-82
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-456I
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2260B-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-83
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-457A
05-6L-2257A-2
OMS
457
DIODE
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[ P ]
[ F ]
[ N ]
B
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVING THIS FMEA FROM THE CIL. ACCORDING TO THE
LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA SHOULD BE IN THE NEW
NASA CIL LIST BUT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS
TO A NONCIL, AND IOA TENTATIVELY CONCURS. IOA BELIEVES THIS
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT, SINCE ONLY A MULTIPLEXER-DEMULTIPLEXER
(MDM) IS BEHIND THE "GPC CLOSE" DIODES, AND THAT IS WELL
PROTECTED INTERNALLY FROM REVERSE CURRENT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE BOTH IOA AND
NASA MADE THIS FMEA A NON-CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-84
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-474
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 474
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 475
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-86
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-476
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 476
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-477
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2004-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 477
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-88
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
0MS-483
05-6L-2131-2
OMS
483
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-89
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 485
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-90
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT :
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOa [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
0MS-487
05-6L-2131-2
OMS
487
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-91
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-92
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 491
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-93
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-492
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 492
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE
"PASS", NOT "NA". THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE SINCE IT DOES NOT IMPACT
THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-94
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-493
05-6L-2126-2
OMS
493
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-95
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 495
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-96
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETEI
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHI_
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE
"PASS", NOT "NA". THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE SINCE IT DOES NOT IMPAC_
THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-97
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-497
05-6L-2126-2
OMS
497
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-98
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-499
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2131-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 499
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-99
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
OMS-501
05-6L-2130-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 501
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
COMPARE [ N /N ]
W.A. HAUFLER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I00
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2131-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 503
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-i01
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-505
05-6L-2130-2
OMS
505
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I02
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
0MS-507
05-6L-2127-2
OMS
507
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-103
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
OMS-508
05-6L-2126-I
OMS
508
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ NA]
[ F ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE
"PASS", NOT "NA". THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE SINCE IT DOES NOT IMPACT
THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I04
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 509
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 510
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
cRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F. IOA'S
CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2007-1.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I06
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-512
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2127-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 512
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS, BUT IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE EFFECTS
FIELD, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH
IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206.
NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON
THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD
INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR
OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING
OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME
EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS
SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND
HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO
THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE
PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF
DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I07
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-513
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 513
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN. THESE RELAYS ARE NOT
STANDBY REDUNDANT TO ANY OTHER ITEMS SINCE THEY ARE NORMALLY
OPERATIONAL. SOME OF THESE RELAYS FAILING HAVE NO IMMEDIATE
EFFECT AND CANNOT BE DETECTED EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS SIGNALS WHICH
ARE NOT READILY USED BY THE CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE. THAT IS,
TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE
"PASS", NOT "NA". THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE SINCE IT DOES NOT IMPACT
THE CIL.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I08
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 514
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I09
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 520
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-II0
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 526
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-III
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079A-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 532
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I12
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 538
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I13
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 544
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I14
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-558
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 558
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I15
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2083-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 564
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I16
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 570
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I17
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 572
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I18
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 578
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AND
CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVE(S), SINCE
THE SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING
WHEN THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S
SCENARIO WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS
IRRELEVANT. A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL
COMPONENTS AND VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST
WHEN THE VALVE MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS
FAILURE DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE
FAILURE. FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS
POWER BY AN ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE
MOTOR AT NO MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-I19
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-580
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2079A-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 580
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-586
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 586
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA
SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST, BUT IT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES
THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS FMEA TO A NONCIL SINCE IT DOES NOT
APPEAR IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST. IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT NASA USE
THE PREVIOUS (LAST AVAILABLE TO IOA) CRITICALITY AND SCREENS
(3/IR PFP) AND REINSTATE THIS FMEA AS A CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE A TOGGLE
SWITCH STUCK IN GPC POSITION IS CERTAINLY DETECTABLE WHEN THE
CREW TRIES TO SWITCH TO OPEN OR CLOSE AND SEES NO RESPONSE FROM
THE VALVE'S BARBERPOLE TALKBACK.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-587
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 587
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-588
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 588
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY, SINCE THE CRIT AGREES WITH
OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2 (CAUSES CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL
CLOSED). HOWEVER, NASA FAILED B SCREEN BECAUSE ONE OF THE TWO
POLES FAILING IS UNDETECTABLE. IOA BELIEVES THIS IS A
CARRYOVER FROM WHEN NASA FAILED ONLY ONE CONTACT SET, AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THIS B SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE B SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS
B SCREEN IS INACCURATE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-I
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 589
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ACCORDING TO THE LAST AVAILABLE NASA CRITICALITY, THIS FMEA
SHOULD BE IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST, BUT IT IS NOT. IOA ASSUMES
THAT NASA DOWNGRADED THIS FMEA TO A NONCIL SINCE IT DOES NOT
APPEAR IN THE NEW NASA CIL LIST. IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT NASA USE
THE PREVIOUS (LAST AVAILABLE TO IOA) CRITICALITY AND SCREENS
(3/IR PFP) AND REINSTATE THIS FMEA AS A CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE A TOGGLE
SWITCH STUCK IN GPC POSITION IS CERTAINLY DETECTABLE WHEN THE
CREW TRIES TO SWITCH TO OPEN OR CLOSE AND SEES NO RESPONSE FROM
THE VALVE'S BARBERPOLE TALKBACK.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-590
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-3
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 590
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND THAT BELLOWS FAILURE SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
AND CRITICALITY THUS REDUCED, SINCE IT CONSTITUTES A "MULTIPLE
UNRELATED FAILURE" WHICH IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF IOA'S
INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206. NASA IS RIGHT THAT THIS FAILURE
COULD CAUSE CONTINUOUS POWER ON THE ASSOCIATED VALVES, SINCE THE
SIGNAL THROUGH THIS ITEM WOULD INHIBIT CLOSING OR OPENING WHEN
THE VALVES REACH FULL CLOSED OR OPEN. HOWEVER, NASA'S SCENARIO
WITH ANOTHER FAILURE CONSISTING OF BELLOWS RUPTURE IS IRRELEVANT.
A BELLOWS RUPTURE ANYTIME EXPOSING ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND
VALVE MOTOR TO PROPELLANT IS SERIOUS, NOT JUST WHEN THE VALVE
MOTOR IS CONTINUOUSLY ON AND HOT. THAT IS, THIS FAILURE DOES NOT
SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE BELLOWS RUPTURE FAILURE.
FURTHERMORE, THE VALVES ARE PROTECTED FROM CONTINUOUS POWER BY AN
ELECTRICAL THERMAL SHUTOFF DEVICE WITHIN THE VALVE MOTOR AT NO
MORE THAN 352 F.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE IOA WILL NOT
DISPUTE NASA'S MORE SEVERE CRITICALITY, AND AGREES THAT B SCREEN
FAILS SINCE BELLOWS LEAK IS UNDETECTABLE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2028-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 591
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLELT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA'S CRITICALITY, SINCE THE CRIT AGREES WITH
OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-3-2008-2 (CAUSES CROSSFEED VALVE TO FAIL
CLOSED). HOWEVER, NASA FAILED B SCREEN BECAUSE ONE OF THE TWO
POLES FAILING IS UNDETECTABLE. IOA BELIEVES THIS IS A
CARRYOVER FROM WHEN NASA FAILED ONLY ONE CONTACT SET, AND
RECOMMENDS PASSING THIS B SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE B SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS
B SCREEN IS INACCURATE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-594
NASA FME #: 05-6L-2027-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 594
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-
3-2007-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE TO
FAIL CLOSED. ALSO, NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G.
TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY.
NASA CONSIDERED ONE POLE TO BE STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE OTHER AND
SO HAD "NOT APPLICABLE" FOR B SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: NASA ACCEPTED IOA'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. A
NASA EPD&C EXPERT AGREED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR A TOGGLE SWITCH
ROLLERS AND SPRINGS TO BREAK AND SHORT ACROSS THE CLOSE POSITION
OF BOTH POLES.
IN FACT, OTHER SUBSYSTEMS' FMEAS ARE USING THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE NASA OMS SSM THEN AGREED TO ACCEPT THIS ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-597
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2027-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 597
ITEM: SWITCH TOGGLE LT/RT
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ClL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA'S RECOMMENDED CRITICALITY IS DRIVEN BY OMS HARDWARE FMEA 03-
3-2007-2, SINCE THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE TANK ISOLATION VALVE TO
FAIL CLOSED. ALSO, NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES (E.G.
TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER CRITICALITY.
NASA CONSIDERED ONE POLE TO BE STANDBY REDUNDANT TO THE OTHER AND
SO HAD "NOT APPLICABLE" FOR B SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: NASA ACCEPTED IOA'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. A
NASA EPD&C EXPERT AGREED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR A TOGGLE SWITCH
ROLLERS AND SPRINGS TO BREAK AND SHORT ACROSS THE CLOSE POSITION
OF BOTH POLES.
IN FACT, OTHER SUBSYSTEMS' FMEAS ARE USING THIS FAILURE MODE.
THE NASA OMS SSM THEN AGREED TO ACCEPT THIS ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-610
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
610
SENSOR TEMPERATURE, FUEL TANK LOWER
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. A TEMPERATURE
SENSOR FAILURE COULD LEAD TO WRONGLY FAILING THE OMS FUEL
PROPELLANT TANK LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHALLOW ATO
BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NO REDUNDANCY AND MISSION
LOSS IMPLIES A CRIT OF 2/2. SEE JSC 20923 PCN-I AND FLIGHT RULE
6-2 AND 6-40K.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
REINTERPRETATION OF THE FLIGHT RULES WHICH IMPLIES THAT ONE
SENSOR FAILING WOULD NOT LEAD TO AN ABORT DECISION. IN FLIGHT
RULE 6-2, IF LOW OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, THEN OMS PROP TANK IS LOST
(BUT NOT FAILED). IN RULE 6-40K, OMS PROP TANK IS LEAK/FAILED IF
PRESSURE (NOT TEMP) IS LOW OR HIGH.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-611
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2803-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
611
SENSORTEMPERATURE,OX LOWERTANK
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IN THE LIFTOFF PHASE. A TEMPERATURE
SENSOR FAILURE COULD LEAD TO WRONGLY FAILING THE OMS FUEL
PROPELLANT TANK LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHALLOW ATO
BEFORE SENSOR FAILURE IS DETERMINED. NO REDUNDANCY AND MISSION
LOSS IMPLIES A CRIT OF 2/2. SEE JSC 20923 PCN-I AND FLIGHT RULE
6-2 AND 6-40K.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
REINTERPRETATION OF THE FLIGHT RULES WHICH IMPLIES THAT ONE
SENSOR FAILING WOULD NOT LEAD TO AN ABORT DECISION. IN FLIGHT
RULE 6-2, IF LOW OR HIGH TEMPERATURE, THEN OMS PROP TANK IS LOST
(BUT NOT FAILED). IN RULE 6-40K, OMS PROP TANK IS LEAK/FAILED IF
PRESSURE (NOT TEMP) IS LOW OR HIGH.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 633
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE FIRST FAILURE'S
EFFECT (GN2 PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK OPEN) IS NOT DETECTABLE, EXCEPT
FOR AN MDM FA3 VALVE POSITION SIGNAL. BUT SINCE FSSRS DID NOT
MENTION THAT SIGNAL, THE IOA ASSUMED THAT THE SOFTWARE DOES NOT
USE THE SIGNAL TO DETECT VALVE STUCK OPEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA THE GNC SYSTEM SUMMARY 2 CRT DISPLAY OR
TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE.
THAT IS, TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 641
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND FAILING THE B SCREEN SINCE THE FIRST FAILURE'S
EFFECT (GN2 PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK OPEN) IS NOT DETECTABLE, EXCEPT
FOR AN MDM FA3 VALVE POSITION SIGNAL. BUT SINCE FSSRS DID NOT
MENTION THAT SIGNAL, THE IOA ASSUMED THAT THE SOFTWARE DOES NOT
USE THE SIGNAL TO DETECT VALVE STUCK OPEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THIS ONE
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT EXCEPT IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER FAILURES,
AND SO DETECTING IT VIA THE GNC SYSTEM SUMMARY 2 CRT DISPLAY OR
TELEMETRY IS ACCEPTABLE.
THAT IS, TIME-TO-DETECT IS GENERALLY LESS THAN TIME-TO-EFFECT.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT IT IS NOT READILY
DETECTABLE BY THE CREW.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-689
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
689
SENSOR PRESSURE, OMS ENGINE REG OUT
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS GENERATING A FMEA FOR THIS ITEM. NASA HAS NO
APPARENT FMEA TO EXPLICITLY COVER THIS ITEM. THE CLOSEST NASA
FMEA IS 03-3-4581-1 FOR "OMS ENGINE PNEUMATIC PRESSURE SENSOR"
INSTEAD OF "OMS ENGINE REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE SENSOR".
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE TURNING OFF
ONE APPARENTLY FAILED OMS ENGINE WILL NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION,
AND THIS CRIT SHOULD BE 3/2R PPP, A NONCIL, AT WORST. THE OMS i,
2, AND DEORBIT BURNS CAN ALL BE PERFORMED WITH ONE OMS ENGINE OR
AFT THRUSTING RCS JETS WITHOUT AFFECTING THE MISSION. HOWEVER,
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM IS NOT DIRECTLY COVERED ON
ANY FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-706
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 706
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-708
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 708
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-710
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 710
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-712
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 712
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-714
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 714
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-715
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 715
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-718
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 718
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE Ii. 5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-720
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 720
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-722
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 722
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-724
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 724
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE
SAME HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS
RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED
LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD
PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-726
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 726
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE ii. 5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-144
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-728
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 728
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-730
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 730
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-146
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-732
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 732
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.SB STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-147
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-734
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDACID: 734
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-148
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-736
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 736
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-149
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-738
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 738
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-150
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-740
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 740
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C. 17-151
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-742
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 742
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-744
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 744
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/1R SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-153
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-746
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 746
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-154
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-748
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2210-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 748
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-846
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2134-2
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 846
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A,B HTR CKTS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-156
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-848
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2134-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: OMS
MDAC ID: 848
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A,B HTR CKTS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-157
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
0MS-850
05-6L-2134-2
OMS
850
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[ F ]
[ P ]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A,B HTR CKTS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-158
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
OMS-852
05-6L-2134-2
OMS
852
RELAY
W.A. HAUFLER
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[F]
[P]
[ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS RAISING THIS CRITICALITY TO 2/IR SINCE THIS
FAILURE IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE
MAY OCCUR BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE
ASSOCIATED HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME
HEATER GROUP WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF TWO OR MORE HEATERS
ON SIMULTANEOUSLY WHEN THE REDUNDANT HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE.
THIS RESULTS IN A TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL
QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F IN APPROXIMATELY TWO MINUTES AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE
FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A & B HEATER CIRCUITS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-159
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-895
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
895
THERMALSWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.LB STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DI F FERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-897
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
897
THERMALSWITCH, LT/RT GSE SERVICE PNL GROUP2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-899
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GROUP 1
OMS
899
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-901
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
GROUP 2
OMS
901
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT KEEL WEB HEATER SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ ] [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-903
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
1
OMS
903
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-905
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
OMS
905
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT LOWER INBOARD Y WEB GROUP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-907
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
907
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-909
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
909
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COMPT GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-911
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
911
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-913
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
913
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT OME COVER GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-915
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
915
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-917
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
917
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT RCS HOUSING GROUP 2
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/1R SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: 0MS-919
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
1
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
919
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-921
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
OMS
921
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER INBOARD Y-WEB GROUP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE ll.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-923
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
1
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
923
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-925
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
2
OMS
925
THERMAL SWITCH, LT/RT UPPER OUTBOARD Y WEB GROUP
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DID RECOMMEND RAISING THIS CRIT TO 2/IR SINCE IT IS ONE
FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, AND DAMAGE MAY OCCUR
BEFORE IT IS DETECTED. FIRST FAILURE RESULTS IN THE ASSOCIATED
HEATER SET FAILED ON. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE SAME HEATER GROUP
WOULD RESULT IN BOTH ELEMENTS OF SOME HEATERS ON SIMULTANEOUSLY
WHEN THE OTHER HEATER GROUP IS ACTIVE. THIS RESULTS IN A
TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING THE POD STRUCTURAL QUALIFIED LIMIT OF 425F
IN APPROX. 2 MIN. AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. NASA'S BASELINE FMEA HAZARDS FIELD PARTIALLY
SUPPORTS THIS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE MORE THAN ONE
OTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO LOSE CREW/VEHICLE. ALSO,
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES THIS "WILL RESULT IN HEATER
BURNOUT", NOT OVERHEATING. HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
CREW WOULD NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THUS IOA
RECOMMENDS A "3/IR PPP", BUT SINCE THIS IS NOT A CIL, IOA
WITHDRAWS IT AS AN ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS COVERING POD AND
CROSSFEED ITEMS SEPARATELY, SINCE THEIR CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE
DIFFERENT.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-926
NASA FMEA #: 05-6L-2031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
926
SWITCH, TOGGLERCS/OMSHEATER LT/RT POD GROUP1
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDED UPGRADING THE CRIT TO 2/IR, AND PASSING THE B
SCREEN. NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE OR CONTACT SET, CONSIDERING
THE OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES
(E.G. TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER
CRITICALITY AND NASA'S FAILED B SCREEN, SINCE ONE POLE MAY BE
UNDETECTABLE, BUT NOT BOTH. THIS COULD ALSO RESULT IN BOTH
REDUNDANT HEATERS FAILED ON AND OVERHEATING.
WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE (IR) FROM LOSS OF
ABILITY TO DUMP PROPELLANT, THUS LANDING HEAVY, SINCE CREW WOULD
NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THIS ALSO COULD
POSSIBLY LEAD TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE OF THE POD.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A,B HTR CKTS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-927
05-6L-2031-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
927
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATER LT/RT POD GROUP 2
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS UPGRADING THE CRIT TO 2/IR, AND PASSING THE B
SCREEN. NASA FAILED ONLY ONE POLE OR CONTACT SET, CONSIDERING
THE OTHER POLE AS REDUNDANT, WHEREAS IOA CONSIDERED THE WORST
CASE FAILURE MODE BY FAILING A PART COMMON TO BOTH POLES
(E.G. TOGGLE LEVER). THIS IS THE REASON FOR IOA'S HIGHER
CRITICALITY AND NASA'S FAILED B SCREEN, SINCE ONE POLE MAY BE
UNDETECTABLE, BUT NOT BOTH. THIS COULD ALSO RESULT IN BOTH
REDUNDANT HEATERS FAILED ON AND OVERHEATING.
WORST CASE EFFECT IS LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE (IR) FROM LOSS OF
ABILITY TO DUMP PROPELLANT, THUS LANDING HEAVY, SINCE CREW WOULD
NOT FIRE OMS ENGINE WITH HOT PROPELLANT. THIS ALSO COULD
POSSIBLY LEAD TO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE OF THE POD.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, AFTER SOME STUDYING
REMOVED THE CONCERN FOR HOT PROP OR STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. ALSO
MALFUNCTION PROCEDURE II.5B STATES "SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF
BOTH A,B HTR CKTS WILL RESULT IN HEATER BURNOUT".
HOWEVER, IOA RETAINS A CONCERN, RECOMMENDING A "3/IR PFP"
CRITICALITY.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-994
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SENSOR
OMS
994
CENTER - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2R).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-994A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SENSOR
OMS
994
CENTER - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-997
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
997
LEFT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2R).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
OMS-997A
03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
997
LEFT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS ll. SA NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-998
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
998
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2R).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-998A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
998
LEFT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1001
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SENSOR
OMS
i001
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2R).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1001A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SENSOR
OMS
I001
RIGHT - AFT FUSLG OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >9OF) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1002
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7801-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
1002
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS II.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2R).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1002A
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-2804-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1002
RIGHT AFT OXIDIZER XFEED LINE TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA ASSUMED NO LAUNCH IF A SENSOR INDICATES CROSSFEED TEMPS
OUTSIDE THE DESIRED LIMITS (<50 F OR >90F) UNLESS SENSOR FAILURE
WAS DETERMINED AND THE RISKS OF LOSS OF DETECTABILITY FOR THE
THERMAL SYSTEM IS EXCEPTED (THIS ENSURES CROSSFEED FOR ABORTS).
WORST CASE EFFECT WOULD BE A FALSE INDICATION OF HEATER SYSTEM
FAILED OFF ON A MISSION CRITICAL CROSSFEED LINE, LEADING TO
DELAYED LAUNCH AND/OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF
INTERCONNECT/CROSSFEED CAPABILITY. THIS IMPLIES A CRIT 2/2 SINCE
NO REDUNDANCY. SEE FLIGHT RULES 6-9A (VS) 6-73D AND MALF. PROC.
OMS 11.5A NOTES 2,3,4.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO
JSC 22206, A DELAYED LAUNCH DOES NOT COUNT AS A LOSS OF MISSION
(CRIT 2).
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-1004
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
1004
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVERTEMP (LT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1006
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1006
FUEL & OXIDIZER FLEX LINE OVER TEMP (RT DECK)
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CA020 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1008
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1008
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER CENTER FEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-IOIO
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
I010
FUEL & OX LOWER CENTER XFEED LINE CONTROL TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* OIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1012
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1012
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER LEFT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, ANDTESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1016
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1016
FUEL & OXIDIZER LOWER RIGHT FEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: 0MS-I024
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
OMS
1024
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
W.A. HAUFLER
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-I026
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
1026
FUEL HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENTID: OMS-1030
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
ITEM:
OMS
1030
L FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I038
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1038
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH ICONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-1040
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1040
OXIDIZER HI PT BLEED LINE T-4 UMB OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-I044
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-7002-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
1044
R FUEL & OXIDIZER LO PT BLEED LINE OVER TEMP
LEAD ANALYST: W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPED POD AND CROSSFEED HEATERS IN ONE FMEA, BUT THEIR
CRITS AND EFFECTS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT, SO THEY SHOULD BE ON
SEPARATE FMEAS. THIS FMEA COVERS BOTH 'CONTROL TEMP' AND 'OVER
TEMP' THERMAL SWITCHES. OVER TEMP IS STANDBY REDUNDANT TO
CONTROL TEMP. SINCE THERE ARE NO TEST POINTS BETWEEN THEM, AND
NO WAY TO ARTIFICIALLY FAIL A CONTROL TEMP THERMAL SWITCH, THERE
IS NO WAY TO TEST ON THE GROUND FOR AN OVER TEMP THERMAL SWITCH
FAILING CLOSED. THEREFORE, IOA RECOMMENDS FAILING THE A SCREEN.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE OMRSD TEST
CAO20 LISTS THEM SEPARATELY AS TESTED, AND TESTED ONLY BEFORE
FIRST FLIGHT. ALSO, EACH THERMAL SWITCH CAN BE STIMULATED
SEPARATELY USING FREON CANS AND HAIRDRYERS OR HEAT GUNS.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/01/88
ASSESSMENT ID: OMS-21001X
NASA FMEA #: 03-3-8001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OMS
21001
DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LEAD ANALYST : W.A. HAUFLER
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID RECOMMEND UPGRADING THIS FMEA TO 2/2, i/I ABORT, THUS
ADDING THIS TO THE CIL LIST. IOA'S CRIT IS BASED ON THE HIGHEST
CRITICALITY OF THE SIGNALS ROUTED THROUGH THE SIGNAL
CONDITIONERS. THESE WORST CASE SIGNALS ARE FROM OMS ENGINE
TEMPERATURE PRESSURE SENSORS (E.G. ENGINE REGULATOR OUTLET
PRESSURE SENSOR; 0MS-689 OR SECTION 4.2.3.B.6). LOSS OF A VITAL
ENGINE MEASUREMENT WILL PREVENT THE CREW FROM USING THAT OMS
ENGINE FOR NONCRITICAL BURNS, RESULTING IN LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE BECAUSE THE EPD&C CIL
ISSUES THAT THIS ISSUE IS BASED ON WERE WITHDRAWN.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988 C.17-200
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